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TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS AND
NONTRADITIONAL CONCEPTIONS: SOCIAL
SECURITY SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS FOR
POSTHUMOUSLY CONCEIVED CHILDREN
Gloria J. Banks*
PROLOGUE: THE HART CASE
On June 4, 1991, a baby girl named Judith Christine Hart was
born to Nancy Young Hart and the late Edward W. Hart, Jr. The
child would never know her father because she was conceived by
gamete intrafallopian transfer three months after his death, as he lay
in his grave.I
Almost one year later, Nancy Hart applied for social security
survivor's benefits for her daughter based upon the earnings of her
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law. The
author wishes to thank the competent assistance and legal research of students
Sandra Thompson, Angela Haynes, and Joan Balderamos. Invaluable com-
ments and review were also provided by Professors Robert Hayman, John Ge-
did, Randy Lee, Anthony Fajfar, and Kevin Hopkins.
1. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 5, Hart v. Shalala (E.D.
La. 1994) (No. 94-3944) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review). For
explanations and discussions on posthumous conception and its treatment by
the law, see Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on
Postmortem Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 HOus.
L. REV. 967, 972-79 (1996); Robert J. Kerekes, My Child... But Not My Heir:
Technology, the Law, and Post-Mortem Conception, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 213 (1996); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, From Cradle to Tomb: Estate
Planning Considerations of the New Procreation, 57 LA. L. REV. 27 (1996);
Laurence C. Nolan, Posthumous Conception: A Private or Public Matter?, 11
BYU J. PUB. L. 1 (1997); Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit Reasons and Means for
Reproduction: On Excessive Choice and Categorical and Technological Im-
peratives, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1127-32 (1996); Helene S. Shapo, Matters
of Life And Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive Technologies,
25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091, 1158-60 (1997); Ellen J. Garside, Comment, Post-
humous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to the Dilemma of the Posthumously
Conceived Child, 41 LoY. L. REv. 713 (1996).
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deceased husband. By opinion letter dated November 17, 1993, the
Social Security Administration denied her claim.2 It determined that
under relevant federal and Louisiana law, Judith was not Edward's
legal child based upon several grounds. First, because Judith did not
qualify as her father's heir for intestacy purposes under Louisiana
law, she could not meet the requirements of the Social Security Act
(Act), which provides that when "determining whether an applicant
is the child... of a[n] ... individual ...,the Commissioner of Social
Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the
devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in
which such insured individual.., was domiciled at the time of his
death."3  Under Louisiana's intestate succession laws, qualifying
heirs were limited to those persons alive at the time of the decedent's
death or born within at least 300 days thereafter.4 Judith failed to
meet either requirement because she was born thirteen months after
her biological father's death. As such, she was not a legal heir of his
estate, 5 and was therefore preempted from qualifying for social secu-
rity survivor's benefits under this provision of the Act.
6
Second, Judith was also legally considered an illegitimate child
because she was born more than 300 days after the dissolution of her
parents' marriage at her father's death.7 As an illegitimate child, Ju-
dith had to prove filiation within one year after the death of her fa-
ther.8 She was unable to meet this time requirement because she was
only ten days old at the time the statute of limitations expired in her
case, no birth certificate was available, and Mrs. Hart was unable to
file a petition while recovering from childbirth.9
2. See Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint at 6, Hart (No. 94-3944).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (1994).
4. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 934, 953, 954, 957 (West 1997).
5. See Memorandum from the Office of the Chief Counsel, Department of
Health & Human Services to Noel D. Wall, Regional Commissioner, Social
Security Adminstration 1-2 (Nov. 4, 1993) [hereinafter Dept. Memorandum]
(on file with Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review).
6. See Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint at 6, Hart (No. 94-3944).
7. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 178-180, 184 (West 1993); id. art. 185
(West 1991); see also Lambert v. Lambert, 164 So. 2d 661, 664 (La. Ct. App.
1964) (stating that the presumption of paternal parentage is rebutted if the child
is born more than 300 days after the dissolution of the couple's marriage).
8. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 209 (West 1997).
9. See Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint at 10, Hart (No. 94-3944);
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Finally, Judith was unable to prove her paternity by showing
that her father acknowledged her, prior to his death, as his biological
daughter either under the laws of Louisiana,' 0 or under other relevant
provisions of the Act." Social Security officials acknowledged that
it was a biophysical impracticality under existing law for Judith to
prove her father's acknowledgment because she was in a frozen em-
bryonic state when he died.
12
The circumstances of Judith's birth had never been contem-
plated by the drafters of the relevant legislation. Thus, extant federal
and Louisiana statutes were ill-equipped to address her nonconven-
tional conception and birth under traditional administrative or juris-
prudential protocol. 13  Judith's conclusive proof of her biological
paternity was the only vehicle providing her a probable constitutional
see also Sudwischer v. Estate of Hoffpauir, 589 So. 2d 474, 476 (La. 1991)
(recognizing an illegitimate child's constitutional right to prove filiation to de-
ceased father); Malek v. Yekani-Fard, 422 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1982)
(holding that an action to prove filiation can be brought before the child is
born).
10. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 6, Hart (No. 94-3944).
Louisiana has at least two means of establishing paternity: (1) showing that
the mother and putative father were married at the time the child was con-
ceived; and (2) showing that the father legitimized the child as his own by ac-
knowledging so in a notarial act. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 184, 185
(West 1991); id. art. 200 (West 1993). The mere placement of the father's
name on the child's birth certificate by others without the father's accompa-
nying signature is insufficient to prove legal acknowledgment in Louisiana.
See In re Wildeboer, 406 So. 2d 687, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1981); In re Succes-
sion of Brown, 522 So. 2d 1382, 1385 (La. Ct. App. 1988); see also LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 203 (West 1993) (defining legal acknowledgement).
11. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I)-(III) (1994), there are sev-
eral ways in which a putative father can acknowledge paternity, such as the
father's written acknowledgment that the child is his own, or a court decree
entered prior to the father's death establishing paternity or ordering child sup-
port on behalf of the child. The only other means of establishing paternity for
purposes of qualifying for survivor death benefits under the Act is a showing
that the deceased was in fact the biological father and that he resided with the
child or contributed to the child's support at the time of his death. See id. §
416(h)(3)(C)(ii). Cf. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635 (1974) (stating
that legitimate children qualify for survivor's benefits even if the deceased did
not live with or support the children at the time of death).
12. See Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint at 5, Hart (No. 94-3944).
13. See News Release from Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Se-
curity at I (Mar. 11, 1996) [hereinafter Chater Statement] (on file with Loyola
of Los Angeles Law Review).
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nexus for securing her entitlement to benefits based upon her de-
ceased father's work history and earnings record.14
At the administrative level, the hearing officer awarded both Ju-
dith and her mother survivor's benefits based upon Judith's biologi-
cal connection with her father.' 5 The hearing officer interpreted evi-
dence showing that Mr. Hart had, on at least one occasion,
contemplated the prospect of his wife's posthumous conception of
his child by artificial insemination, 16 and of his assignment to his
wife of the rights to use his sperm as sufficiently establishing his in-
tent to acknowledge paternity and his support of any posthumous
child resulting from his wife's artificial insemination.'
7
The Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration
overturned the hearing officer's opinion because the officer had
failed to apply proper law. The Council did adopt the hearing offi-
cer's findings that Judith was Mr. Hart's biological daughter, and
that he had donated his sperm to his wife for whatever use she chose
after his death. The Council did not, however, opine that these facts
substantiated a conclusive finding that Mr. Hart intended to father
and acknowledge children posthumously conceived by his wife. The
Council concluded that Judith, albeit Mr. Hart's biological child, did
14. See infra Part IV.
15. The hearing officer relied primarily on Smith ex rel Sisk v. Bowen, 862
F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982)) and
Cox v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1982). These affiliation cases recog-
nized the constitutionally protected right of illegitimate children, under the
United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause, to prove paternity of a
parent within a reasonable time period. The hearing officer also based his de-
cision on his prediction that the highest court of Louisiana would have ruled in
favor of Judith's paternity for intestacy purposes under Louisiana law if the
particular circumstances had allowed her to do so within the one year statutory
time frame. See In re Hart, at 10 (Soc. Sec. Admin. Office of Hearings & Ap-
peals Mar. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Soc. Sec. Admin. Hearings Office Decision]
(on file with Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review).
16. The hearing officer also emphasized the fact that Judith's family and
friends recognized her as Mr. Hart's daughter. See Soc. Sec. Admin. Hearings
Office Decision, at 3. He further stated that "[t]he record indicates that no heir
or legatee who held an interest in the succession of the wage earner would be
reduced as filed to contest or to otherwise oppose the claim affiliation on the
part of Judith Christine Hart pursuant to Article 207 of Louisiana Civil Code
(Rev. 1870)." Id.
17. See id. at 7.
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not meet the threshold statutory requirement of being a child who
was dependent upon her father at the time of his death. 8
On March 11, 1996, before the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, Social Security Commissioner
Shirley S. Chater announced that survivor's benefits would be paid
to Judith Hart upon return of the case from the court to the Social
18. The Council's written decision nicely summarizes ten relationships
which could qualify a child for benefits from a wage earner:
1. A natural legitimate child is a child who was born of a valid mar-
riage of the worker ([42 U.S.C.] section 216(h)(2)(A)).
2. A natural child of the worker who was born outside of a marriage
but the child could inherit the worker's intestate personal property
under State law ([42 U.S.C.] section 216(h)(2)(A)).
3. A natural child of the worker who was born outside of a marriage
but was legitimated under State law by an act(s) of the worker
([42 U.S.C.] section 216(h)(2)(A)).
4. A natural child of the worker whose parents went through an in-
valid ceremonial marriage ([42 U.S.C.] section 216(h)(2)(B)).
5. A natural child of the worker who was born of a void or voidable
marriage ([42 U.S.C.] section 216(h)(2)(B)).
6. A natural child of the worker who was born outside of a marriage
but the worker has either acknowledged in writing that the child is
his son or daughter; or been decreed by a court to be the father of
the child; or been ordered by a court to contribute to the child's
support because the child is his son or daughter; or was either
living with the child or contributing to the child's support at the
time the application for child's insurance benefits was filed or at
the time of the worker's death ([42 U.S.C.] section 216(h)(3)(C)).
7. A child who was legally adopted by the worker. In addition, a
child or grandchild who was legally adopted after the worker's
death by his or her surviving spouse ([42 U.S.C.] section 216(e)).
8. A stepchild if, after the child's birth, his or her natural or adopting
parent married the worker, inclusive of step-relationships created
by an invalid ceremonial marriage ([42 U.S.C.] section 216(e)).
9. A grandchild or step-grandchild if the child is the natural child,
adopted child, or stepchild of a person who is the worker's child
and if the child's parents are either deceased or under a disability
([42 U.S.C.] section 216(e)).
10. An equitably adopted child of the worker, i.e., a child whom the
worker agreed to adopt but no legal adoption actually occurred
([42 U.S.C.] section 216(h)(2)(A)).
In re Hart, at 7-8 (Soc. Sec. Admin. Office of Hearings & Appeals Nov. 27,
1995) [hereinafter Soc. Sec. Admin. Unfavorable Appeals Council Decision]
(on file with Loyola ofLos Angeles Law Review).
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Security Administration. The Commissioner stated that the review
and resolution of the significant public policy issues raised in Hart,
in light of "[r]ecent advances in modem medical practice, particu-
larly in the field of reproductive medicine,.., should involve the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches, rather than the courts."' 9 This Arti-
cle is written in response to Commissioner Chater's plea for the
enactment of such legislation.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article will discuss the legal, ethical and moral issues
raised in the Judith Hart case as they relate to the determination of
paternity and social security survivor's benefits of posthumously
conceived children. The uncertainty of the rights and status of this
newly created class of children is a direct consequence of the ad-
vancements in medical technology that have made tremendous in-
roads in assisted reproduction in the last ten years.20 These inroads
have plagued the legal community with a myriad of novel issues and
controversies that, before this time, could never have been contem-
plated by lawmaking bodies.2 ' The combination of the long existing
process of artificial insemination22 with recently developed repro-
ductive techniques 23 has all but made noncoital human reproduction
19. Chater Statement, supra note 13, at 1.
20. See EUGENE B. BRODY, BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 63-96 (1993) (discussing the impact of reproductive technology on
American and international social and cultural systems as they relate to par-
enting, gender and reproductive human rights).
21. See Lorio, supra note 1, at 27-29, 48-50. Some of these controversies
range from the determination of the legal status of children born from such in-
novative technology and include the evaluation of parental prerogatives such
as custody, paternity, child support and the like. Ultimately, modem repro-
ductive technology has caused the legal community to more closely scrutinize
the meaning, beginning, and ending of human conception, birth, life, and
death.
22. Artificial insemination is defined as "the introduction of semen into the
vagina other than by coitus." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 876 (26th
ed. 1995). Semen which is supplied in artificial insemination by a "donor who
is not the woman's husband" is referred to as heterologous insemination,
whereas homologous insemination refers to artificial insemination which util-
izes the woman's husband's semen. See id.
23. One of the most popular techniques is cryopreservation, which consists
of the freezing of human semen, ova, and embryos at very low temperatures
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
an everyday occurrence. Unfortunately, as seen in Hart, the rapid
growth of this technology has continued to outpace the regulatory re-
sponse of government.
The increase in the use of assisted reproduction is due largely to
the development of the process of cryogenetical "freezing" of human
concepti.2 4 The cryogenetical preservation of gametes grants gamete
providers the luxury of postponing their final decision to procreate to
some later, more convenient and advantageous time. Ultimately,
these processes provide prospective biological parents with the op-
portunity to determine whether or when they would like to partici-
pate in the gestational development of future children. Should a
couple decide to wait until either or both of the progenitors have died
to conceive by artificial reproductive means, the resulting child's le-
gal status may be uncertain, severely limiting any accompanying• • 25
rights based upon the parent-child relationship.
This paper raises the query of whether social security survivor's
benefits should be made available to children who are posthumously
for extended periods of time once extracted from the donor source. See
Monica Shah, Comment, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues
Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED.
547, 550 (1996). Eugene B. Brody also discusses political and social implica-
tions in the development of reproductive techniques such as: surrogate embryo
transplantation, "the removal by uterine lavage of the fertilized egg a few days
after artificial insemination of a surrogate mother, and its transfer to the uterus
of the 'wish mother"'; gamete intrafallopian transfer, "transferring ova and
sperm by catheter to the Fallopian tubes where fertilization may take place";
and in vitro fertilization, "fertilization outside of [the] body." BRODY, supra
note 20, at 90, 93. See infra Part II.A for a detailed discussion and explanation
of these and other techniques.
24. See Shah, supra note 23, at 550. Human conceptus is "[t]he product of
conception, Le., embryo and membranes." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL
DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 377. Human gamete refers to "[a]ny germ cell,
whether ovum or spermatozoon." Id. at 701.
25. See Chester, supra note 1, at 976-79; Emily McAllister, Defining the
Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Reproductive Technology: Implications
for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 55, 95-100 (1994); John A.
Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND. L.J. 1027, 1030-35 (1994);
Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm as Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 57, 62-64
(1995); Lisa M. Burkdall, Note, A Dead Man's Tale: Regulating the Right to
Bequeath Sperm in California, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 875, 883-88 (1995); Garside,
supra note 1, at 713; Sherri Gilbert, Note, Fatherhood from the Grave: An
Analysis of Postmortem Insemination, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 521, 555-58
(1993).
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conceived. This evaluation requires an examination of posthumous
conception, the parental prerogatives related thereto and finally, a
determination of whether Congress ever intended to include such
children as beneficiaries of social security survivor's insurance. In
any event, this evaluation requires an inquiry into whether the inten-
tional or unintentional exclusion of such children is constitutionally
permissible pursuant to principles of due process and equal protec-
tion under the United States Constitution. This Article provides sev-
eral approaches which would alleviate any existing constitutional
impediments by suggesting that the Act be interpreted or amended so
as to minimally afford this newly created class of children the op-
portunity to qualify for survivor's benefits.
Posthumous conception is the beginning of the human gesta-
tional process after the death of one or both biological parents.
26
Employment-related death benefits such as social security insurance,
along with inheritance, are often the primary financial means avail-
able to support such orphaned children. The posthumously con-
ceived child's ability to receive survivor's benefits hinges upon
whether they can prove legal paternity and actual or statutory pre-
sumptive dependency on a deceased wage earning parent.27 The So-
cial Security Administration's first official attempt at resolving this
statutory interpretive issue on behalf of Judith Hart resulted in an ex-
ecutive compromise because the legislature did not enact the Act
with these children in mind.28
A literal interpretation of the Act provides only one plausible,
albeit unlikely, means for most posthumously conceived children to
qualify for survivor's benefits. The Act presumes paternity and
26. See generally supra note 25. For earlier articles addressing the then
novel concept of posthumous conception, see W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in
the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942
(1962); Carolyn Sappideen, Life After Death--Sperm Banks, Wills and Perpe-
tuities, 53 AusTL. L.J. 311 (1979); Winthrop D. Thies, A Look To The Future:
Property Rights and the Posthumously Conceived Child, 110 TR. & EST. 922
(1971) (proposing the enactment of a Uniform Rights of the Posthumously
Conceived Child Act).
27. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY
HANDBOOK 74-75 (13th ed. 1997) [hereinafter S.S. HANDBOOK]; CARLTON D.
STANSBURY, THE FAMILY LAW PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE To SOCIAL SECURITY
9-14 (A.B.A. 1995).
28. See supra Prologue.
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dependency of applicants who qualify as heirs under the intestate
laws of the deceased parent's state of domicile.29  Unfortunately,
only a few states have legislation addressing the inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children.30 Actual dependency can also be
proven by a showing that the child applicant was either living with or
supported by the worker at death.31 Because of the timing of the
posthumously conceived child's conception and birth, they are usu-
ally unable to establish either of these dependency standards.32
Two approaches can resolve this legislative paucity. One ap-
proach is to embark upon a nationwide campaign to adopt a Uniform
Rights of Posthumous Conceived Children Act,33 while the other ap-
proach is to amend state paternity and inheritance laws throughout
the country.34 The latter approach is unlikely to occur in a timely
and uniform manner due to the unique and rather individualized
public policy platforms, legislative reform agendas, and political
climates facing each jurisdiction. This is most evident when consid-
ering the current administrative nightmare Social Security officials
struggle to overcome by unraveling the massive web of inconsistent
state inheritance and paternity laws that are so heavily relied upon in
child survivor's claims.35 The Act's presumptive deference to local
law is no longer an appropriate means in determining the outcome of
survivor's benefits that are provided by a national social insurance
program. 36 A more exacting standard would be for Congress to
amend the Act so that it expressly addresses the relational status of
such children.
37
29. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 495-97 (1976); Haas v. Chater, 79
F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 1996); Wolfe v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1025, 1027 (10th
Cir. 1993).
30. See infra Part II.C.1.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 500-01; Haas, 79 F.3d at 563-65; Wolfe, 988
F.2d at 1025, 1028-29.
33. See Thies, supra note 26, at 922.
34. See McAllister, supra note 25, at 100-12; Garside, supra note 1, at 731-
34.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See infra Part IV.
37. It is possible that nontraditional reproductive activities have caused the
substance of Congress' delegation of administrative power and rule making
authority under the Act to become unintelligible in identifying whether this
January 1999]
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Judicial intervention has helped to establish the legislative intent
and constitutional boundaries of the Act's class restrictive provi-
sions. Historically, the Act has been amended and broadly inter-
preted so as to award benefits to qualified applicants whenever pos-
sible.38  Courts construing the legislative purpose of survivor's
provisions have consistently recognized that:
[t]he expansive inclusion of related individuals illustrates
the Act's goal to help and protect aged and disabled persons
and their families against the financial burden of illness and
old age and helps achieve the [A]ct's goal to keep families
together and to give children the opportunity to grow up in
health and security.3
In light of the current bleak political outlook for the social security
program, this expansive trend may jettison into a more conservative
approach when providing coverage to the families of deceased quali-
fied workers.40
A denial of death benefits based solely on the timing of one's
birth might seem constitutionally impermissible. Survivor's insur-
ance, however, under public employment-related programs like
newly created class of individuals are to benefit from social insurance.
Moreover, congressional action as a source of determinative relief assures the
integrity of democratic representational overtures essential in our country's
political framework. Amending the Social Security Act is also the better ap-
proach in resolving this matter in light of the Administration's preemptive ju-
risdiction over state court decisions. Although the Social Security Administra-
tion must apply the laws of the wage earner's domicile, it is not required to
give full faith and credit to a state court decree deciding the relational status
between the wage earner and a particular applicant. See generally Gray v.
Richardson, 474 F.2d 1370 (6th Cir. 1973) (holding that the Social Security
Administration should have followed the state court determination that the de-
ceased was the father of plaintiff's daughter).
38. See STANSBURY, supra note 27, at 2.
39. See id. at 14. See generally Mathews, 427 U.S. at 495 (discussing the
statutory classification of children entitled to survivor's benefits).
40. See SHERYL R. TYNES, TURNING POINTS IN SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM
"CRUEL HOAX" TO "SACRED ENTITLEMENT" 155-93 (1996); SOCIAL
SECURITY'S LOOMING SURPLUSES: PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATION (Carolyn L.
Weaver ed., 1990); see also Teresa Tritch, Cast Your Vote On Social Security,
MONEY, Dec. 1996, at 96 (stating that "[a]ccording to a 1996 report of the So-
cial Security Trustees, starting in just 16 years-2012-the taxes paid into So-
cial Security will no longer cover the benefits going out, as millions of baby
boomers begin retiring").
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
social security and worker's compensation, is conceptually different
than benevolent government funded public welfare programs which
aid all qualified, needy families.41 The Supreme Court has inter-
preted the legislative intent of survivor's benefits as simply to re-
place "lost" income the child would have continued to receive but for
the death of the wage earner.42 This interpretation has led to the un-
derstanding that "Congress is not obligated to provide benefits for
every individual who might conceivably have been dependent on the
wage earner for support."
43
Amending the Act requires adherence to extant constitutional
parameters set by the Supreme Court in cases dealing with the classi-
fication of children based upon their relational status with a parent.
44
41. See STANSBURY, supra note 27, at 2.
42. See Garner v. Richardson, 333 F. Supp. 1191, 1195-96 (N.D. Cal.
1971).
43. Id.
44. See Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 93, 105-13 & n.35 (discussing in detail three ma-
jor Supreme Court Cases addressing the inheritance rights of nonmarital chil-
dren). The three cases discussed by Brashier, Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852
(1986), Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (plurality opinion), and Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), all dealt with state statutes which limited the
rights of nonmarital children from inheriting from their biological fathers' es-
tates under intestate laws. The author provides a chronological listing of the
twelve cases leading up to these three. Of the twelve listed, five cases were
social security-related cases which will be addressed later in this Article.
Cases based upon claims against the constitutionality of the Act as applied to
illegitimate children are as follows: Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d
300 (5th Cir. 1973); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md. 1972),
aft'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.
1972), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
A number of other constitutional issues involved in determining the legal
status and entitlement rights of posthumously conceived children will not be
addressed in this Article. Potential progenitors argue that their decision to pro-
create by artificial means, even after death, is an exercise of their constitution-
ally protected liberty interests and choices in private matters concerning the
family. This raises the issue of whether there is a constitutional right to trans-
mit ones' gametes after death. See Chester, supra note 1, at 979-82; Shapiro,
supra note 1, at 1127-29. This then raises the unique question of whether such
fundamental rights should be afforded protection beyond a person's lifetime in
the context of posthumous conception. It is unlikely that the Supreme Court
will recognize the protection of so-called postmortem fundamental privacy
rights in dead persons. Instead, mainstream constitutional discourse should fo-
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Equal protection guarantees under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion,45 restrict Congress and states from making or enforcing laws
that treat similarly situated individuals differently based upon the
circumstances of their birth, such as the timing,4 6 the reproductive
technique employed,47 and the marital status of the progenitors.48
Posthumously conceived children are de facto nonmarital children
because their parents' marital union dissolves at either spouse's
death.49  Equal protection concerns are clearly implicated in at-
tempting to make such class-based determinations under the Act.
50
There are, however, interposed socio-political ramifications inherent
in considering whether congressional actions are constitutionally
permissible.
American jurisprudential history and cultural traditions have
often played pivotal roles in determining the constitutionality of laws
that have class-based restrictive provisions. 51 Over the past twenty
years, the legal system has slowly overturned impermissible dis-
criminatory laws motivated by institutionalized traditional bias
against nonmarital children, mandating that they be accorded the
cus primarily on the affected rights of survivors such as the after-conceived
child, the conceptus recipient, the intended custodial parents, and other sur-
viving relatives.
Posthumous conception also calls forth the controversy of whether the
right to inherit and transmit one's property after death is a civil or natural right.
In the rather obscure 1987 case of Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), the
Supreme Court embraced the concept that the nature of inheritance implicates
some constitutional safeguards. Should inheritance rights gamer further con-
stitutional kinship in future decisions, states' ability to forestall inheritance
rights of after-conceived children will be greatly impeded. Statutorily created
probate time restrictions based upon a state's interest in the orderly distribution
of the intestate estates of dead persons may no longer past constitutional mus-
ter. See Chester, supra note 1, at 979-82; Nolan, supra note 1, at 14-19.
45. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
46. See Garside, supra note 1, at 717-23.
47. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 1099-1100.
48. See Gilbert, supra note 25, at 539-40.
49. See infra Part IV.B.l.b.iii.
50. See generally Brashier, supra note 44, at 105-13 (providing a brief his-
tory of modem Supreme Court cases challenging discrimination against non-
marital children).
51. See infra Part IV.C.4.
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same rights, benefits and legal status as marital children.1
2 All juris-
dictions now provide some statutory means of establishing paternity
and inheritance rights of nonmarital children born or conceived prior
to the death of a putative parent.
53
Posthumously conceived children are a newly created class of
nonmarital children whose rights, entitlements, and status remain un-
settled.54 As tradition would have it, these children are conceived by
nonconventional reproductive techniques and practices which have
no history in the archives of normative familial or procreative infra-
structures. Assuring the equal protection of laws for such after-
conceived children may therefore necessitate progressive judicial ac-
tivism premised on moral and ethical principles of fair treatment.
55
Otherwise, it would seem pragmatic to simply statutorily extend sur-
vivor's benefits to a qualifying, deceased worker's surviving chil-
dren, irrespective of the parent's reproductive choice or marital
status.5 6 Unfortunately, posthumously conceived children, like
52. See Brashier, supra note 44, at 105-13.
53. See id.; see also Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (discussing
the Illinois statute giving legitimate status to illegitimate children who are ac-
knowledged by their fathers after their parents inter-marry).
54. In both Hart v. Shalala (E.D. La. 1994) (No. 94-3944) and Hecht v. Su-
perior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993), the courts
never reached the determination of what the paternity status of the respective
posthumously conceived children would be to their predeceased parents for in-
heritance and social security survivorship insurance purposes. Only a few
courts have addressed these issues as they apply to after-conceived children.
Neither Congress, nor any judicial body, has directly addressed the paternity
status and resulting entitlement rights of this emerging class of children.
55. See infra Part IV.B.
56. Under section 4 of the Uniform Parentage Act, a presumption of pater-
nity arises for children who are born within 300 days after the death of a puta-
tive parent who was married to the mother of the child at death. See UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 4(a)(1), 9B U.L.A. 298 (West 1987). All states have
statutorily recognized the paternity of children who are conceived prior to a
parent's death, but born within at least 280 days thereafter. For a list of state-
wide statutes which provide for the traditional posthumous child and other
qualified relatives who are conceived prior to the decedent's death, but born
alive thereafter, see Nolan, supra note 1, at 30 n.179. The author also identi-
fies the survivorship benefits which are available to the traditional posthumous
child under state worker's compensation laws. See Nolan, supra note 1, at 29
n.177. See also Byerly v. Tolbert, 108 S.E.2d 29 (N.C. 1959) (discussing
whether a child in gestation for over 10 months and born 322 days after the
death of the father was the legal child of the deceased). Virtually every state
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Judith Hart, are practically unable to establish their requisite legal
status under the Act.57 The very nature of posthumous conception
has created this legal vacuum. Who would think that individuals
would ever desire or be able to conceive a child from the grave?
Laws simply have not kept up with medical technology and ever-
changing public sentiment. Yet, posthumous conception is not just a
technological mishap with a dim and bleak future. In an age of hu-
man cloning,58 abortion by pill,59 wombs for rent,60 and even male
birth moms,61 posthumous conception may represent only a glimpse
of the legislative challenges on the horizon. Perhaps the greatest feat
will be to reconcile socio-political agendas while balancing tradi-
tional family constructs with emerging nontraditional expressions of
individual liberty within familial associations.
has also enacted pretermitted heir statutes which permit children born or
adopted after the execution of a decedent's will to take a share of the estate.
See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-302, 8 U.L.A. 135 (West 1998).
57. See infra Part IV.
58. See generally Stephen A. Newman, Human Cloning and the Family:
Reflections on Cloning Existing Children, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 523
(1997) (discussing the impact of clonal reproduction on the familial infra-
structure).
59. See REBECCA CHALKER & CAROL DOWNER, A WOMAN'S BOOK OF
CHOICES: ABORTION, MENSTRUAL EXTRACTION, RU-486, at 207-20 (1992)
(discussing the French abortifacient drug, RU-486 also known as mifepristone,
the first in a new category of drugs called antiprogestins which, among other
actions, interfere with the production of progesterone, the hormone that sup-
ports and nurtures pregnancy). The identification and development of RU-486
began as early as 1968, but has yet to receive world-wide approval, especially
in the United States. See id. at 213. See also ETIENNE-EMILE BAULIEU, THE
"ABORTION PILL" RU-486: A WOMAN'S CHOICE 126-55 (1990) (providing a
historical and political overview of the abortion pill in the United States).
60. See generally BRODY, supra note 20, at 90-91 (discussing surrogacy
motherhood relationships where a noncustodial woman serves as a gestational
host for an infertile couple). The womb for rent process may include artificial
insemination of the surrogate with sperm from the custodial father or from a
donor. See id. In vitro fertilization and embryo transfer are used to accom-
plish a true "womb rental" where the test tube fertilized embryo of the custo-
dial parents is transferred directly into the womb of the host surrogate. See id.
Since 1978, over 20,000 live births have resulted from such technology. See
id.
61. See generally Celestine Bohlen, Almost Anything Goes in Birth Science
in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1995, at A14 (discussing the theoretical possibil-
ity of male pregnancy).
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This Article will begin by describing, in rather technical terms,
the medical technology and biophysical qualities of human repro-
duction which make posthumous conception possible.62 Some rather
intriguing uncertainties arise from society's use of reproductive tech-
niques, requiring the reconsideration of once universally-settled law,
such as whether a birth mother is a child's legal mother.63 Similar
issues were implicated in determining Judith Hart's paternity, in-
heritance rights, and her survivor's benefits.64 This Article will also
discuss the following two queries resonating in Judith's posthumous
conception: (1) the determination of her legal status as frozen human
concepti prior to implantation;65 and (2) the assignment of parental
prerogatives to progenitors, such as her mother, who decide to pro-
create posthumously. 66 These issues will be explored as addressed in
prevailing jurisprudential fora and as implicated in the Act's evolv-
ing definition of "children" and qualifying familial relationships.
Although significant legal discourse exists regarding inheritance
rights of posthumously conceived children, scholars have only re-
cently begun to consider whether such children should be entitled to
survivor's insurance. 67 The Judith Hart case prompted a reevaluation
of the legislative intent behind survivor's benefits in social security
legislation.68 Historically, courts interpreted the legislative purpose
as purely humanitarian, aimed to support surviving children who
were "dependent" upon the wage earner at the time of his death. 69 It
must now be determined whether posthumously conceived children
are capable of being "dependent" upon a predeceased parent.70 Thus,
62. See infra Part II.A.
63. See generally Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 494 (1993) (holding that a surrogate mother, although the child's birth
mother, was not the legal mother of the child).
64. See infra Part II.C.
65. See infra Part II.C.
66. See infra Part II.C.
67. See supra note 1.
68. See id.
69. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634-35 (1974) (recognizing
that the purpose of awarding social security survivorship benefits is to provide
financial support for children who were dependent upon the deceased wage
earner at his or her death).
70. The tests most often used to establish dependency require a showing
that the deceased parent was living with the child claimant at his or her death
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the historical and political framework of social security in this coun-
try will be explored in order to understand the executive and con-
gressional sentiment which motivated the Act's adoption sixty years
ago.7 1 Next, existing social security programs will be examined gen-
erally to foster a contextual understanding of survivor's benefits. Fi-
nally, child survivor's insurance will be explored in greater detail to
determine whether children conceived posthumously should be in-
cluded in the class of survivor beneficiaries.
There are three approaches to addressing the posthumously con-
ceived child's status under social security. The course of least resis-
tance in maintaining the traditional status quo is simply to do noth-
ing. This means that certain laws will soon be outdated in their
ability to govern the legal conduct of the polity they were enacted to
regulate. Such "slouching off' by elected legislative officials in tra-
ditional areas of immense public concern, such as procreation and
or a showing that the deceased parent supported the child during the deceased
parent's life. See infra Part IV.B.l.b.iii. The dependency requirement under
social security legislation is representative of the legislative intent supporting
other types of employment-related child survivorship benefits under Veteran's
Administration and Worker's Compensation legislation. See infra Part
V.B.1.b.iii. The postmortem determination of a child's legal paternity for pur-
poses of proving dependency is also critical in assuring that the child is pro-
vided the greatest degree of financial support from various sources based upon
the lifetime activities of a predeceased, putative parent. See generally Sondra
S. v. Jay 0., 482 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (Fam. Ct. 1984) (holding that a paternity
proceeding in New York was the appropriate forum to determine fatherhood by
a predeceased man). The Sondra S. court explained its decision by stating that:
[t]he purpose of paternity proceedings has traditionally been 'to insure
support for the child born out of wedlock and to provide a procedure
for the government to obtain indemnification for the expense of sup-
porting the child.'. . . While an order of filiation does not confer the
status of legitimacy, it serves as a foundation upon which certain
rights, interests and obligations of all parties may be based.... An
order of filiation determines rights of inheritance; the right to recover
benefits under the New York Workers' Compensation Law, the Veter-
ans' Benefits Act, and the Social Security Act; the right to recover
serviceman's life insurance proceeds and a military allowance, the
right to notice in adoption proceedings; and under the Family Court
Act, the right to support by parents, custody or visitation, and an order
of protection.
Id. (citations omitted).
71. See infra Part III.
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familial relationships, threatens to undermine the majoritarian virtues
of democracy.
A second approach calls forth judicial activism to reinterpret the
congressional intent in enacting survivor's insurance so as to expand
its coverage to all children who suffer financial loss due to the death
of a parent who has made qualified payments into the program.
72
Enlisting courts to serve in this capacity may, however, have the
counter-majoritarian effect of usurping public opinion and desires in
areas typically reserved for deliberation in legislative representa-
tional forums.73  Foremost, however, unleashed judicial restraint
upon the wrong court or bench at the wrong time may result in an
unpopular outcome which is the sole product of a judge's own indi-
vidual bias and preferences.
This Article promotes congressional response as the final and
more workable approach in resolving the issues posed by Hart. The
Act regulates a national insurance program created by Congress to
promote the ongoing health and welfare of workers and their families
by providing supplemental support upon their retirement, disability,
or death. No local governing body or other branch of government
should speak on behalf of Congress in matters so deeply immersed
within its constitutionally derived authority. This Article suggests a
reasonable approach in filling the posthumous conception legislative
gap by urging Congress to enact an expanded view of dependency, as
either a constructive or prospective determination.74 This approach
more properly reflects the reproductive choices of parents who elect
to conceive through modem day assisted reproduction.
II. MEDICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL STRATI IMPLICATED IN
POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION
A. An Overview ofAssisted Reproductive Technology
Advancements in reproductive technology have consistently
challenged traditional legal concepts governing the human gesta-
tional process. 75  Assisted reproduction has become a viable
72. See infra Part IV.C.
73. See infra Part IV.C.
74. See infra Part V.
75. See BRODY, supra note 20, at 83.
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alternative for many infertile couples seeking to have children of
their own.76 In the United States alone, an estimated 2.3 million
couples seek help for infertility every year.77 It has been reported
that at least 40,000 of these infertile couples employ some type of as-
sisted reproduction technique. 78 The use of these techniques is on
the rise. In 1985, there were 3,921 in vitro fertilization procedures
performed in the United States.79 By 1993, the number had risen to
31,900.80 As the ranks of infertile couples grow steadily, they are
also joined by fertile couples who decide, for whatever reason,
against traditional coital reproduction.
81
It is essential to review the physiology of human gametes in or-
der to understand the process of posthumous conception and to fully
grasp the extent to which assisted reproductive techniques have pro-
gressed in recent years. The utilization of such techniques for repro-
duction purposes has led to problems in determining whether one's
biological connection to a child is determinative in parental contro-
versies. Courts often rely upon the biophysical characteristics of
human gametes as well as upon the stage and manner of conception
and the gestational processes in resolving the rather novel parental
76. See id. Infertile couples are couples who have been unable to conceive
a child after at least twelve months of sexual intercourse without the use of
contraceptives or other natural pregnancy prevention methods. See id.
77. See Sharon Begley, The Baby Myth, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 4, 1995, at 38,
41. The percentage of childless, infertile couples is expected to continue in-
creasing as it has over the last thirty years. See id. at 40. This increase has
been due largely to delayed birth decisions and the increase in sexually-
transmitted diseases. See id. Male infertility may be caused by affective dis-
eases, excessive temperature of the testes, cryptorchidism (failure of a testis to
descend from the abdomen into the scrotum), low sperm count, sperm mor-
phology (physical abnormalities), and sperm motility (inability to move into
the uterine cavity). See ARTHUR C. GuYTON, M.D., TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL
PHYSIOLOGY 889-90 (8th ed. 1991). "Approximately 1 out of every 6 to 8
marriages is infertile; in about 60 percent of these, the infertility is due to fe-
male sterility." Id. at 913. Some of the causes of female infertility include the
lack of ovulation, salpingitis (inflammation of the fallopian tubes), and abnor-
malities in the cervix. See id.
78. See Begley, supra note 77, at 41.
79. See id. at 40.
80. See id.
81. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275
(1993) (discussing how an otherwise fertile man sought to have his sperm fro-
zen and stored for future use by a surviving girlfriend after his death).
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complexities resulting from nontraditional reproduction.81 Thus, this
overview may help to further explicate the judicial reasoning of as-
sisted reproductive cases discussed in this Article.
Prior to conception, human gametes consist of the female egg
and male sperm.83 Spermatogenesis, the production of sperm, begins
at age thirteen in the typical male adolescent and continues until
death.84 It takes an average of seventy-four days to form a single
mature sperm during this process. 8 5 Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injec-
tion (ICSI)86 or Nonsurgical Sperm Aspiration 87 may be used to
82. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592-94 (Tenn. 1992) (evaluating
the cell-stage development of human gametes for the purpose of determining
the distribution of a couple's previously frozen embryos in a divorce settlement
case). See also Kass v. Kass, No. 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368, at *1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995) (stating that, in a divorce action, "the starting point of
any discussion of the parties' rights must be a categorization of the nature of
the zygotes," to determine the distribution of the couple's frozen pre-embryos).
83. "Sperm," also referred to as "spermatozoon" or "semen" is defined as
"[t]he male gamete or sex cell that contains the genetic information to be
transmitted by the male, exhibits autokinesia, and is able to effect zygosis with
an ovum. The human s[perm] is composed of a head and a tail, the tail being
divisible into a neck, a middle piece, a principal piece, and an end piece; the
head, 4 to 6 gim in length, is a broadly oval, flattened body containing the nu-
cleus; the tail is about 55 pim in length." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY,
supra note 22, at 1644-45. "Egg," also referred to as "ovum," "oo-
cyte"(immature ovum) or "ova" (plural of ovum) is characterized as "[t]he fe-
male sex cell. When fertilized by a spermatozoon, an o[vum] is capable of de-
veloping into a new individual ... ; during maturation, the o[vum], like the
spermatozoon, undergoes a halving of its chromosomal complement so that, at
its union with the male gamete, the species number of chromosomes (46 in
humans) is maintained." Id. at 1275.
84. See GUYTON, supra note 77, at 885.
85. See id. at 886.
86. ICSI involves the use of a microscopic pipette to inject a single sperm
from a man's ejaculate into an egg. The zygote is then returned to the uterus.
Doctors perform approximately 1,000 of these procedures per year, with a 24
percent success rate, at a cost of $10,000 to $12,000 per attempt. See Begley,
supra note 77, at 41. This process helps sluggish or low count sperm and is
often used in conjunction with the latest technique of nonsurgical sperm aspi-
ration, which removes immature sperm from male testes with a thin needle.
See Gina Kolata, Revolution in Treating Infertile Men Turns Hopelessness to
Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1995, at C8.
87. The latest use of this technique has gone as far as removing immature
sperm from male testes with a thin needle and fertilizing an egg with a single
sperm. "Even men who have no sperm at all or only dead sperm in their
ejaculate or men whose sperm cannot swim or cannot penetrate an egg may be
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extract either mature sperm from the male ejaculate or immature
sperm directly from the male testes for use in artificial insemina-
tion.88 Although the fertilization of an oocyte requires the penetra-
tion by only one sperm during sexual intercourse, a single ejaculate
89
could contain more than 400 million sperm.
90
The average life span of expelled sperm depends largely upon
the temperature to which it is exposed. Upon ejaculation, at normal
body temperature, sperm can last between twenty-four and forty-
eight hours.91 At freezing temperatures as low as minus 100 degrees
Celsius, sperm can be stored in a frozen state for ten years or more.02
The process of cryopreservation, with the use of liquid nitrogen,
permits this long term storage of sperm.
93
The female human body does not produce ova during the fe-
male's post-birth lifetime. Oogenesis, the formation of ova, takes
place during the fetal development of the female fetus. "At the thir-
tieth week of gestation, the number of ova reaches about 6 million; ..
about 1 million are present in the two ovaries at birth, and only
300,000 to 400,000 at puberty. 94 A woman's normal reproductive
capability begins at the onset of her monthly menstrual cycle, which
normally occurs, during puberty, between the ages of eleven and
sixteen.
95
On the fourteenth day of the typical woman's cycle, ovulation
facilitates the expulsion of one ovum, usually, from the ovarian
helped [by this procedure]." Kolata, supra note 86, at C8.
88. See Begley, supra note 77, at41.
89. An ejaculate consists of semen, which "is composed of the fluid and
sperm from the vas deferens.. ., fluid from the seminal vesicles.. ., fluid from
the prostate gland. . ., and small amounts from the mucous glands.... [T]he
bulk of the semen is seminal vesicle fluid, which is the last to be ejaculated and
serves to wash the sperm out of the ejaculatory duct and urethra." GUYTON,
supra note 77, at 888.
90. See id. at 890. An ejaculate must usually contain more than 20 million
sperm in order to penetrate the oocyte for fertilization. See id. Male infertility
is often associated with a sperm count at or below this level. See id. at 889-90.
91. See id. at 888.
92. See id.
93. See Shah, supra note 23, at 550.
94. GUYTON, supra note 77, at 899.
95. See id. at 900. The normal range of the female sexual cycle is 28 days;
irregularities in the length of the cycle may cause infertility. See id.
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follicle into the uterus.9 6 Pregnancy occurs if the ovum is fertilized
by at least one vital sperm present in the uterine cavity.97 The fertil-
ized ovum then implants itself onto the uterine wall for fetal devel-
opment within twenty-four hours after its expulsion from an ovary.
98
Thus, in any given month, there are only one to three days during
which a typical pregnancy can occur.
9 9
The use of fertility drugs and assisted reproductive techniques
have permitted physicians to manipulate this time frame and to ex-
pand the number of pregnancies that can occur in a woman in any
given month. 100 The process of ovum aspiration is used to retrieve
multiple eggs directly from the ovaries by using a hollow needle
guided by an ultrasound image.' 0 ' The micromanipulation of oo-
cytes facilitates the in vitro fertilization (IVF)10 2 of any such re-
trieved oocytes with sperm through reproductive techniques such as
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection'03 and Nonsurgical Sperm Aspira-
tion.10 4 Upon the laboratory fertilization of gametes in petri dishes,
either Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer (GIFT), 05 Zygote Intrafallo-
pian Transfer (ZIFT),106 or Surrogate Embryo Transplantation, 0 7 can
96. See id. at 899.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 899-903.
99. See id. at 912.
100. See Gina Kolata, Harrowing Choices Accompany Advancements in
Fertility, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1998, at F3.
101. See Shah, supra note 23, at 549-50.
102. In vitro fertilization involves combining an egg and sperm (forming an
embryo) in a laboratory dish. See BRODY, supra note 20, at 90-92.
103. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
105. Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer involves the use of a laparoscope to in-
sert eggs and sperm directly into a woman's fallopian tube. Any resulting em-
bryo floats into the uterus. Doctors initiate approximately 4,200 procedures
each year, with a 28 percent success rate, at a cost of $6,000 to $10,000 per
procedure. This process was used to conceive Judith Hart after her father's
death. See Begley, supra note 77, at 41.
106. In a two-step procedure, eggs are fertilized in the laboratory (IVF) and
any resulting zygotes (fertilized eggs) are transferred to a fallopian tube. Ap-
proximately 1,500 of these procedures are performed each year, with a 24 per-
cent success rate, at a cost of $8,000 to $10,000 per attempt. See Begley, su-
pra note 77, at 41.
107. Surrogate Embryo Transplantation involves "[t]he removal by uterine
lavage of the fertilized egg a few days after artificial insemination of a surro-
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be used to insert the resulting conceptus into the uterus or fallopian
tubes of the intended gestational host.
The fertilization of human gametes initially creates one two-cell
entity whose medical name changes based upon its developmental
stage and the continued division of its cells in the gestational proc-
ess. 0 8 After the earliest stage of fertilization, the union of the egg
and sperm is called a zygote or preembryo. 10 9 Shortly thereafter, the
conceptus becomes an embryo. Eight weeks later, 110 it becomes a
fetus"'i until birth."
12
During the first eight weeks of embryonic development, the pro-
cess of cryopreservation can also be used to freeze unused embryos
for future use. 1 13 The cryopreservation of human embryos has be-
come a routine procedure essential for use in procedures such as em-
bryo transfer and in vitro fertilization. 114 The freezing and the stor-
age of human gametes and embryos through this process are crucial
in facilitating posthumous conception. Posthumous conception is
made possible when such concepti are frozen for the purposes of
gate mother, and its transfer to the uterus of the 'wish mother."' BRODY, supra
note 20, at 93.
108. See generally STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at
559, 638, 1976 (defining an embryo, fetus, and zygote in relation to the gesta-
tional process).
109. See id. at 1976.
110. See id. at 559 (stating that embryogenesis, the process of establishing
the characteristic configuration of the embryonic body, concludes by the end of
the eight week).
111. See id. at 638 (describing a fetus as "the product of conception from the
end of the eigth week to the moment of birth").
112. The legal status and constitutional safeguarding of human conceptus
has historically been based upon the stage of fetal development. The United
States Supreme Court has, in its litany of abortion cases, conferred the greatest
degree of protection upon viable fetuses. See Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The moral dilemma in assigning
rights to human conceptus has exploded with the advent of assisted reproduc-
tive techniques. The Court's reliance on viability is rather tenuous as technol-
ogy threatens to expand fetal viability into the embryonic and zygote stages of
human development. This, of course, hinges upon an even greater moral ques-
tion of when life begins. Does life begin during the processes of spermato-
genesis and oogenesis, at conception, during gestation, at birth, or did concep-
tual human life begin before the creation of the earth?
113. See BRODY, supra note 20, at 92.
114. See id.
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
fertilization or implantation into a gestational host after the death of
the gamete provider."15
All of the reproductive procedures identified have, in some way,
made possible the option of posthumous conception. These proc-
esses all aid in some stage of the extraction, fertilization, or implan-
tation of conceptus in assisted reproduction.11 6 When combined with
the cryogenetical process, they make posthumous conception possi-
ble and have thus served as the impetus of the legal issues which this
Article addresses.117
B. Defining the Legal Posture of Human Gametes and Parental
Relational Prerogatives in Assisted Reproduction
The use of assisted reproductive techniques challenges the legal
community to define parental relationships and other prerogatives
such as child custody, visitation and support.' The traditional
115. See id. (discussing the process of cryopreservation).
116. See BRODY, supra note 19, at 92.
117. See supraPartI.
118. See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). In re Baby M rep-
resents a traditional surrogacy case involving three possible sets of biological
and legal parents. These sets include the biological father and his wife as the
adoptive mother, the biological mother and her husband as the presumptive
father under marital and paternity laws, and the intended custodial parents
through adoption or some other legal or biological configuration. This case
presented rare issues involving the paternity, maternity, child custody, visita-
tion, and support of children born through surrogacy. Other cases dealing with
issues raised by assisted reproductive techniques include Johnson v. Calvert, 5
Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993) and Jhordan C. v. Mary
K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986). Johnson is a gestational
surrogacy case also creating the potential of three possible sets of parents.
These sets include the biological father and mother, the gestational mother
(and her husband, if married under the marital presumption of paternity), and
finally the intended custodial parents, whether through adoption or some other
legal or biological configuration. This case raised the novel query of whether a
child can have two legal natural mothers. The court chose to abide by the par-
ties' own predetermination of which woman would have custody of the result-
ing child. See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 93, 851 P.2d at 780, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
498. In Jhordan C., the court held that the sperm donor was the legal father of
a child born into a two-female relationship because the parties failed to satisfy
the statutory requirements regarding artificial insemination under laws de-
signed to exclude sperm donors from being the legal father of resulting chil-
dren. See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 398, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 538. See also
McAllister, supra note 25, at 103-11 (discussing several nontraditional parental
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notions of the American family structure continue to evolve as courts
are asked to decipher some rather complex configurations of poten-
tial progenitors. 19 The resolution of Hart relied heavily upon a de-
termination of Judith Hart's biological and legal relationship with her
father. This section examines the progression of assisted reproduc-
tive decisions providing judicial precedence helpful in resolving the
relational status of children conceived after a parent's death.
California courts have provided significant leadership in re-
solving the paternity and maternity of children conceived through as-
sisted reproduction. In Jhordan C. v. Mary K, 120 the California
Court of Appeals addressed the paternity rights of a male donor who
privately provided semen to a woman and her female lover desirous
of having and raising a child of their own. 121 The women sued to
prevent the sperm donor's claim of paternity and to confirm their re-
lationship as the child's birth mother and de facto parent.' 22 They
claimed that all parties had agreed, prior to conception, that the
sperm donor would have no parental relationship, rights or obliga-
tions towards the child.123 The sperm donor argued that any such
agreement was nullified or waived by the parties post agreement
conduct.' 24 He presented evidence showing that he was allowed to
actively participate in the various stages of the gestational mother's
configurations involving two or more persons regardless of sex or marital
status); Lorio, supra note f, at 32-36 (suggesting that Louisiana adopt the Uni-
form Act for Children of Assisted Conception as a means of clarifying the pa-
rental conflicts arising from artificial insemination and examining other pa-
rental configurations and conflicts emanating from assisted reproductive
techniques).
119. See, e.g., McAllister, supra note 25, at 103-11; Lorio, supra note 1, at
32-36.
120. 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986).
121. See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 389, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
122. See id. at 391, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
123. See id. at 389, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
124. See id. at 396, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 536. See generally K.B. v. N.B., 811
S.W.2d 634, 638-39 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (applying the concept of ratification
in a child support case to overcome the statutory requirement of a husband's
written consent to his wife's heterologous artificial insemination, where the
husband's conduct during the resulting child's life indicated his intent to be
acknowledged as the child's legal father). The putative father's denial of bio-
logical paternity was raised as a defense to child support. See id. This deci-
sion reflects a judicial predisposition in legitimizing intent-based parentage
determinations.
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pregnancy and that he was afforded early visitation rights with the
child.'25
The court resolved this case by considering California's version
of the Uniform Parentage Act, California Civil Code section 7005,
which provides, in relevant part, that
(A) a husband of any woman who conceives a child from
donated sperm from a man not her husband through
artificial insemination, is the father of that child if he
consented to the process;
(B) a sperm donor is not the father of a child born through
assisted reproduction from any woman who is not his
wife.
126
The court determined, however, that a literal interpretation of
the Uniform Parentage Act rendered it inapplicable to this case. The
statute expressly required that sperm used in artificial insemination
be delivered for use by a licensed physician in order to invoke the
parental status afforded by the above section.127 The sperm donor in
this case had provided his sperm directly to the intended gestational
125. See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
126. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (West 1983) (repealed 1994) (current ver-
sion at CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1994)). Applicable statutes from other
states include the following: ALA. CODE § 26-17-2 (1997); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-501 (1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-4-106 (West 1997); FLA.
STAT. § 742.11 (West 1997) (except in a case of gestational surrogacy); ILL.
COMP. STAT. 40/2 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 39-5405 (1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 23-128, 23-129, 38-111(4)(f) (1997); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
188 (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (1991); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 4B (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
700.111(2) (West 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.56 (West 1998); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 210.824 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-106
(1997); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.061 (Michie 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:17-44 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-6 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 49A-1 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-03 (1997) (to dispute pater-
nity, the husband must deny parentage within two years of discovering the
child's birth and he must prove he did not consent to the insemination); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.37 (West 1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 554,
555 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.243, 109.239 (1997); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 68-3-306 (1996); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.101 (West 1996);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.050 (West 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 891.40
(West 1997).
127. See Jhordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 392-94, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 534-35.
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host.128 The appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision de-
claring the sperm donor as the legal father of the child and awarding
him visitation rights. 129 Although the nongestational woman's visi-
tation rights were undisturbed by the court, the court also determined
that it was premature to address the woman's claim as the child's de
facto parent.13
0
Parental prerogatives such as custody, support, and visitation are
not exclusively assigned based upon a person's biological connection
with a child.' 3 ' This proposition is evident in the court's granting of
visitation rights to the biological mother's female lover. Judicial and
legislative preferences have traditionally placed great normative
value upon traditional social constructs, such as the unitary family, in
exacting parental roles and responsibilities. 132  This unyielding
gravitation toward such normative constructs is represented by the
conclusive statutory presumption that children conceived through
heterologous artificial insemination, with the husband's consent, will
be deemed the offspring of the marital union.
133
The Jhordan C. decision represents a strict adherence to the
plain language of the assisted reproduction law which, parentheti-
cally, is supported by substantial jurisprudential fora resembling the
court's final outcome, but on different grounds. 134 The outcome in
128. See id. at 390, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 532.
129. See id. at 397-98, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38.
130. See id. at 397, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
131. See infra Part IV.C.
132. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125-30 (1988) (holding that
although the California statute in question permitted the granting of visitation
rights to anyone having an interest in a child's well being, the nonmarital fa-
ther had no right to visitation and custody of his biological child conceived and
bom while the mother was lawfully married to another man). The Supreme
Court upheld the statute's provisions restricting standing to challenge a marital
child's paternity to actions brought by the marital mother and father within two
years after the child's birth. The Court determined that society's protection of
the sanctity and tranquility of an intact marital familial association justified the
statute's preemptive effect on putative biological parents. See id. at 131-32.
133. See id. at 129-30.
134. See Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (apply-
ing equitable principles of estoppel and implied contract in determining that
"[t]he husband's declarations and conduct respecting the artificial insemination
of his wife by means of a third-party donor, including the husband's written
'consent' to the procedure, implied a promise on his part to furnish support for
any offspring resulting from the insemination"). Gursky thus held the husband
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Jhordan C. reflects an intent-based parentage context premised upon
progenitors' consensual representations and conduct enforced
through traditional contractual and equitable modules. 135  Finally,
liable for child support even though, under then-existing law, the child was not
the husband's legitimate offspring. See id. The court concluded that "the hus-
band [was] liable for the support of the child... whether on the basis [of] an
implied contract to support or by reason of application of the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel." Id. at 412. See also People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 289,
437 P.2d 495, 501, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 13 (1968) (addressing the issue of whether
a husband who consents to his wife's heterologous artificial insemination can
be considered the resulting child's lawful father for purposes of violating a
criminal statute for his willful failure to support the child). Sorensen rejected
the view that the child was illegitimate in the absence of laws prohibiting such
reproductive practices and in furtherance of strong public policy favoring le-
gitimacy. See id. As such, the court found the defendant guilty of the offense
while recognizing that "legitimacy is a legal status that may exist despite the
fact that the husband is not the natural father of the child." Id. See also In re
Estate of Gordon, 501 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding that chil-
dren born by heterologous artificial insemination were the decedent's legal
children for purposes of inheritance, where procedure was performed with the
deceased's oral consent and acknowledgment prior to death); In re Adoption of
Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435-36 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (rejecting a divorced
mother's claim that the ex-husband's consent to adoption of their marital child
born through heterologous artificial insemination was not required because he
was not the child's lawful parent. Again, the court determined that the hus-
band's consensual conduct prior to the couple's use of the reproductive proce-
dure substantiated a finding that he was the child's parent for adoption pur-
poses by putting to rest prior judicial discourse in holding "a child born of
consensual AID during a valid marriage is a legitimate child entitled to the
rights and privileges of a naturally conceived child of the same marriage.");
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835, 836-37 (Sup. Ct. 1964)
(adopting the Gursky decision in holding a husband liable for the support of
children conceived through heterologous artificial insemination based upon the
husband's consent and implied contractual obligation to support such chil-
dren); People v. Dennett, 184 N.Y.S.2d 178, 184-85 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (holding
that a wife was equitably estopped in a custody or visitation action from
claiming, as a defense, for the first time that the children were not the biologi-
cal children of the husband because they were conceived by artificial insemi-
nation); KB. v. N.B., 811 S.W.2d at 638-39 (holding that where a husband
failed to provide statutorily required written consent for his wife's heterolo-
gous artificial insemination, his subsequent conduct ratified his intent to con-
ceive for purposes of rendering him liable for child support).
135. See generally Shapo, supra note 1, at 1182-94 (discussing intent-based
parenting resulting from contractual relationships as emanating from a person's
constitutionally protected right to procreate). The author views parenthood by
intent as
determin[ing] the parents of children born of reproductive technolo-
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Jhordan C. reflects the expansion of libertarian judicial activism be-
yond the Supreme Court's early recognition of married couples' fun-
damental procreational rights by embracing unmarried persons' ex-
ercise of that right, even if by nontraditional means and between
nontraditional partners.136
Later, in the 1993 gestational surrogacy 37 case of Johnson v.
Calvert,13 8 the California Supreme Court was presented with an un-
usual twist in a controversy between a child's biological mother and
her surrogate birth mother-a case of dual motherhood.' 39 The fe-
male surrogate served as a gestational host, or womb, for a zygote
created from the artificially inseminated sperm and eggs of the in-
tended custodial parents. 1
40
gies based on their intent to be a parent. In this perspective, the
child's legal parents are those whose preconception intent was to raise
the child, that is, those who intended to be the child's social parent or
parents. The legal parents may have no biological connection to the
child, either genetically or gestationally, and they may not be married
to a person with a biological connection.
Id. at 1182.
136. See id. at 1121-29. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
485-86 (1965) (discussing the fundamental right of privacy in those matters
concerning family and reproductive decisions, such as birth control).
137. Traditional surrogacy refers to a surrogate's artificial insemination with
sperm from (or copulation with) the intended custodial father. The surrogate is
therefore biologically related to the resulting child. See Susan A. Ferguson,
Comment, Surrogacy Contracts in the 1990's: The Controversy and Debate
Continues, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 903, 904 (1995). The New Jersey courts ad-
dressed the parental legal issues arising from traditional surrogacy in the well
noted case of In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). Gestational surrogacy
occurs when the egg and sperm of the intended custodial parents are trans-
planted into a surrogate who then carries the child to term. Although the ges-
tational surrogate gives birth to the child, she and the child are not biologically
related. See Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 92-93, 851 P.2d 776, 781-82, 19
Cal. Rptr. 2d 496, 499-500 (1993); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d
477, 480 (Sup. Ct. 1994); Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766-67 (Ohio
1994). For a more detailed discussion on surrogacy contracts, statutes, and ju-
dicial precedents, see Shapo, supra note 1, at 1160-81.
138. 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993).
139. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 1194-1207 (discussing multiple parenthood
as it relates to dual inheritance). See also Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123-30 (re-
solving a dual fatherhood controversy against the unmarried, biological father
in favor of the husband of the child's mother where the child was conceived
and bom during their marriage).
140. See Johnson, 5 Cal. 4th at 87, 851 P.2d at 778, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
Both women, the gamete provider and the gestational host,
claimed to be the biological mother of the child born through this
process.14 ' The gamete provider was genetically related to the child,
whereas the surrogate had given birth to the child.' 42 The determi-
nation of maternity under state law was relatively uniform in that a
child's birth mother was traditionally presumed to be the child's
mother. 143 Never before had a court considered the biological possi-
bility of a child having more than one natural mother. 144 The court
determined that the common law presumption of maternity would
not apply in this case because it was rebutted by evidence showing
that the surrogate birth mother had entered into the surrogacy agree-
ment with the understanding that she would not have custody of any
resulting child. 145 The court's intent-based decision upheld the par-
ties' reproductive agreement and determined that both the male and
female gamete providers were the intended, and therefore lawful,
parents of the offspring.
146
Both of these California decisions developed the foundational
groundwork needed to pave the analytical framework substantiating
the far-reaching abstraction that procreational liberties might extend
to individuals seeking to conceive posthumously. 147  The courts'
affirmance of nonmarital conception by artificial insemination and
141. See id. at 88, 851 P.2d at 778, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496.
142. See id.
143. See id. at 88-97, 851 P.2d at 778-85, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 496-503.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 90-96, 851 P.2d at 780-84, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 498-502.
146. See id. at 93-95, 851 P.2d at 782-84, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 500-02. No le-
gal controversy arose with respect to the male gamete provider's claim of pa-
ternity. However, this case would have presented a more complex parental
web if the gestational host had been married. The common law presumption of
paternity of a child born within the marital relationship would have been im-
plicated, thereby creating an issue of paternity between the male gamete pro-
vider and the surrogate's husband. Some states have enacted surrogacy stat-
utes that have outlawed surrogacy arrangements or that specifically define the
paternity and maternity of children conceived and born through this process.
See Shapo, supra note 1, at 1167-71 (reviewing the statutory treatment of sur-
rogacy by the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act and
various state statutes).
147. See Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275
(1993); Hecht v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 4th 1289, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222
(1996) (certifiedfor partialpublication Jan. 15, 1997).
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intent-based parentage determinations are inherent components of
posthumous conception. 14 8 The consideration of parental preroga-
tives in assisted reproduction cases has not been the only approach
courts have resorted to in resolving the fate of such progenitors and
their resulting children.
Some jurisdictions have faced such issues by shifting the em-
phasis from assigning parental status to resolving the legal status of
frozen human concepti. One approach has been to identify the point
in the assisted gestational process in which the "potential life" or
"life" will acquire personhood status, thus invoking constitutional
protection under state and federal constitutions. 149 Hence lies the un-
relenting controversy of whether human gametes are property,
150
persons,15 1 or something else.
152
148. See infra Parts II.C, IV.B.l.a.iii, IV.B.l.b.iii. Paternity and maternity
problems associated with posthumous conception are most prevalent where a
progenitor's death dissolves an existing marital union. As such, the surviving
custodian of frozen gametes most often seeks to engage in nonmarital concep-
tion due to the gamete provider's death. The judicial recognition of nonmarital
progenitors' constitutionally protected right to procreate by assisted produc-
tion, in turn, ensures their ability to conceive a child posthumously.
149. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 425 (E.D. Va. 1989) (holding that
progenitors had a recognizable property-like interest in their stored, frozen pre-
zygotes which would entitle them to transfer the pre-zygotes to another facility
for their use). Much commentary has been written on the legal status of frozen
embryos within the context of assisted reproductive techniques. For further
detailed analysis on the myriad of legal and ethical issues related to this deter-
mination, see Lori Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY. L. REV.
357 (1986); Stanford P. Berenbaum, Davis v. Davis: Frozen Embryos and the
Thawing of Procreative Liberties, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1337 (1990); John A.
Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos, 76 VA. L.
REV. 437 (1990); Cristi D. Ahnen, Note, Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: Who
Wins, Who Loses, and How Do We Decide?, 24 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1299
(1991); Mark A. Pieper, Note, Frozen Embryos-Persons or Property?: Davis
v. Davis, 23 CREIGHTON L. REv. 807 (1990).
150. See generally York, 717 F. Supp. at 425 (discussing the written agree-
ment which referred to the pre-zygote as "property"). Treating human con-
cepti as property would afford concepti providers with the greatest degree of
control over the concepti. In employing the notions of ownership, gamete pro-
viders could avail themselves of the full "bundle of sticks" with respect to such
concepti. They would have the enforceable right to use, possess, enure profits,
exclude, destroy and dispose of by sale, loan, abandonment, pledge, or gift
their concepti. However, posthumously conceived children would have the
least degree of protected rights prior to birth if human concepti are considered
mere property. Personhood status and attending rights would not attach until
280
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In Davis v. Davis,'53 the Tennessee Supreme Court dealt with a
divorce custody battle over cryopreserved preembryos stored in a
Knoxville fertility clinic by a couple during harmonious marital
times. The eggs and sperm were extracted from each party, fertilized
in a petri dish, and frozen for later use by the couple.' 5 4 The wife
initially sued to preserve the preembryos for her own later use. After
a subsequent marriage, however, she requested that the preembryos
be donated for use by some other third party donee(s)i 55 The
husband sought to have them destroyed because of his unwillingness
to father unwanted biological children that he might never know. 1
56
after the birth of the child. See also Steinbock, supra note 25, at 59-62 (dis-
cussing property fights in stored sperm).
151. See generally Pieper, supra note 149 (discussing frozen embryos); Rob-
ertson, supra note 149 (discussing sperm and frozen embryos). Concepti pro-
viders would have the least amount of dispositional control if personhood
status was assigned to human concepti. If regarded as persons, human con-
cepti would be entitled to constitutionally protected rights and assigned a
greater degree of moral human significance. This would severely impede the
provider's ability to exercise the rights and powers represented by the "bundle
of sticks" in a manner which would not be in the concepti's best interests.
Treating human concepti as persons, however, gives posthumously conceived
children the greatest level of legally enforceable and constitutionally protected
rights in their efforts to secure financial benefits from a deceased parent. Their
future rights to such entitlement would attach the moment the conceptus is re-
moved from the parent's body.
152. See generally Pieper, supra note 149 (discussing frozen embryos); Rob-
ertson, supra note 149 (accepting, but not defining the property-like nature of a
decedent's frozen sperm); Steinbock, supra note 25, at 58-62; Hecht v. Supe-
rior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993). See also Davis
v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (adopting the "other" status for
human concepti which is considered the interim category). This approach
equips providers with just enough of an ownership interest in their own con-
cepti, so as to exercise a "decisional-making authority." Steinbock, supra note
25, at 60. It has yet to be judicially determined exactly how this type of
authority differs from the traditional notions of property ownership. The trend
in affording human concepti special respect as "potential life" has left for fur-
ther judicial determination whether such biological material has any legally
protected rights prior to fertilization, implantation, or birth, and if so, the exact
nature of any such rights. The courts' reliance on this interim category resem-
bles a judicial manipulation intended to avoid the inevitable question of when
constitutionally protected human life begins. See id. at 58-62.
153. 842 S.W.2d at 588 (Tenn. 1992).
154. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591-92.
155. See id. at 590.
156. See id.
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The court resolved this case by first evaluating whether human
concepti qualified as property which could be distributed pursuant to
a divorce settlement. 157 Thus, it was necessary to assign legal status
to the frozen preembryos as either property, human life or something
else. 158 The court chose the "something else" category, which was,
quite possibly, a compromised attempt to at least symbolically rec-
ognize the moral significance of the human body. 5 9 It concluded
that the preembryos were not property nor human life, but occupied
an interim category of potential life deserving of special respect.160
This interim category did however, create limited decisional
authority in the gamete providers akin to an ownership interest in
property which would enable them to decide the embryo's fate. 161 In
assigning frozen embryos a status greater than mere biological mate-
rial, the Davis court assumed that it could justify awarding the gam-
ete providers the unbridled, exclusive right to dispose of the embryos
157. See id. at 594-97. See also Hecht v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 4th
1289, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (1996) (holding that decedent's sperm was not an
"asset" for purposes of property settlement agreement). In Hecht, the last of a
series of actions regarding the determination of whether a decedent's cryopre-
served sperm could serve as probate property, the court opined that sperm was
a proper asset that could devolve under probate jurisdiction, but that it would
not be considered property for purposes of a compromise property settlement
agreement between the parties. In recognizing the interim category of human
sperm, the court determined that the decedent's dispositional authority over the
sperm would control in determining its ultimate disposition. Documentary
evidence presented in the case clearly established the decedent's intent to leave
his sperm behind for his surviving partner's sole procreational use. One inter-
esting outcome is that the court extended its prohibition against any unauthor-
ized use to restrict the partner's disposal of the sperm in a manner inconsistent
with the decedent's expressed wishes. See id. at 1289, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222.
The decedent alone would have the postmortem control in determining
whether, how, and with whom to procreate from the grave. This, of course,
has far-reaching implications on the extant "dead-hand rule" public policy,
which limits the control the dead can exert over the living. See id.
158. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 594-97.
159. See id. at 597. The court "conclud[ed] that preembryos are not, strictly
speaking, either 'persons' or 'property,' but occupy an interim category that
entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life." Id.
160. See id.
161. See id. The court states that the couple, as progenitors, "have an inter-
est in the nature of ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making
authority concerning disposition of the preembryos, within the scope of policy
set by law." Id.
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as they so chose. 162 The sole dispute rested in resolving the disposi-
tional rights between affected private parties. It is most difficult to
reconcile the court's assignment of this right to dispose of human
embryos in a property-like fashion without any significant discourse
on the attenuating limitations and responsibilities placed upon this
right due to the embryos' heightened status beyond mere personalty.
Perhaps this heightened status compels increased governmental
regulation based upon a substantial government interest in protecting
and respecting biological material which has the potential of be-
coming human life. One level of potential government mandated
progenitor responsibility supports long standing public interests in
promoting the best interest of children by preventing state wards.
Persons who dispose of their frozen sperm could be held accountable
for the care and support of such offspring, perhaps even beyond the
progenitor's death in cases of posthumous conception.1
63
The progeny of constitutional abortion rights cases minimally
concede that the incremental intervention of government action is
warranted as the unborn's gestational developmental status nears
birth. 164 On the other hand, extending greater governmental protec-
tion to unborn, frozen concepti by limiting the progenitor's disposi-
tional rights would likely have far reaching implications on extant
Supreme Court precedents. Assigning enhanced rights to gametes
prior to conception or implantation would raise even greater concern
of whether the viability standard is still warranted as the point at
which states can place greater limitations on abortion.1
6 5
162. See id.
163. See infra Part V for further discussion; Steinbock, supra note 25, at 63.
Steinbock states that:
[a] responsible decision to procreate, however, requires thoughtful
consideration of the welfare of the children one brings into the world.
[B]efore having children likely to have seriously burdened lives, indi-
viduals should think about whether they will be able to compensate for
the difficulties and give their children lives that are well worth living.
Id.
164. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
165. Some local governments have taken great measures to regulate non-
abortive conduct towards the unborn by proscribing infanticide and fetal mur-
der, negligence, and abuse. Some states affirm the personhood status of the
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This anomaly provides greater insight into the Tennessee court's
measured hesitancy in classifying embryos as persons. 16 6  The
court's rationale was even based, in part, upon Tennessee's statutory
incorporation of the Roe v. Wade167 trimester approach to abortion.
16 8
"This statutory scheme indicates that as embryos develop, they are
accorded more respect than mere human cells because of their bur-
geoning potential for life."'169 However, the court reiterated that
"even after viability, [human embryos] are not given legal status
equivalent to that of a person already born."'170 What the court leaves
unsaid, however, is exactly what level of respect, through govern-
ment intervention, is warranted in protecting frozen embryos as-
signed to this interim category.
unborn for all purposes beyond permitted abortive procedures. See infra note
166. The fallible nature of the Roe Court's viability standard is also evident in
light of developing reproductive technology which enables fertilization, im-
plantation, and even possible gestation outside of the progenitor's body. Fur-
thermore, the technique of embryo transplantation permits one woman's con-
ceptus to be implanted into a host carrier for gestation to full term. The
traditional viability standard-measured by a determination of whether the fe-
tus can survive independently outside of the womb-stands to be reconciled
with such technological advances. There may no longer be a gestational time
frame of non-viability that would promote a woman's unbridled right to have
an abortion. These issues implicate constitutional discourse which is far be-
yond the scope of this Article. It is important to at least note the far reaching
impact reproductive technology may have on existing reproductive jurispru-
dence in determining the legal status and rights of the unborn.
166. Louisiana's Human Embryo statute, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:121
(West 1991), specifically confers protection over frozen embryos in a manner
consonant with laws protecting infants and children. The statute prevents the
destruction of unwanted embryos, requiring instead that they be adopted. In
any case, the disposition of any such unwanted embryos is to be made in light
of their best interest. Pennsylvania's legislature has enacted similar legislation
which affirmatively promotes the life interest of the unborn and of those chil-
dren born alive during attempted abortive procedures. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3212(a)(b)(c) (West 1983); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601,
2603-2607 (West Supp. 1998). See also Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590 n.1 (refer-
ring to the Louisiana Human Embryo statute); Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 (up-
holding the preamble to the Missouri abortion control statute referring to un-
born children as persons protectable under the U.S. Constitution).
167. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
168. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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After weighing the procreative rights and relevant circumstances
of each party where no disposition agreement existed, as in this case,
the court concluded that the father's right not to procreate would
prevail over the mother's desire to donate the embryos to some third
party for implantation.' 7 1 The embryos were eventually destroyed
pursuant to a final court order affirming what might be construed as a
man's right not to procreate.
172
The use of reproductive technology continues to challenge ex-
isting legal parameters concerning parentage and personhood deter-
minations. The most compelling issue thus far, however, raises
questions germane to society's most treasured concepts of human
existence and death. The Davis decision facilitated judicial move-
ment toward recognizing some form of limited property rights in
human gametes. 173 The court's adoption of this interim category,
along with intent-based parental determinations, paved the road for
technology which would call forth the reproductive capability of
dead persons while providing the legal foundation necessary to sup-
port such activity. The very nature of posthumous reproduction re-
quires some degree of dispositional control over one's gametes for
post-death conception by surviving third parties. This would later be
substantiated by Davis and by forthcoming cases addressing the
rights of parties seeking to procreate posthumously.
C. Posthumous Conception
The prospect of posthumous conception and the attending legal
issues were considered by legal scholars as early as 1962.174 Amidst
more recent accounts of "the widow and the sperm,"'175 the "birth of
171. See id. at 604.
172. See generally Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992) (invalidating a provision in Pennsylvania's abortion control
statute which required a husband's prior consent to an abortion); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (discussing the distribution of contraceptives);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a privacy right in
marital relations).
173. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
174. See generally Leach, supra note 26 (addressing the threat which post-
humous conception could pose to the Rule Against Perpetuities).
175. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the
Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 276-77
(1986-87). This Article discusses the 1984 French case Parpalaix v. CECOS,
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a baby from the egg of a dead woman,"'176 and "sperm extracted from
a dead man at his widow's request,"'177 many people were repulsed to
learn that the dead were actually parenting children from their
graves. 178 Alas, a new frontier of legal controversy had finally be-
gun,179 posthumous conception-the fertilization of eggs with sperm
from gamete providers, one or both of whom are dead at the time of
conception and implantation.1
80
This new form of alternate reproduction has raised significant
legal issues involving the determination of the respective rights of
potential progenitors, resulting children, and other surviving third
parties. A few courts, legislatures, and progressive legal scholars
have recognized, to some degree, that posthumous conception should
fall within the protection of existing constitutional safeguards
which was credited with starting much of the early debate on the efficacy of
postmortem conception. Parpalaix differed from Hecht in that the widow's
deceased husband failed to leave any written acknowledgment of his desire to
have his sperm used by his wife after his death. See id. at 230. The deceased
gamete provider in Hecht, William E. Kane, Jr., left behind several written ex-
pressions of his intent and desire to leave his fifteen vials of sperm to his girl-
friend for the specific purpose of postmortem conception. He executed a
"Specimen Storage Agreement" with the sperm bank designating Deborah
Hecht as the intended recipient upon his death. He also provided for the dispo-
sition of his frozen sperm in his will executed on September 27, 1991, be-
queathing all "right, title, and interest that I may have in any specimens of my
sperm stored with any sperm bank or similar facility for storage to Deborah
Ellen Hecht." See Hecht v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 840, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (1993). He further expressed his intent that the sperm be
used by Ms. Hecht to have children after his death if she would so choose.
Lastly, the decedent left behind a letter specifically written to any such chil-
dren. See id.
176. New Ethics Flares Over Test-Tube Birth, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 12, 1995, at
A7.
177. Carole Agus, Woman Saves Sperm of Her Dead Husband: She Needs to
Raise $12,000 to Have Babies of Man Who Died in Police Custody, DET.
NEWS, Jan. 19, 1995, at A5. Mirabel Baez, after the death of her husband,
Anthony Baez, requested the removal of her husband's sperm for freezing and
her later reproductive use. The article reports the attending physician's ac-
count of "mak[ing] a small nick in the tube that carries the sperm from the tes-
ticles back to the body and directly flush[ing] the sperm out of that tube using a
very fine plastic needle." Id.
178. See id.
179. See Garside, supra note 1; Gilbert, supra note 25; Leach, supra note 26;
Robertson, supra note 25; Thies, supra note 26.
180. See Nolan, supra note 1, at 6 n.35.
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afforded to expressions of traditional procreative liberty. The legal
community has yet to fully embrace the multifaceted legal, moral,
and ethical ramifications inherent in postmortem conception. Per-
haps, ultimate discourse will shift the focus, at some point in time,
from whether posthumous conception is permissible to a discussion
on how best to promote and protect the interests of affected per-
sons-such as the resulting children. The following discussion con-
siders the legal and ethical aspects of posthumous conception with
the ultimate goal of determining whether such after-conceived chil-
dren should be entitled to social security survivor's benefits.
1. Inheritance and posthumous conception: ajudicial, legislative,
and constitutional response
The new frontier of posthumous conception was spurred on by a
California case of first impression, Hecht v. Superior Court. 181 In
Hecht, a California Court of Appeals had to resolve the legal status
of frozen sperm disposed of by will to the decedent's surviving girl-
friend, Deborah E. Hecht, for her reproductive use after his sui-
cide. 182 In a rather strange letter, the decedent left behind for his
potential postmortem offspring, he wrote
I address this to my children, because, although I have only
two, Everett and Katy, it may be that Deborah will decide-
as I hope she will-to have a child by me after my death.
I've been assiduously generating frozen sperm samples for
that eventuality. If she does, then this letter is for my post-
humous offspring, as well, with the thought that I have
181. 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (1993).
182. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 840-41, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276-77. See
also Hall v. Fertility Institute of New Orleans, 647 So. 2d 1348, 1351 (La. Ct.
App. 1994) (upholding a trial court's preliminary injunction preventing a fer-
tility institute's distribution of frozen sperm to a decedent's surviving non-
marital partner based upon a claim by his surviving relatives that decedent was
coerced into executing a pre-death act of donation on the partner's behalf).
The Hall court also rejected the argument that the sperm donation was against
Louisiana public policy, stating that, "[t]he sole issue relevant to disposition of
the instant case is the validity vel non of the authentic act of donation that pur-
ports to convey to St. John the decedent's fifteen vials of sperm now on deposit
with the Institute. If it is shown at trial that decedent was competent and not
under undue influence at the time the act was passed, the frozen semen is St.
John's property, and she has full rights to its disposition." Id.
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loved you in my dreams, even though I never got to see you
born. If you are receiving this letter, it means that I am
dead-whether by my own hand or that of another makes
very little difference.
183
Similarly to Davis, the Hecht court first had to explicate the le-
gal status of frozen sperm under California probate law.'8 4 Paren-
thetically, the court's final decision was based upon the Tennessee
Supreme Court's rationale in Davis.185 The California Appeals Court
also recognized gamete providers' decisional authority, which was
akin to a property-like ownership interest, in controlling the disposi-
tion of their frozen gametes.1
8 6
The court concluded that human gametes and concepti were
neither property, nor human life; but were "potential human life" de-
serving special respect. 187 Probate jurisdiction was confirmed and
Mr. Hart's sperm was considered "probate property" for the purposes
of inheritance. 8 8 The court concluded that the frozen sperm would
be best afforded this special respect by acknowledging Mr. Hart's
decisional authority to dispose of the sperm as expressed in his
will. 189 This aspect of the Hecht decision alone may have provided
the greatest assurance of the future existence of posthumous concep-
tion. Deceased gamete providers would be unable to conceive from
the grave unless they were permitted to transfer to some surviving
person or entity the ownership of their frozen human concepti for
postmortem conception. 19° The recognition of human concepti as
183. Id. at 841, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277. The decedent left a will, a specimen
storage agreement, and a letter indicating his desire that the sperm be given to
Ms. Hecht upon his death.
184. See id. at 846, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281.
185. See id. at 858-59, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288-89.
186. See id. at 845-52, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280-84.
187. See id. at 846, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 281.
188. See id.
189. See id. at 850, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283.
190. It is conceded that decedents could attempt to transfer their concepti by
some inter vivos transfer prior to death. Existing law, however, would not
permit persons to sell their sperm, eggs, or preembryos during their lifetime to
another person, while retaining a legal parental relationship with the resulting
child. This, of course, would defeat the purpose of posthumous conception and
eliminate the issue of whether the child is entitled to inherit or otherwise bene-
fit from the decedent's estate.
Inter vivos transfers of concepti by gift may also prove futile because of
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probate property ensures a deceased gamete provider's right to util-
ize the primary means of postmortem transfer-the transmission of
one's p r operty through the well-established institution of inheri-
tance.
Ms. Hecht, the intended donee, sought possession of the sperm
for her reproductive use and claimed that the court's failure to do so
would infringe upon her privacy and procreative liberty protected by
the federal and California Constitutions. 192 Ms. Hecht's action was
strongly opposed by the decedent's two surviving children from a
prior marriage. They countered that it was against strong public
policy to allow an unmarried woman to be artificially inseminated
with the sperm of a dead man.193 The court rejected the children's
argument by holding that it was a forgone legal issue already re-
solved by the California legislature and courts. 194 The court rea-
soned that under California's version of the Uniform Parentage Act,
unmarried women had already been given the right to procreate by
the required relinquishment of one's dominion and control in the delivery of
gift property to another which would also defeat the purpose. of posthumous
conception and parenthood from the grave. The most difficult aspect in such
attempted inter vivos transfers has been the hesitancy of fertility and storage
clinics to release the concepti to the designated donee whether or not the gam-
ete provider has authorized the transfer in an executed storage agreement. See
Parpalaix v. CECOS, Judgment of Sept. 15, 1984, Trib. Gr. Inst., 1984 Gazette
du Palais [g.P.] 11 (Fr.); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989);
Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 842, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 278; Davis v. Davis, 842
S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
191. See generally, John A. Gibbons, Comment, Who's Your Daddy?: A
Constitutional Analysis of Post-Mortem Insemination, 14 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 187 (1997) (arguing that the "constitutional right to the
use of reproductive technology encompasses the use of post-mortem insemina-
tion. However, the right to procreative decision-making does not encompass a
right of the parents to have the 'posthumous child' declared the child of the
male donor"). For a brief discussion on the constitutional ramifications of the
right to transmit one's concepti by inheritance for postmortem conception, see
Chester, supra note 1, at 979-82 (acknowledging an existing right to transmit
one's gametes through inheritance based upon the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding in Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987)).
192. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 844, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279.
193. See id.
194. See id. at 854, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286.
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artificial conception, 195 as was recognized in the Jhordan C. v. Mary
K 196 case.
The court also assigned little merit to the surviving children's
primary concern, which was to prevent Ms. Hecht from having addi-
tional half-siblings who would potentially lay claim to a share of
their dead father's estate. 197 The court, relying upon relevant sec-
tions of the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(U.S.C.A.C. Act)'98 and the California Probate Code, 199 concluded
that, "it [was] unlikely that the estate would be subject to claims with
respect to any such children."
200
With respect to other public policy concerns raised by the dece-
dent's surviving children regarding the birth, custody, and concep-
tion of posthumously conceived children, the Hecht court adopted
the California Supreme Court's pronouncement in the gestational
surrogacy case of Johnson v. Calvert,2 ' that "[it is not the role of
the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technology when the
Legislature has not seen fit to do so; any such effort would raise seri-
ous questions in light of the fundamental nature of the rights of pro-
creation and privacy."
202
Posthumous conception is an area which most state legislatures
have yet to address, although considerable scholarly attention has
recently been drawn to the inheritance rights of posthumously con-
ceived children.20 3 The laws of most states currently do not entitle
such children to take under or through their deceased parent's estate
because of the timing of the child's birth.2 °a The most relevant leg-
islative initiative thus far determining the relational status of
195. See id. at 852-56, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284-88.
196. See Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. 530
(1986).
197. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 860-61, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290-91.
198. See Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 4(b), 9B
U.L.A. 186 (Supp. 1996).
199. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 6407 (West 1996).
200. Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 859,20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290.
201. 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993).
202. Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 861, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291 (citing Johnson
v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 101, 851 P.2d 776, 787, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 505
(1993)).
203. See Chester, supra note 1; Lorio, supra note 1; Shapiro, supra note 1.
204. See infra notes 208-15 and accompanying text.
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posthumously conceived children is represented by the U.S.C.A.C.
Act.20 5 Pursuant to section 4(b) of the U.S.C.A.C. Act, "[a]n indi-
vidual who dies before implantation of an embryo, or before a child
is conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the individ-
ual's egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child. °20 6 The
comments accompanying this section indicate that its purpose is to:
provide finality for the determination of parenthood of those
whose genetic material is utilized in the procreation process
after their death. [Section 4(b)] deal[s] with procreation by
those who are married to each other. It is designed primar-
ily to avoid the problems of intestate succession which
could arise if the posthumous use of a person's genetic ma-
terial could lead to the deceased being termed a parent. Of
course, those who want to explicitly provide for such chil-
dren in their wills may do so.
207
Although this provision directly addresses the relational status of
posthumously conceived children, it does not promote or protect the
beneficial interests of such children under intestate succession or so-
cial security entitlements. Three states, Virginia,
-208 North Dakota,20 9
and Florida,210 have taken varying stances in addressing the legal
status of posthumously conceived children. Virginia's version of the
uniform act, Status of Children of Assisted Conception, § 20-158(b),
provides that:
[a]ny child resulting from the insemination of a wife's
ovum using her husband's sperm, with his consent, is the
child of the husband and wife notwithstanding that, during
the ten-month period immediately preceding the birth, ei-
ther party died. However, any person who dies before in
utero implantation of an embryo resulting from the union of
his sperm or her ovum with another gamete, whether or not
the other gamete is that of the person's spouse, is not the
205. See Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 4(b), 9B
U.L.A. 186 (Supp. 1996).
206. Id. at 189-90.
207. Id. at 190.
208. See VA. CODEANN. §§ 20-156 to 165 (Michie Supp. 1997).
209. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (Michie Supp. 1997).
210. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997).
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parent of any resulting child, unless (i) implantation occurs
before notice of the death can reasonably be communicated
to the physician performing the procedure or (ii) the person
consents to be a parent in writing executed before the im-
plantation.211
Florida has adopted a similar version which provides that "[a]
child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who
died before the transfer of their eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a
woman's body shall not be eligible for a claim against the decedent's
estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent's
will. ' 212 North Dakota has also implemented similar legislation pro-
viding that "[a] person who dies before a conception using that per-
son's sperm or egg is not a parent of any resulting child born of the
conception." 213 These laws all reflect a growing legislative move-
ment to foster individual procreative liberty through an "intent-
based" framework in addressing the legal status and rights of chil-
dren and progenitors involved in assisted reproduction. Florida con-
ditions the testate inheritance rights of resulting children upon the
existence of a will so providing and executed by the deceased parent
prior to death.214 These states, completely forestall the intestate suc-
cession rights of posthumously conceived children. In Virginia, the
posthumously conceived child's right to intestate succession would
not be recognized without some express writing by the predeceased
parent indicating an appropriate pre-death intent to become the
child's postmortem parent.
215
It is questionable whether these statutory exclusions or limita-
tions upon the posthumously conceived child's right to inheritance is
constitutional. 1 6 Although no court has affirmatively recognized a
211. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (emphasis added).
212. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17.
213. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04.
214. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17.
215. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156 to 165.
216. See generally, Gibbons, supra note 191 (contending that the constitu-
tional right to procreative decision-making does not encompass the right to
determine paternity for inheritance purposes); Chester, supra note 1, at 979-82.
See also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (holding that federal law pre-
venting Native Americans from passing small parcels of reservation lands to
heirs constituted a "taking" under the Fifth Amendment).
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constitutional right to inherit property,217 there are, however, equal
protection safeguards which are implicated in the enactment of state
217. Inheritance has long been a means of transferring property after death.
The two probate classifications of inheritance include the transfer of property
by will (or testacy) and the default transfer of property by state succession stat-
utes (or intestacy). Inheritance does not include non-probate transfers such as
inter vivos trusts, life insurance policies, and other techniques such as joint
tenancy ownership with rights of survivorship. Although inheritance is not the
sole means of postmortem transfer, it has existed as the greatest assurance that
the devolution of private property will start with either the decedent's desig-
nees or nearest relatives, instead of escheating directly to the state.
An effectual transfer of property through inheritance permits the owner to
transmit the property and allows the recipient to receive the property. See
Daniel J. Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional Right?, 36 RuTGERS L.
REV. 741, 749 (1983-84). Hence, the ability to transmit and receive property
are both a part of determining the nature of inheritance rights. See id. These
rights are implicated in the major stages of posthumous conception. The na-
ture of the gamete provider's right to transmit the concepti by inheritance must
be determined, as well as the recipient's right to receive such unique property.
Ultimately, the resulting child's right to inherit from and through the deceased
provider's estate is summoned. The pivotal question affecting the outcome is
whether there is some life, liberty, or property interest being threatened. The
1993 Hecht decision had the potential of resolving this query by holding that
proper probate jurisdiction was implicated in determining a decedent's right to
transmit and a beneficiary's right to receive human concepti which should be
regarded as probate property for postmortem reproduction. The California
Appellate Court's most recent decision in the ongoing saga of Hecht indicates,
however, a greater judicial preference for treating frozen sperm in a manner
which most respects its potential for becoming human life. See Gibbons, supra
note 191 and accompanying text.
Inherent in the ongoing debate on inheritance rights implicated in post-
humous conception is the query of whether the right to inheritance is a funda-
mental liberty protected under the U.S. Constitution. See generally Ronald
Chester, Essay: Is The Right To Devise Property Constitutionally Protected?
The Strange Case ofHodel v. Irving 24 SW. U. L. REV. 1195 (1995) (arguing
for a very narrow construction of the nature of the right protected in Irving-
the right to dispose of property at death by will, but only where inter vivos
transfers would have been impracticable). As early as 1789, American critics
argued that there were no constitutional provisions to support such a finding.
See id. at 1195-96 (citing 15 THE WRrrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 470-71
(Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1907)). The author refers to a
1789 letter written by Thomas Jefferson to James Madison where he suggests
that the "dead have neither powers nor rights over" the earth and that "the por-
tion occupied by any individual ceases to be ... and reverts to the society." Id.
at 1195. The traditional, common-law treatment of inheritance rights is "that
any rights to transmit or to receive property at an owner's death were 'civil'
not 'natural rights': rights created by our society for its own convenience." Id.
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This represents the Jeffersonian argument regarding the institution of inheri-
tance rights. On the other hand, antagonists have maintained that "inheritance
[is] a natural right that predates civil government and is beyond its power."
Kornstein, supra, at 749. These approaches, rooted in positivism and natural
rights theories, have historically fueled arguments justifying or denying fun-
damental inheritance rights. See id.
The preliminary determination of the source of a possessor's ownership
interest in property emerges in almost every discussion on the nature of a prop-
erty right. The natural rights theory as applied to a property interest, provides
the rightful possessor with the greatest degree of protectable ownership in their
property. The owner's right to control the disposition, destruction, exclusion,
enjoyment, use, and possession of the property is viewed as one which he was
born with, a right so embedded in the law of nature that no man could create.
See id. at 750. Property ownership derived from natural rights is most likely to
implicate protection as property or liberty interests which are "fundamental"
under the U.S. Constitution. See Chester, supra, at 1196-97. Chester states
that "[i]f inheritance-or some component of it-is a natural right, it is then
but a short step to constitutionally protecting this right under the 5th and 14th
Amendments to the Constitution." Id.
Hugo Grotius and John Locke both claimed that natural law provides the
source of inheritance rights. See Komstein, supra, at 750. These early pro-
moters of inheritance viewed both the right to inherit and the right to transmit
one's property as natural rights. Within this context, the inquiry becomes
whether inheritance calls forth constitutional safeguarding. See Chester, supra,
at 1196-97.
No federal constitutional provision expressly identifies inheritance as a
constitutional right. Among possible indirect sources of federal protection of
inheritance are the Ninth Amendment; the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; the Takings Clause under the Fifth Amendment;
the Griswold v. Connecticut "penumbra theory" of the right of privacy; and
substantive Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See
Chester, supra, at 1196-97. For the most part, American courts have been re-
luctant to attribute any of these sources as the appropriate basis. Even though
one pre-Irving scholar determined that substantive due process was the most
likely source of safeguarding inheritance, he concluded that there was no due
process right of inheritance. See id. This summation has found little support
in more recent findings of state and federal courts that have seemed to recog-
nize greater due process-like rights in one's right to transmit and receive prop-
erty after death.
The deprivation of a person's "life, liberty or property without due proc-
ess of law" by state or federal governments is expressly prohibited under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV. Protection under the Due Process clauses is therefore war-
ranted only when the claimed interest impacts a person's life, liberty, or prop-
erty. This means that no state or federal government can enact laws that de-
prive such personal rights if the law does not satisfy the requisite level of
scrutiny by showing a compelling, substantial, or reasonable governmental
purpose. Thus, due process protection of inheritance would require a finding
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probate laws where there is some unlawful exclusion of a protected
class of persons without a compelling government interest, or where
such limitations are not rationally or substantially related to the fur-
thering of an important or legitimate government purpose.218 Post-
humously conceived children, as a class, do not fall within the tradi-
tionally protected suspect classes which are accorded the strictest
level of review.219 Where state action discriminates based upon the
timing or circumstances of a child's birth, like in cases involving
nonmarital children, either the intermediate or lower levels of judi-
cial review are applied in determining the legality of exclusionary
legislation.220 Thus, a state's denial of inheritance based solely on
the circumstances of birth would survive constitutional scrutiny only
that it is life, liberty, or property. Inheritance is more accurately seen as a
property right or as incidental to the ownership of property. Transmitting
property through inheritance is but one way to dispose of property. The dispo-
sition of property by other means, such as a sale, gift, or loan are essential as-
pects in the bundle of sticks of property rights, which have enjoyed the greatest
level of constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has undoubtedly protected property interests that are "well be-
yond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money," and has embraced
the concept of property as a "broad range of interests that are secured by 'ex-
isting rules or understandings."' Komstein, supra, at 767-68 (citations omit-
ted).
In the ordinary context, inheritances would not implicate any protectable
life interests under due process guarantees. This requires further analysis in
posthumous conception cases due to the "life potential" of human concepti.
Does the nature of the object transmitted and received implicate due process
rights over interests not ordinarily protected? Maybe so. Although inheritance
is but one means to accomplish postmortem conception, concepti providers
must be able to securely transmit their concepti to an intended beneficiary for
reproductive use after their death. Likewise, the intended beneficiary must
also be able to receive the concepti. State or federal laws unduly restricting or
prohibiting transmission by inheritance of human concepti could be an in-
fringement on the "potential life" interests of the unborn human concepti.
218. See Chester, supra note 217; Komstein, supra note 217.
219. See Gibbons, supra note 191, at 202-10; Chester, supra note 1, at 979-
82.
220. See infra Parts IV.A.2, IV.B, IV.C.1. See generally Mathews v. Lucas,
427 U.S. 495 (1976) (holding that strict scrutiny does not apply to legislation
that treats legitimate and illegitimate children differently); Robertson, supra
note 25, at 1040-41 (arguing that interests other than the decedent's directions
for disposition of stored sperm would fail to pass muster under a heightened
standard of scrutiny).
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if there were substantial or legitimate state interests which support
the statutory exclusion.
221
There are several state interests which are relevant in determin-
ing the classes of children entitled to take from a deceased parent's
estate. The primary state interest asserted as justification of the ex-
clusion of posthumously conceived children from inheritance is the
administrative convenience of preserving orderly distribution of the
affairs and estates of the deceased.222 This purpose, although legiti-
mate, does not justify a total abrogation of a child's right to inherit
from his parent(s) based upon the timing of birth.223 Minimally, this
state interest could be promoted by less intrusive means simply by
allowing all children, who are born or conceived prior to the final
disposition of the estate, to inherit from their deceased parent(s).,24
Another less intrusive means would be to require that children be
conceived prior to some reasonable future date, such as two years
after the parent's death.225
A second state interest in preventing certain children from tak-
ing under probate law is the prevention of dubious and spurious
claims which overburden the judicial system and delay the settlement
of estates. 226 It is feared that extending inheritance rights to after-
conceived children increases the number of potential stale claims in
multitudinous proportions. 227 One less intrusive approach in ad-
dressing this concern would be to allow parents to execute intent-
based, prospective transmissions of property to unconceived chil-
dren.228  These pre-death acknowledgments-by will, letter,
assignment, sperm storage agreement, or hybrid "Procreative
221. See Brashier, supra note 25, at 105-12.
222. See Robertson, supra note 25, at 1040.
223. See Chester, supra note 1, at 990-94.
224. See Thies, supra note 26, at 960.
225. See id.
226. See Robertson, supra note 25, at 1040; Chester, supra note 1, at 995.
227. See Chester, supra note 1, at 995.
228. See Robertson, supra note 25, at 1031 ("Because a person reproducing
posthumously is by definition dead, the meaning or value of posthumous re-
production lies in the importance that individuals place on being able to deter-
mine the fate of their gametes, embryos, and fetuses after they have died. The
key normative issue is the reproductive importance or significance of advance
directives for or against posthumous reproduction."); Steinbock, supra note 25,
at 62.
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Will"--would serve both as proof of the after-conceived child's pa-
rental relationship and as verification of the deceased parent's intent
to procreate posthumously.229
A more liberal definition of children for inheritance purposes
actually promotes other important state interests-the prevention of
state wards and the preservation of state revenue. Allowing after-
conceived children to inherit from and through a deceased parent
could create a surplus of public revenue which could in turn be used
to support and aid other orphaned, dependent children. Furthermore,
prospective parents would again be able to meet a moral obligation
to continue supporting children who survive their death.23°
229. A rebuttable presumption of parental acknowledgment of resulting chil-
dren and their right to inherit should arise where the human concepti providers
were married at the death of one of the progenitors. This presumption furthers
the state's interests in promoting concepts of a nuclear family. Permitting a
decedent to make provisions for after-conceived children also furthers the de-
cedents' right to transmit property after death (especially if constitutionally
protected as a natural right and not a mere civil right). If a decedent is permit-
ted to provide for after-conceived children by will, then intestate laws should
reflect what a decedent would want to happen under intestacy as well. Absent
the progenitor's written consent and authorization, gametes used to conceive
children posthumously should be considered as having been donated for third
party insemination and adoption. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 860, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 290.
230. Post-death support agreements and orders have been found enforceable.
Such agreements are in furtherance of strong public policy seeking to hold
progenitors financially liable for their offspring. See Garney v. Estate of Hain,
653 A.2d 21 (Pa. 1995) (holding that a deceased divorced father's estate could
not be forced to pay post-death child support payments where there was no
support order or contractual agreement in place prior to the father's death);
Kathryn Gehrels, Comment, Liability of Estate of Divorced Father for Support
of Minor Child, 22 CAL. L. REV. 79 (1934). In this very early comment, Ge-
hrels explores the old common law rule that a father's liability "for the support
of his child [is] terminated by his death." Id. at 82. This common law rule is
reviewed in terms of case law existing at that time in various jurisdictions,
some of which recognized an exception to the rule where there was a pre-
existing child support order incorporated into a divorce decree. The author
concludes that following the common law rule of no survival of support obli-
gations would "work the.., ludicrous result of making it advantageous to be a
child whose family life has been sufficiently upset as to necessitate court inter-
ference." Id. at 85. But see Chester, supra note 1, at 994 (proposing that "the
Supreme Court and the legislature... encourage only those forms of posthu-
mous conception that provide support from and connection with the dead fa-
ther-that any right of the male to procreate posthumously subsumes the re-
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2. Moral and ethical considerations implicated in posthumous
conception
a. the rule of the dead hand
One of the major arguments espoused against posthumous con-
ception is that it fosters the procreative activities of dead persons in
violation of long-standing public policy that restricts dead hand con-
trol from the grave.231 Posthumous conception does not significantly
promote the control over the living by the dead beyond existing pa-
rameters set forth by rules permitting the devolution of traditional
property after death. Posthumous conception can only occur if there
is a surviving, willing party who seeks to exercise their own procrea-
tive rights.
The Hecht court took a realistic approach in addressing the is-
sues of whether procreative rights are indeed assigned to the dead in
posthumous conception. Even though the court recognized the de-
ceased's pre-death decision making control over his frozen sperm by
will, it properly relegated its determination of procreational rights to
the living. The final decision in Hecht promoted only the procrea-
tional rights of the living party to whom the deceased had deter-
mined, prior to death, would be entitled to use the frozen sperm for
such purposes-his girlfriend, Ms. Hecht.233
There are indeed certain social risks inherent in permitting indi-
viduals to designate by will persons whom they would like to have
the custody of property which has life-creating potential. Of primary
concern is the welfare and best interests of the after-conceived child
who, for the most part, will be born without the benefit of at least one
biologically related parent. Although public policy should not foster
sponsibility to support the resulting offspring by inheritance, through will or
intestacy, unless the female using his sperm assumes this responsibility").
231. See generally Chester, supra note 1, at 994-1003 (implicating dead
hand control issues in posthumous conception by proposing that deceased pro-
genitors make pre-death support arrangements for any after-born children).
232. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 852-55, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284-87. The
court stated, "[w]e thus conclude that real parties fail to establish with any per-
tinent authority that the public policy of California prohibits the artificial in-
semination of Hecht because of her status as an unmarried woman." Id. at 855,
20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287.
233. See id. at 852-55, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284-87.
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procreative choices which result in orphaned children, fundamental
constitutional safeguards would not substantiate laws restricting such
activities without compelling government interests.
234
There are levels of permissible government regulation which
would address the concern of preventing posthumous conception
from creating dependent orphans and wards of the state. The first
approach is again to permit persons seeking to leave behind their
biological material for post-death conception to provide means of
child support for any such children who are conceived within a rea-
sonable time after death.235 This would permit the parent to meet a
moral, if not legal, obligation to support any offspring after death.236
Permitting children to inherit through or from a deceased parent's
estate also furthers strong public policy to hold progenitors finan-
cially liable for their offspring. Finally, another permissible ap-
proach would be to extend employment-related entitlements, such as
social security and workers' compensation survivor's benefits that
are based upon the earnings record of the deceased parent, to after-
conceived children who are born within a reasonable time after the
worker's death.237
One last policy concern under the dead hand control objection
against posthumous conception is that it promotes a society of the
living dead by diminishing the structure of the traditional American
family. Opponents fear that this form of conception will result in
large numbers of gamete bank orphans available for "stranger
234. See Steinbock, supra note 25, at 62-64, 66 (refuting the argument that
posthumous conception will negatively impact the emotional, psychological,
and social well-being of resulting children). See also Gilbert, supra note 25, at
546-47 (refuting claim that the state has a compelling interest in protecting
children from psychological harm which might arise when they learn they were
conceived non-coitally).
235. See Steinbock, supra note 25, at 63-64; Chester, supra note 1, at 994-
1003. Unlike Professor Chester's proposition, this is not a proposal to mandate
post-death child support as a precondition to post-death procreation. Greater
consideration would need be made regarding the constitutional ramifications of
attaching the exercise of procreational liberty to one's economic status and po-
sition. Further constitutional issues arise, along with administrational concerns
of enforcement and execution, in conditioning a living person's right to pro-
create on the pre-death actions of dead persons.
236. See Chester, supra note 1, at 994-1003.
237. See Thies, supra note 26, at 922-23, 960.
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procreation." 238  This of course means that the resulting children
would never have an opportunity to know of or have relations with
their predeceased biological parent(s). Arguably, this scenario could
possibly present economic, developmental, and social disadvantages
for such children.
239
However, this argument does not justify the elimination of an
entire means of procreation.240 The approach taken by many gamete
banks regarding abandoned gametes is first to follow the express
wishes of the gamete providers as provided in the storage agree-
ment.2 4 1 Although one option would be to make available such gam-
etes for stranger procreation, most gametes are discarded upon aban-
donment or after their useful life expires.2 42 This of course raises
other ethical and moral issues regarding the proper disposal of bio-
logical material having the potentiality of becoming human life. 43
Intent-based, stranger procreation by assisted reproduction can
be compared to society's current stranger adoption system.244 Both
systems provide homes for orphaned children, or gametes with the
potential of becoming children, with parents who usually have a
great desire to parent children in a responsible and committed fash-
ion. The obvious distinction, of course, is that stranger adoptions
work mostly to alleviate the societal burden of orphaned children
238. See generally Gilbert, supra note 25, at 539-47 (refuting state interests
concerning the protection of the traditional family structure and concerns re-
garding the well-being of posthumous offspring as justifiable means for re-
stricting posthumous procreation).
239. See id.
240. See id. (discussing constitutional implications based upon equal protec-
tion and due process principles which would preclude states' total abrogation
of posthumous conception as an expression of one's procreative choice). See
also John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983) (contending that a sin-
gle person has a constitutional right to procreate via non-coital, collaborative
conception).
241. See York, 717 F. Supp. at 421; Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 836, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 275; Hall, 647 So. 2d at 1348; Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588. These
cases deal with controversies involving clinics and their disposition of stored
frozen human gametes.
242. See British Clinics, Obeying Law, Destroy Thousands of Embryos, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at A3.
243. See id.
244. See Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge For
Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 502, 504-05, 507, 511-12 (1983).
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who are already in gestation or born. 245 Assisted reproductive tech-
nology is becoming a more popular means of exercising the consti-
24tutional right to procreate.246 This reproductive option, however
cannot be restricted in any greater manner than laws restricting the
reproductive activities of progenitors who later decide to give up
their children for adoption.247
It may be possible that intent-based parenting may produce more
healthy, well-balanced offspring regardless of the system creating the
parental relationship.248 Traditional bias and prejudice against
adopted children also continue to diminish as society embraces
higher concepts of responsible parenting reflected in providing a
child with a loving, nurturing, and disciplined environment. 249 Most
states' inheritance laws historically prevented adopted children from
inheriting from both biological or birth parents.2 5 0 Now, adopted
children are statutorily recognized by states as the legal children of
adoptive parents for all purposes, including inheritance.
251
The modem reality of a traditional American family structure
today does not depend solely upon one's biological affiliation with
those within the familial association. Of most importance is the
creation of voluntary familial associations by parents who intensively
accept the attending rights, responsibilities, and benefits of raising
children. After all, what is the familial tie that really binds-blood
or commitment?
245. See id. at 511-12.
246. See supra Part II.A.
247. See generally, Gilbert, supra note 25, at 531-38 (assuming the existence
of a constitutional right to procreate by artificial means based upon long-
standing precedents supporting a constitutional right to traditional procreation).
Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993),
provides significant support and judicial recognition that assisted reproduction
is a protected form of fundamental constitutional activity.
248. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 1182-85 (suggesting that intent-based par-
enting may not negatively impact traditional familial structures, but that it
promotes the procreative choices of persons intensively seeking to raise chil-
dren).
249. See Wadlington, supra note 244, at 511-12.
250. See infra Part IV.A.2.
251. See infra Part IV.A.
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b. in the best interests of the unconceived
Some administrative accommodation for posthumously con-
ceived children in their pursuit of survivor's benefits is reasonable.
As it stands, the Act virtually excludes them as a subclass from bene-
fitting from their own deceased parent's actual contributions into a
social retirement insurance program. Unconceived, as well as un-
born, children understandably have some degree of moral expectancy
of being supported by their predeceased biological or intended pro-
genitors.
252
This moral expectancy of support is reflected in state inheritance
laws which were extended to incorporate the class of after-born chil-
dren as appropriate takers of the intestate estates of predeceased par-
ents.253 Some level of minimal protection should also attach to the
unconceived, who are later born alive within a reasonable gestation
period after the parent's death. A few states have at least acknowl-
edged this approach by permitting predeceased parents to provide for
such children 
by will.
2 5  m
Society should not punish posthumously conceived children be-
cause their parents elected to procreate by assisted reproduction. The
right to procreate has long-standing judicial recognition as a funda-
mentally protected constitutional right that is "one of the basic civil
rights of man... fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race."2 55 Jhordan C. represented the majority view that progeni-
tors should not be discriminated against based upon their chosen
method of procreation, which includes the assisted reproductive op-
tions discussed in this paper. 2 56 It has also been firmly established
that judicial and legislative actions determining the rights and
252. See Chester, supra note 1, at 994-1003.
253. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.1.a.ii, IV.B.l.b.ii.
254. See supra Part II.C.1.
255. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
256. See .hordan C., 179 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 530. Cali-
fornia's Supreme Court concluded in the gestational surrogacy case of Johnson
v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494 (1993), that "[lit
is not the role of the judiciary to inhibit the use of reproductive technology
when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so; any such effort would raise seri-
ous questions in light of the fundamental nature of the rights of procreation and
privacy." Id. at 101, 851 P.2d at 787, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 505.
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entitlements of children should not be an attempt to control the social
behavior and procreational choices of their parents.257
A pervasive prejudice and strong bias against nonmarital chil-
dren is deeply embedded in the lawmaking history of this country.
This prejudice has resulted in the unfair and unequal treatment of
such children as though they were inferior persons entitled to less
protection and to fewer rights based solely on their status.2 8 Society
continues in its struggle to unweave this web of disenfranchisement
traditionally associated with the procreational choices of parents.
Nonmarital children have suffered long enough for the improvident
actions of their ancestors. As reproductive technology advances,
creating new means of exercising one's procreative choices and
thereby potentially creating new legal classes of nonmarital children,
existing relevant laws should be revisited and revamped accordingly.
Although the method of reproduction is unusual, nontraditional,
and, perhaps to some, reminiscent of the mad scientist era, society
must remember that frozen embryos represent the potentiality of hu-
man life in the form of real, living children. Once these children are
born, should they be labeled or even treated as modem day Franken-
steins? One should hope not, for they are indeed individuals.
2 5 9
257. See generally Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (upholding a
statutory provision barring intestate inheritance by an illegitimate child who
had not established paternity during the lifetime of its father).
258. See id. at 505. See also Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (limiting a
nomnarital child's right to inherit from the biological father's estate under in-
testacy laws).
259. See CLIFFORD GROBSTEIN, SCIENCE AND THE UNBORN: CHOOSING
HUMAN FuTURES 22-23 (1988). The moral, ethical, political, and biophysical
implications in assigning individuality status to the unborn has become a rather
complex, yet abstract arena for philosophical and legal debate due to the ad-
vent of reproductive technology. This author provides a rather insightful dis-
cussion on the policy ramifications of assigning such status to the unborn in the
various stages of biophysical development. The individuality and humanness
of the preembryo, embryo, and fetus is discussed in
six separable aspects... that arise during a life history: genetic, de-
velopmental, functional, behavioral, psychic, and social. Genetic in-
dividuality refers to hereditary uniqueness, where "hereditary" means
"able to be transmitted from generation to generation"; developmental
individuality refers to achievement of singleness and its consequences;
functional individuality refers to diverse activities essential to sur-
vival; behavioral individuality refers to integrated activities of the
whole in relation to environments; psychic individuality refers to inner
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They are persons whose liberties and rights are indisputably pro-
tected by principles of fairness and equity promoted by the Constitu-
tion as was once vehemently interpreted through the judicial activism
and leadership of the Warren Court.
260
III. OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY LEGISLATION AND THE NATURE
OF SURVIVOR'S DEATH BENEFITS
A. An Overview of the Historical and Political Schemes of Social
Security
By the turn of the twentieth century, the poverty level of this
rapidly industrialized nation was in epidemic proportions.2 6' Under
experiences accompanying behaviors; and social individuality refers
to self-aware interactions within a community of individuals.
Id. at 22-23.
260. The political demography of the Warren Court's majority is marked by
remnants of Chief Justice Warren's progressivismn-a political ideology of af-
firmative government which embraced the impact technological progress
would have in making America a better place to live; promoted the return of
moralistic canons of social values and decency to replace corrupted govern-
ment public offices politicized by deference to monopolistic corporate over-
tures; and which refuted anti-patriotic foreign nationals, their ideologies, and
organizations which were perceived as threats to national security, and radical
liberalism which resulted in high profile landmark civil liberties decisions such
as Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Warren Court's
overall interpretive ideology represented a radical metamorphosis from past
Courts' adherence to judicial restraint in matters of traditional public policy
and law making vestiges. Judicial activism motivated by egalitarian and lib-
ertarian principles, sometimes criticized as being devoid of any legal princi-
ples, fueled the Warren Court's reputation in that
[n]o group of judges before the Warren Court had sought simultane-
ously to encourage affirmative government and to protect rights
against the state. No group of judges had been willing to depart so
markedly from canons of judicial restraint and at the same time to
champion so vigorously the rights of disadvantaged and dissident per-
sons. Warren and his fellow members of the liberal majorities on the
Warren Court took those positions, in the face of severe professional
and lay criticism, because they believed in the rightness and justice of
their undertaking.
G. EDWARD WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 348 (1982).
261. After the Great Depression in the late 1920s and early 30s, many
Americans no longer had confidence in their ability to forestall the economic
uncertainties of poverty through savings, extended families, and an agricultural
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the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Congress re-
sponded with the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935.262
President Roosevelt's intent was to create a social insurance program
to pay one-time lump sum benefits to retired workers over age 65.263
During remarks at the signing of the Act, he envisioned that
This social security measure gives at least some measure of
protection to thirty million of our citizens who will reap di-
rect benefits through unemployment compensation, through
old-age pensions and through increased services for the
protection of children and the prevention of ill health.
We can never insure one hundred percent of the popu-
lation against one hundred percent of the hazards and vicis-
situdes of life, but we have tried to frame a law which will
give some measure of protection to the average citizen and
to his family against the loss of a job and against poverty-
ridden old age.264
The Act has been amended in monumental ways to reflect the
economic conditions and political trends in America. Some of the
most significant amendments were enacted to expand the coverage of
social security programs.265 For instance, in 1939, insurance benefits
were made available to the dependents and survivors of workers with
earning base. The problem of economic insecurity was further compounded by
the Industrial Revolution, as many agricultural and rural families left their
homes in search of the promised economic rewards of urban living. See
ROBERT J. MYERS, SOCIAL SECURITY 1-20 (4th ed. 1993); SOCIAL SEC.
ADMIN., A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (1995)
[hereinafter A BRIEF HISTORY].
262. See A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 261, at 3; MYERS, supra note 261, at
228-32.
263. See A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 261, at 3.
264. Id. at 4.
265. Current coverage under the Act includes the following programs: Re-
tirement Insurance, Survivor's Insurance, Disability Insurance, hospital and
medical insurance for the aged, the disabled, and those with end-stage renal
disease, Black Lung benefits, Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment
Insurance, public assistance and welfare services (aid to needy families with
children, medical assistance, maternal and child health services, child support
enforcement, family and child welfare services, food stamps, and energy as-
sistance). See S.S. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 5; Stansbury, supra note 27,
at 1-3.
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qualified earnings.266 In the next decade, between 1950 and 1956,
the Act's coverage was expanded to include disability insurance
payments to disabled adult workers and their dependents. 67 Be-
tween 1965 and 1977, the Act's coverage expanded further when the
Medicare bill was signed into law to provide health coverage insur-
ance to all Americans aged 65 or older.268
This progressive and steady expansion of coverage269 and pro-
grams 27 came to a halt in the early 1980s when it became evident
that the long-term financial viability of social security was at risk.27'
266. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360,
1363-67.
267. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, 64 Stat. 477,
555; Social Security Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, 70 Stat. 807, 815.
268. See The Health Insurance for Aged Act (Medicare Act of 1965), Pub. L.
No. 89-97, tit. 1, 79 Stat. 290.
269. On June 30, 1961, the Act's eligibility age requirement for benefits was
reduced from 65 to 62 by the Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L.
No. 87-64, 75 Stat. 131, 131. Later, under the Prouty Amendment in the Tax
Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-368, 80 Stat. 38, 67-68, social security
benefits were made available to all persons 72 years of age and older who were
without coverage.
270. President Richard Nixon signed into law the Social Security Act
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329, 1465, creating the
Supplemental Security Income program, which federalized the benefits for
needy, aged, disabled and blind adult persons into one centralized system un-
der the jurisdiction of the Social Security Administration.
271. The National Commission on Social Security Reform was proposed by
President Ronald Reagan in September of 1981 to address Social Security's
short and long term financial outlook and to provide a reasonable congres-
sional bipartisan consensus in resolving the financial crisis of the country's so-
cial security program. This group, the Greenspan Commission, provided rec-
ommendations which were reflected in the Social Security Amendments of
1983. See Myers, supra note 261, at 310-27.
When signing into law the Social Security Amendments of 1983, Presi-
dent Reagan stated that
Just a few months ago, there was legitimate alarm that Social Security
would soon run out of money .... The Social Security System must
be preserved. And rescuing the System has meant re-examining its
original intent, purposes and practical limits. The amendments em-
bodied in this legislation recognize that Social Security cannot do as
much for us as we might have hoped when trust funds were over-
flowing . . . . These amendments reaffirm the commitment of our
government to the performance and stability of Social Security. It was
nearly 50 years ago when, under the leadership of Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, the American people reached a turning point, setting up the
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
During this decade, President Ronald Reagan signed into law the
first of a series of retrenchment amendments which limited eligibility
threshold requirements and permitted the taxation of social security
benefits as an additional source of government revenue. 272  The
1990s have led to significant legislation which increased the percent-
age of social security income subject to taxation,273 placed additional
limits on disability payments to alcoholics and drug addicts, 274 and
created a progressive increase in the threshold retirement age for so-
cial security eligibility over the next decade.275 The financial crisis
facing the social security program has led to great public debate and
re-evaluation of program objectives and possible alternative funding
sources in the future.
276
The funding of the social insurance program, through specially
created trust funds, began in January, 1937, by the collection of
Social Security System .... Today we reaffirm Franklin Roosevelt's
commitment that Social Security must always provide a secure and
stable base so that older Americans may live in dignity.
MYERS, supra note 261, at 893-95 (citing PuBLIc PAPERS: RONALD REAGAN
1983 (1984)).
272. See id. at 258-60; Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460 § 11(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1794, 1806; Social Security Act
Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65; Social Security Act Dis-
ability Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, 94 Stat. 441.
273. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66,
tit. 13, § 13215, 107 Stat. 312, 475-77. See also MYERS, supra note 261, at
258-60 (discussing legislative retrenchment measures on the social security
program taken in the last decade).
274. See Social Security Independance and Program Improvements Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-296, 108 Stat. 1464. See also MYERS, supra note 261,
at 258-60 (discussing legislative retrenchment measures on the social security
program taken in the last decade).
275. See A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 261, at 16.
276. See Tritch, supra note 40, at 96-99. Tritch discusses several alterna-
tives, which include: (1) Personal Security Accounts-individuals would rein-
vest the difference in a reduced payroll tax in a personal security account with
a private investment source; (2) Personal Investment Plans-individuals would
take a smaller reduction in payroll taxes to be reinvested in an investment fund;
(3) Individual Accounts-taxpayers would be required to open a separate indi-
vidual retirement account without any corresponding reduction in payroll
taxes; (4) Maintain Benefits Plan-calls for an investment of "as much as 40%
of the trust fund in a stock index fund;" and (5) Raise taxes and cut benefits-
proposes a progressive payroll tax increase and increasing the retirement age to
70 by the year 2037. See id; see also Tynes, supra note 40, at 155-92 (dis-
cussing changes in the program between 1977 and 1990).
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Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes from qualified
employers and workers based upon their reported wages.277 Since
then, a reported $4.1 trillion has been paid out in benefits from the
total collected fund balance of $4.5 trillion.2 78 It has been estimated
that the remaining balance of the trust fund, some $496 billion, along
with funds to be collected over the next 14 years will not be enough
to pay out benefits starting in the year 2012.79
As Congress determines the political outcome and financial fu-
ture of Social Security, American courts continue to address cases
challenging the constitutionality of the Act's statutory restrictions on
eligibility requirements for certain classes of people, such as post-
humous children.280 Federal courts have adopted a liberal approach
in interpreting the legislative intent of social security provisions so as
to award benefits in marginal cases when at all possible.
2 81
277. See A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 261, at 8. See also MYERS, supra
note 261, at 229-94 (providing a detailed overview on the legislative history of
the Act affecting areas of monthly lump sum benefits coverage for workers and
auxiliaries-family and spouses; adjustments to the minimum retirement age;
designations of qualified "insured status," and the taxation of benefits, relevant
tax rates and other funding issues).
278. See A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 261, at 8. In 1937, a total of
$1,278,000 in social security benefits were paid out to recipients, compared to
a total of $316,812,000,000 paid out in 1994. A total of $5,096,000,000 in
Supplemental Security Income was paid out in the first year of federally ad-
ministered payments in 1974, whereas the total paid out in 1994 was
$25,291,000,000. See id. at 22.
279. See Tritch, supra note 40, at 96 (stating that "[a]ccording to a 1996 re-
port of the Social Security Trustees, starting in just 16 years-2012-the taxes
paid into Social Security will no longer cover the benefits going out, as mil-
lions of baby boomers begin retiring").
280. The constitutionality of various portions of the Social Security Act was
determined in Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979); Fleming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603 (1960); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). For a case dealing specifically with provi-
sions related to the determination of paternity of a posthumous child, see Haas
v. Chater, 79 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 1996) holding that the Social Security Act's
incorporation of the Indiana state inheritance statute as a basis for determining
the paternity of a posthumous child for insurance benefits was constitutional.
281. See Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1982); Adams v.
Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 659 (2d Cir. 1975); Wharton v. Bowen, 710 F.
Supp. 903, 906 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (determining that the humanitarian aim of the
act required a liberal interpretation of the "living with" requirement in an ille-
gitimate child claim case); Ray v. Social Sec. Bd., 73 F. Supp. 58 (S.D. Ala.
308
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Conversely, courts have also recognized their duty to uphold the
constitutionality of the Act's eligibility requirements when necessary
to prevent spurious claims.282 This existing "tension between hon-
oring the broad remedial scope of the [A]ct and protecting the social
security system from becoming abused and overburdened 28 3 is
likely to polarize even further due to the bleak financial outlook of
social security.
The social security laws of this country offer a broad range of
financial and medical supportive services "providing for the material
needs of individuals and families, protecting aged and disabled per-
sons against the expenses of illnesses that could otherwise exhaust
their savings, keeping families together, and giving children the op-
portunity to grow up in health and security., 28 4 These services range
from Black Lung benefits, railroad retirement, and sickness and un-
employment insurance 285 to hospital and medical insurance for those
with end-stage renal disease.286 State social security-related benefit
programs which operate in concert with the federal government in-
287 288dlude: Unemployment Insurance, Worker's Compensation,
Veteran's Benefits,289 Public Assistance and Welfare (Workfare) to
Families with Children, Food Stamp assistance, and child support en-
forcement and establishment of paternity.290
Services which are typically referred to as "social security bene-
fits" are governed by the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insur-
ance (OASDI) program under the Act and are specifically designed
to protect disabled and aged (retired) persons and their qualifying
family members from financial destitution.291 Events which trigger
1947) (applying Alabama law and pronouncing that the Social Security Act
was to be liberally construed).
282. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 634 (1974).
283. Stansbury, supra note 27, at 2.
284. S.S. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 5.
285. See id.
286. See id. at 439-53.
287. See id. at 485-509.
288. See id. at 459-62.
289. See id. at 474-75.
290. See id. at 464-74.
291. See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1994); S.S. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 462-64.
The Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, and Food Stamps programs are
also major components of the typical social security benefits.
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the Act's provision of retirement, disability, dependent's and survi-
vor's insurance include: a wage earner's retirement at the threshold
age, a person's disability at any age, and the death of a qualifying
wage earner.292
In order to qualify for retirement, disability, and survivor's in-
surance, applicants must establish that they or their qualifying wage
earner has worked the requisite number of years and paid social se-
curity taxes on earnings. 293 The employee's earning record deter-
mines whether the worker has enough covered employment experi-
ence or "credits" to qualify for insurance payments and the amount
the applicant is entitled to receive.294 The higher the worker's aver-
age lifetime earnings are during covered work experience, the higher
insurance payment the applicant receives.295 Applicants for full re-
tirement benefits must have also reached the required age of retire-
ment which was 65 between 1994 and 1999, and increases to 67 in
the year 2022 and later.296 Additional disability status requirements
must be met for applicants seeking disability insurance.
297
Retirement and disability insurance benefits are more properly
characterized as rights of entitlement available to living wage earners
or their families based upon a lifetime condition or activity such as
the worker's disability or work history. Disability and retirement
benefits are terminated when the worker dies.29 8 It is the wage
earner's death which triggers a surviving applicant's right to apply
for survivor's insurance. As such, posthumous conception is rele-
vant in certain claims for survivor's benefits because the conception
and birth of the child applicant occurs after the death of his or her
putative wage earner parent. 299 A pragmatic stance would lead to the
conclusion that only those who are alive and survive the death of the
292. See S.S. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 33-35. See generally Garner v.
Richardson, 333 F. Supp. 1191, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (interpreting the legis-
lative intent of survivor's benefits as simply to replace lost income the child
would have continued to receive but for the death of the wage earner).
293. See S.S. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 29-38.
294. See id.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See id.
298. See id. at 345.
299. See Kerekes, supra note 1, at 232-40 (discussing the fate of Judith Hart
and other posthumously conceived children under the Act).
310
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worker should be entitled to survivor's death benefits.300 This ap-
proach, of course, might result in having different survivor's status
and benefits assigned to whole blood siblings within the same family
u30it. O1
B. Survivor's Death Insurance Under Social Security
In furtherance of the Act's goal of keeping families together,
dependent's and survivor's death benefits were added to worker's
retirement benefits under social security by amendment in 193 9.302
Depending on the applicant's relationship to the deceased worker,
survivor's insurance benefits are payable on a monthly basis, and
may include a one-time lump sum death payment.30 3 The amount of
the monthly payment represents a set percentage of the worker's
primary insurance amount (PIA)30 4 which is based upon the worker's
eamings, the applicant's age and relationship to the worker, and the
extent to which the payment exceeds the "family maximum" limit.
30 5
The establishment of an applicant's relational status to a de-
ceased wage earner is paramount in qualifying for survivor's insur-
ance under social security. Upon the death of a worker who has
earned the requisite employment credits, survivor's benefits may be
payable to a range of family members. Qualifying family members
include the worker's widow or widower,3 6 unmarried children under
18,307 father or mother of the worker's children under sixteen years
300. See id. at 238-39 (discussing the original decision of the Social Security
Administration Appeals Council in Judith Hart's case).
301. See id. at 240-41.
302. See Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360
(1939); MYERS, supra note 261, at 238.
303. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(i), (j) (1994).
304. The computation of the primary insurance amount depends upon the
type of coverage, benefit, age and status of the worker or auxiliary or surviving
familial beneficiaries. The ultimate determination of an insured's benefit
amount is based upon the worker's Average Monthly Wage (AMW) as com-
puted by set formulas to reach the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA). See
MYERS, supra note 261, at 60-62, 247-58.
305. The Maximum Family Benefit (MFB) caps the amount of auxiliary and
surviving benefits payable in one given family based upon the eamings record
of a particular worker. See id. at 169-70, 213-14.
306. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e), (f) (1994).
307. See id. § 402(d).
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of age, 30 8 dependent parents sixty-two years of age or older,30 9 and
surviving divorced spouses.
310
Of all potential survivors, the widow(er) is entitled to the great-
est proportionate share of the worker's PIA.3 1' Survivor's benefits
are payable to the wage earner's unmarried, surviving widow(er)
who is at least sixty, or fifty if disabled, and who meets one of six
qualifications, two of which include: (1) being married to the de-
ceased for at least nine months prior to death, and (2) being the bio-
logical or adoptive parent of a child of the deceased wage earner.
3 12
Posthumous conception issues are clearly implicated in two other
types of survivor's insurance: mother's or father's insurance, and
unmarried children's insurance.
Where widow(er)'s insurance is unavailable, survivor's benefits
may still be payable to the surviving spouse or divorced spouse who
is a mother or father of the deceased worker's children who are under
16 years of age, where that surviving parent is caring for the child
and meets certain other criteria.313  Qualifying for mother's or
308. See id. § 402(g).
309. See id. § 402(h).
310. See id. § 402(b), (c).
311. See id. § 402(e), (f); SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, FAST FACTS
& FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY 15 (Office of Research, Evaluation and
Statistics 1998) [hereinafter FAST FACTS & FIGURES]. See also MYERS, supra
note 261, at 50-52, 54-57, 60 (confirming that the widow(er)'s survivor's bene-
fits are the highest because they are entitled to 100 percent of the PIA if the
claim is made at the normal retirement age as statutorily provided).
312. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e), (f); S.S. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 69-70.
The second requirement is met simply by showing that "a live child was born
to the worker and the claimant, although the child need not still survive." Id. at
70. With assisted reproductive technology, more aged surviving widow(er)s
may now qualify for benefits under this second criterion. More elderly persons
could join the ranks of such applicants by artificially conceiving children, even
after the wage earner's death, at a time beyond their normal reproductive years.
See Margaret Carlson, Old Enough to Be Your Mother: Two Women Stir Up
the Question of When is it Too Late to Bear Children, TIME, Jan. 10, 1994, at
41. As such, it is possible that the legal status of "biological child" will require
future administrative and judicial scrutiny to determine whether the child's live
birth must occur prior to the worker's death.
313. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1). Upon filing an application for such benefits
in a timely fashion, surviving spouses or surviving divorced spouses qualify
for mother's or father's insurance if they are unmarried and are not entitled to
other surviving spouse insurance or old-age benefits. They must also have in
their care a child who qualifies as a child of the deceased worker. See id.
312
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father's benefits is contingent upon establishing a parental relation-
ship between the deceased worker and the children who are in the
care of the surviving mother or father.314 Since reproductive tech-
nology has expanded the configuration of such relationships, the
most challenging task now confronting Social Security officials is
the determination of whether the posthumously conceived children of
a surviving mother or father qualify as the deceased worker's sur-
viving "children." Judith Hart's mother's application for surviving
mother's benefits would have raised this very issue to be addressed
under the Act.
315
Mrs. Hart's primary claim was on behalf of her daughter Judith
as the child of her predeceased husband.316 Ordinarily, child survi-
vor's benefits are payable to the unmarried, dependent children of a
deceased worker until the child reaches age eighteen; or nineteen if
the child is a full-time elementary or secondary school student; or
older if the child has a disability which began prior to age twenty-
two. 3 17 Child survivors, who constitute approximately half of all
children receiving social security benefits, receive the highest aver-
age monthly benefit among child beneficiaries because they are enti-
tled to receive three-quarters of their deceased parent's PIA.31 In
1997, the average monthly benefit payable to all children of disabled,
retired or deceased workers was $345 per month, whereas child sur-
vivors alone received an average monthly payment of $493.3l9
These benefits were established to replace the surviving child's
loss of income resulting from the worker's death.32° Courts have
thus found that the legislative intent behind such payments is to sup-
port surviving children who were actually "dependent" upon the
314. See id. § 402(g)(1)(E). The child must in turn qualify for child's insur-
ance benefits under § 402(d).
315. See supra Prologue.
316. See Kerekes, supra note 1, at 232-40.
317. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B).
318. See FAST FACTS & FIGUREs, supra note 311, at 33.
319. See id.
320. See Wolfe v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1025, 1028 (10th Cir. 1993) (recog-
nizing that pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495, 507, 508 & n.14 (1976), Congress intended to replace the loss of in-
come and support children experienced at their parent's death, which is not
based upon an applicant's otherwise legitimate claim for support).
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wage earner at death.321 The Act's dependency requirement may be
presumed, however, by establishing a child's required relational
status with the wage earner, as discussed below.322 Where depend-
ency becomes an issue, the applicant must produce evidence of ac-
tual dependency. 323 Actual dependency can be proven with evidence
that the child was living with the worker at the worker's death, or
that the worker was contributing to the child's support when the
worker died.324
321. See id. In Wolfe, the Court recognized that the purpose of awarding so-
cial security survivorship benefits is to provide financial support for children
who were dependent upon the deceased wage earner at his or her death. The
benefits are intended to replace the loss of support income that a dependent
child received while the wage earner was alive and working. See id.
322. See Stansbury, supra note 27, at 40-43; Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1028. Wolfe
recognized that pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Mathews, Congress
intended that actual dependency would not need to be shown in instances
where
the child would be entitled to inherit under state laws governing in-
testate succession of personal property, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A); if
the parents went through a marriage ceremony but the marriage is in-
valid due to a legal impediment, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B); or if the
parent, before death, acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his
or her child, had been decreed by a court to be the parent, or had been
ordered to contribute child support because the applicant was his
child. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i).
Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1028.
323. See Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1028 (holding that actual dependency will be-
come an issue when applications for survivor's benefits are submitted by post-
humous illegitimate children, pursuant to Parsons ex rel. Bryant v. Health &
Human Servs., 762 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1985); Doran v. Schweiker, 681
F.2d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1982); and Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 660
(2d Cir. 1975)).
324. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3), (4); id. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii), (h)(3)(B)(ii),
(h)(3)(C)(ii); Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1028; Parsons, 762 F.2d at 1191; Doran, 681
F.2d at 608; Adams, 521 F.2d at 660. These cases recognize the practical im-
possibility in requiring illegitimate, posthumous children to prove actual de-
pendency under this test. Instead, they hold that a more reasonable approach
would be to permit such children to show that their deceased parent's support
was commensurate to the child's needs at the time the parent died. See Wolfe,
988 F.2d at 1028. The "commensurate test" has not been extended to posthu-
mously conceived illegitimate children who would have an even greater diffi-
culty in establishing the factors under the actual dependency tests. See Stans-
bury, supra note 27, at 40-43.
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As mentioned earlier, actual proof of these factors may not be
necessary where the applicant is shown to be the decedent's "child"
under the Act.325 There are six statutory definitions of a qualifying
"child" upon which a proof of actual dependency may not be re-
quired. These are a worker's: (1) legitimate child under state intes-
tate law,326 (2) stepchild under certain criteria,327 (3) legally adopted
child,328 (4) ceremonial marital child under certain situations,32 (5)
dependent grandchild or step grandchild,33 ° or (6) natural child.33' It
has been determined that Congress intended that under these circum-
stances, dependency is "objectively probable."
332
Most recipients of child survivor's insurance qualify for benefits
either as a "legitimate child" under state intestate law or as a "natural
child" of the worker. The statutory deference to states' intestate laws
exists, in part, because in 1939 these laws were fairly uniform, con-
sistent and reliable in determining the paternity of children for intes-
tate purposes. 333 All states' intestate laws presume the paternity of
legitimate children born during the marriage or within a reasonable
gestation period beyond the dissolution of the marriage. 334 Due to
this presumption of paternity, marital children are deemed dependent
on a deceased marital parent for survivor's benefits.335 No proof of
325. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(3), 416(e)(1), (h)(2).
326. See id. § 416(h)(2)(A).
327. See id. § 416(e)(2).
328. See id. § 416(e)(1).
329. See id. § 416(h)(2)(B).
330. See id. § 416(e)(3).
331. See id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i); S.S. HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 74-76.
332. Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1028 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 509
(1976), which upheld the Act's additional requirements of actual dependency
for posthumous illegitimate children who are unable to meet the Act's pre-
sumed tests of dependency).
333. See Charles Nelson Le Ray, Note, Implications of DNA Technology on
Posthumous Paternity Determination: Deciding the Facts When Daddy Can't
Give His Opinion, 35 B.C. L. REV. 747, 750-59 (1994) (proposing changes to
the Uniform Parentage Act and the Uniform Act on Paternity to reflect the le-
gal implications of DNA testing in posthumous paternity disputes).
334. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES § 649, at 158; Le
Ray, supra note 333, at 750-59.
335. See Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1027; Stansbury, supra note 27, at 40.
January 1999]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 32:251
actual dependency is usually required of legitimate, marital chil-
dren.
33 6
Qualifying as a "legitimate child" under state intestate laws is
generally not an option for nonmarital and most posthumously con-
ceived children because they are conceived outside the bounds of
marriage, and thus are unable to avail themselves of a state's pater-
nity presumption as legitimate children.337 Often, their only recourse
in establishing dependency upon a deceased wage earner is to prove
that they are the worker's "natural child. 338
There are four tests used to prove one's status as a worker's
"natural child." A deceased worker's natural child is a child who has
been: (1) acknowledged in writing by the worker as his or her child
prior to death,339 (2) decreed by a court as the worker's child prior to
the worker's death,340 (3) a recipient of court-ordered child support
from the worker prior to the worker's death,341 or (4) shown to be the
child of the worker by other satisfactory evidence and by having
lived with the decedent or been supported by the decedent at his
death.
342
Many nonmarital children are deemed dependent on their de-
ceased parent by proving the factors under one of the first three tests.
These tests are rarely suitable, however, for nonmarital children who
are conceived or born postmortem because the Act requires the ac-
knowledgment or court order of support or paternity to occur prior to
the worker's death.343 Thus, these children are almost always re-
quired to show actual dependency under the final test of natural
336. See Stansbury, supra note 27, at 40-43.
337. See infra Part IV.
338. See infra Part IV.
339. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(i)(I), (h)(3)(C)(i)(I).
340. See id. § 416 (h)(3)(A)(i)(II), (h)(3)(C)(i)(II).
341. See id. § 416(h)(3)(A)(i)(III), (h)(3)(C)(i)(III).
342. See id. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii), (h)(3)(C)(ii).
343. The acknowledgment and court order of support or paternity will be
"deemed to have occurred on the first day of the month in which it actually oc-
curred." Id. § 416(h)(3).
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child.344 This final means of establishing dependency, known as the
"last resort test,"345 is essentially their only plausible option.
The last resort test involves a two-tier analysis. First, the claim-
ant must submit satisfactory evidence of paternity, and then show
that the decedent was living with the claimant or supporting the
claimant at the time of the decedent's death.346 After-born as well as
posthumously conceived children are usually able to establish pater-
nity, especially when the deceased worker's DNA samples are avail-
able for testing. 347 Most find it difficult, however, to prove they
were living with or supported by the worker at his death because they
were either in utero or in some other stage of an assisted reproduc-
tion process.
348
It is practically impossible for such children to meet the statu-
tory requirement that they and the predeceased worker had "ordinar-
ily live[d] in the same home and the worker exercise[d], or ha[d] the
right to exercise, parental control or authority over the child's activi-
ties. ' 349 In Wharton v. Bowen,350 the Eastern District Court of New
York opined that even an unborn child should have the ability to
prove the "living with" requirement in marginal cases.351 The court
recognized that the Act's humanitarian aim supported a liberal inter-
pretation where it could be proven that the unborn, illegitimate child
was the worker's biological child.352
The Act's "support" standard, which mandates that the wage
earner's contributions to a child applicant be made "regularly and
[be] large enough to meet an important part of the [child's] ordinary
344. See Stansbury, supra note 27, at 40-43; Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1025; Par-
sons ex rel. Bryant, 762 F.2d at 1191; Doran, 681 F.2d at 608; Adams, 521
F.2d at 660.
345. See Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1025; Parsons ex rel. Bryant, 762 F.2d at 1191;
Doran, 681 F.2d at 608; Adams, 521 F.2d at 660.
346. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(A)(ii), (h)(3)(C)(ii).
347. See Le Ray, supra note 333, at 750-59.
348. See Doran, 681 F.2d at 608 (stating that such a test does not serve the
remedial nature of the Act because it denies virtually all posthumous illegiti-
mate children the ability to demonstrate their father's support).
349. Stansbury, supra note 27, at 43.
350. 710 F. Supp. 903 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
351. See id. at 906.
352. See id.
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living costs," 353 also presents an impenetrable impasse for nonmari-
tal, posthumously conceived and after-born children. As early as
1975,354 a slow erosion of the "regular and substantial" support stan-
dard began as a number of courts liberally construed the standard
when applying it to such children. 5  Other, more relevant factors
such as the deceased parent's financial support of the unborn child's
mother were considered in determining whether the support require-
ment was met.356 The contributions made to the pregnant mother
were constructively attributed to the care and support of the unborn
child,357 as courts began to concentrate on the nature of the pre-death
relationship between the child's unwed parents. By 1993, the Tenth
Circuit, in Wolfe v. Sullivan,358 ratified Doran's commensurate sup-
port test3 59 which allowed after-born, nonmarital children to prove
that their parent's support was commensurate with their needs as an
unborn child given their father's financial status and the stage of
their mother's pregnancy at the father's death.36°
Wolfe substantiated the need to adjust the administrative inter-
pretation of traditional support standards to reflect current trends in
society's relational and reproductive habits. The unmarried couple in
Wolfe had met in late April of 1988 and began living together in
early May, 1988.361 The mother informed the father of her preg-
nancy in late August, 1988, and the couple separated in early
353. Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1028.
354. See Adams, 521 F.2d at 659.
355. See Wolfe, 988 F.2d at 1025; Orsini v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1393 (1 1th
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024 (1991); Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d
1093 (9th Cir. 1987); Dubinski ex rel. Van Schindel v. Bowen, 808 F.2d 611
(7th Cir. 1986); Imani v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 988 (1986); Parsons ex rel. Bryant, 762 F.2d at 1191; Doran, 681 F.2d at
605; Parker v. Schweiker, 673 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1982); Boyland v. Califano,
633 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1980); Jones v. Harris, 629 F.2d 334 (4th Cir. 1980);
Fleming v. Califano, 594 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 918
(1979); Gay ex rel. McBride v. Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 499 (N.D. Ga. 1984);
Adams, 521 F.2d at 659.
356. See Doran, 681 F.2d at 609.
357. See id.
358. 988 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1993).
359. See id. at 1028.
360. See id.
361. See id. at 1027.
318
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September, 1988.362 The child was born on April 26, 1989, six
months after the father's death on October 5, 1988.363
The claimant in this case, however, was unable to satisfy the
"commensurate support" test because none of the deceased putative
father's contributions to the mother were made to support the unborn
child.364 Although he had the requisite pre-death knowledge of the
unborn child, his contributions were made for courtship purposes
which he had discontinued by the time of his death. 65 He had not
purchased any baby clothes, baby furniture, or provided for the
mother's food, housing, or prenatal and medical care.366 The court
concluded that there was simply no evidentiary basis in this case
upon which even the commensurate support test could stand.
Most courts have, whenever possible, taken a liberal approach
when applying the commensurate test because of the Act's remedial
nature. 367 In one earlier case, another illegitimate, posthumous child
successfully met the test even where there was only a one-time con-
tribution to the child's medical care by the deceased worker.
368
No court has yet been willing, however, to extend the commen-
surate support test to allow nonmarital children conceived after the
death of a parent to satisfactorily prove their dependency upon that
parent. 369 The Hart case prompted a further inquiry into whether
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. See id. at 1029.
365. See id. at 1028-29. Referring to Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507
(1976), the Wolfe court stated that the father must have knowledge of the un-
born child prior to his death so that the Act's purpose of replacing the child's
lost support could be met. See id. The court further stated that "[e]xpenditures
intended for courtship of the mother do not constitute contributions to the sup-
port of the unborn child." Id. at 1029 (citing Bennemon ex rel. Williams v.
Sullivan, 914 F.2d 987, 991-92 (7th Cir. 1990)). The court concluded that any
qualifying contributions must have been made at the time of the putative fa-
ther's death and that the worker's date of death is the controlling date in survi-
vor's claims. See id.
366. See id. at 1028 (determining that pursuant to Soc. Sec. R. 68-22,
"[s]upport may be shown either by proof that contributions such as baby
clothes or a crib were made to the unborn child, or that contributions such as
food, shelter, or medical care were made to the mother").
367. See Doran, 681 F.2d at 607; Adams, 521 F.2d at 659.
368. See Adams, 521 F.2d at 660.
369. See Hart v. Shalala (E.D. La. 1994) (No. 94-3944). At the administra-
tive level, Judith Hart was unable to satisfactorily prove that she was "depend-
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such children are even capable of being dependent, under either the
"living with" or "commensurate support" tests, on a parent who died
prior to the child's conception. 37  This inquiry raised the initial
question of whether Congress ever contemplated extending social se-
curity coverage to such children when the survivor's provisions were
added to the Act in 1939. It is highly unlikely, especially because
the requisite reproductive technology was nonexistent during that
time. Moreover, in Hart, the Social Security Administration con-
ceded that it was unable to conclusively determine this inquiry.37'
IV. CATEGORICAL PARADIGMS IN DETERMINING CHILD SURVIVORS
UNDER SOCIAL SECURITY
The Act's definition of children has evolved over the last sixty
years to reflect constitutional challenges from nontraditional classes
of aggrieved child applicants.372 There is no doubt that early law-
makers never envisioned a time when social protocol and scientific
advancements would compel equal treatment for dependent non-
marital children, after-born children, grandchildren, adopted children
and even stepchildren.373 The final resolution of this inquiry must
ultimately depend upon whether there is sufficient elasticity in the
Act's current definition and treatment of "children" to extend survi-
vor's coverage to posthumously conceived children.374 Thus, in that
vein, the evolution of the Act's treatment of certain classes of
ent" upon her father because she could not establish the "living with" or "sup-
ported by" standards under dependency. Benefits were finally awarded due to
the absence of applicable law which would enable posthumously conceived
children to meet such standards. See id.
370. See Kerekes, supra note 1, at 232-40.
371. See id. at 238.
372. See infra Part IV.B.
373. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 416(e), (h). Some states have determined that a
child is an "individual entitled to take as a child... [from a parent] by intestate
succession." ALA. CODE § 43-8-1(2) (Michie 1991). The term "excludes any
person who is only a stepchild, foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote
descendent." Id.
374. The legal status of posthumously conceived children must be addressed
in order to determine whether they are entitled to survivor's benefits. This re-
quires that the child prove that she is the legal, albeit, biological child of the
parent for entitlement purposes. Establishing this relational status is essential
before the child can make any such claims derived from or through the de-
ceased biological parent.
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children will be evaluated to determine whether further expansion is
warranted.
A. The Evolving Definition of Children for Social Security
Survivor's Benefits Under State Inheritance, Paternity, and Assisted
Reproduction Laws
Prior to 1965, the Social Security Administration relied primar-
ily on state inheritance and paternity laws to determine whether child
applicants met the relational status required to receive survivor's
benefits.375  State inheritance and paternity laws were predicated
upon standards that resulted in social security benefits being awarded
mostly to marital children who were conceived prior to the deceased
worker's death.376
1. State paternity laws-presumptive inheritance
The presumption of patemity for marital children is, in part, a
result of the evidentiary bar against introducing testimony disproving
the paternity of marital children under "Lord Mansfield's Rule. 377
Nationwide departure from this rule began as states changed
evidentiary standards in proving paternity due to the development of
more reliable blood and DNA paternity testing.
378
375. See Kelly Wall Schemenauer, Adams v. Weinberger and Dubinski v.
Bowen: Posthumous Illegitimate Children and the Social Security Survivor-
ship Provision, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1214-17 (1988). This article also de-
scribes how the 1939 amendment limited survivor's benefits to either children
who qualified as a worker's natural children and who could inherit the
worker's estate under state intestacy laws or children born to parents whose
ceremonial marriage was invalidated due to some legal impediment. See id. In
1965, the Act was amended to expand the illegitimate child's options when ap-
plying for survivor's benefits. See id. at 1215.
376. See Doran v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1982) (stating that
the dependency test under survivor's benefits "denie[d] virtually all posthu-
mous illegitimate children the ability to demonstrate their father's support");
Schemenauer, supra note 375, at 1213.
377. HARVEY L. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES
§ 649, at 158. See also SIDNEY B. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY
PROCEEDINGS 17 (3d ed. 1953) (referring to the early English case of Russell
v. Russell, 1924 App. Cas. 721, where Lord Dunedin affirms "the rule that
husband or wife may not testify to non-access where the result may be to bas-
tardize the issue").
378. See Le Ray, supra note 333, at 786-89.
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Other socio-political factors, such as the erosion of the tradi-
tional family structure, as well as greater public acceptance of alter-
nate lifestyles and conception choices in assisted reproduction and
adoption, also diminished uniformity in state paternity laws.
379
These factors prompted greater flexibility in evidentiary standards
which prove or disprove paternity regardless of the parent's marital
status.0 State courts now tend to permit "all competent evidence,
including that of the husband and wife regarding such issues as non-
access and infidelity," in proving a child's paternity.38 1 Thus, puta-
tive fathers now have a greater ability to rebut the presumption of
paternity of marital children, thus forestalling them from qualifying
as takers of an intestate share under the putative father's estate.
2. The equal protection of state inheritance laws
No early statutory presumption of paternity existed for non-
marital children.382 Historically, intestate laws reflected the Latin
phrase nulliusfilius in disallowing nonmarital children from inherit-
ing because they were considered "the children of no one."383 Geor-
gia's modem statutory reference emphasizes this historical bias, pro-
viding that "[a] child born out of wedlock [shall] have no inheritable
blood except that given to them by express law."384 All states now
categorically provide that nonmarital children are minimally their
biological mother's child, and for intestate purposes, can inherit from
the estates of their mother and her relatives.385
379. See id.
380. See id.
381. MCCORMICK, supra note 377, at 158.
382. See Le Ray, supra note 326, at 750.
383. See Schemenauer, supra note 375, at 1213 n.4 (citing I W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIEs 458, which states that "[tihe incapacity of a
bastard consists principally in... that he cannot be heir to any one, neither can
he have heirs, but of his own body; for being nulliusfilius, he is therefore of
kin to nobody"). See also SCHATKIN, supra note 377, at 619-88 (providing an
extensive overview of various state paternity and affiliation laws as of 1946).
Many of these early statutes referred to nonmarital children as "bastards," "il-
legitimates," or as a "child born out of wedlock." Id.
384. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-4 (1994).
385. These statutes typically provide that "[an] illegitimate child shall be
considered as an heir to his mother, and shall inherit her estate, in whole or in
part, as the case may be, as if he had been bom in lawful wedlock." HAW.
REv. STAT. § 532-6 (1993). Other similar statutes include ARK. CODE ANN. §
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The determination of whether such children can inherit from
their father's estate varies among state paternity and intestate laws.
Most state inheritance laws start from a standpoint which bars non-
marital children from inheriting from their putative biological fa-
thers. Where permitted, the establishment of paternity of such chil-
dren for inheritance purposes requires meeting an additional,
heightened evidentiary standard often based upon actual biological
and relational proof.386 A typical statute would require that
For the purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of
parent and child must be established to determine succes-
sion by, through, and from a person. A person born out of
wedlock is the child of the mother. That child is also the
father's child if: a) the natural parents were married before
or after the child's birth, even though the attempted mar-
riage is void; or b) paternity is established by adjudication
before the father's death or after his death by clear and
convincing evidence; or c) the father and mother acknowl-
edged paternity in writing.
387
28-9-209(d) (Michie 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.108(2) (West Supp. 1998);
GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-19 (1998); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-2 (West Supp.
1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-12-7 (West Supp. 1997); IOWA CODE §
633.221 (Supp. 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.105(1) (Michie Supp.
1996); LA. CODE § 43-4-48 (1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-109(2)
(West 1998); MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208 (Supp. 1997); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 700.110 (1995); id. § 700.111(4) (Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. §
525.172 (Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(2) (1994); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 474.060 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. §.30-2309(2) (1995); N.H. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 561:4 (1997); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2(1)
(McKinney Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1984); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2105.17 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (West
1990); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109(2) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. § 42 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-109(2) (1993);
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-5.1.3 (Michie Supp. 1998); W. VA. CODE § 42-1-5
(1997); WIS. STAT. § 852.05 (West 1991); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-107(iii)
(Michie 1997).
386. See Schemenauer, supra note 375, at 1215-17 (discussing the inequita-
ble differences between legitimate and illegitimate children and their ability to
prove dependency upon a predeceased parent under the Act).
387. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-209(d) (Michie 1987); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 391.105 (Michie Supp. 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-
109(2)(iii) (West 1998). Other conditions to establish paternity would be if the
father's name appeared on the child's birth certificate with the father's permis-
sion or if the putative father was obligated to pay child support through volun-
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Some statutes delineate the types of qualifying written acknowl-
edgments which include: a court order declaring the child legitimate
as provided by law; a court order establishing the father as parent; a
sworn statement executed by the father attesting to the parent-child
relationship; or the child's birth certificate signed by the father.
388
Petitioners in one state can also establish paternity for intestate pur-
poses by presenting "clear and convincing evidence the child is the
child of the father and the father intended to share in his estate as if
the child were legitimate."
389
A rebuttable presumption of paternity for inheritance purposes
may also arise in some states where a genetic test is performed after
the conception of the child which establishes paternity with at least a
95 to 99 percent probability, depending on the jurisdiction.390 All
tary promise or court order. See ALA. CODE § 43-4-48 (1991). An adopted
child can continue to inherit from its natural parents if the child is included in
the will by name or by some other designation that is not based upon a blood
relationship. See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-19 (1998). A cause of action must be
filed within five months of the decedent's death. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-
12-7 (West Supp. 1997). In some states, the father's acknowledgment must be
general and notorious. See IOWA CODE § 633.222 (West Supp. 1998); MD.
CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 1-208(3) (Supp. 1997). Michigan adds an addi-
tional requirement in determining paternity: the man and mother make a writ-
ten request to correct the birth certificate, the birth certificate is corrected, and
the man and child began a parent and child relationship before the child
reached age eighteen and the relationship continued until either's death. See
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.110 (1995); id. § 700.111(4) (Supp. 1997). In Min-
nesota, illegitimate heirs cannot inherit from the father's kindred. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 525.172 (West Supp. 1998). Mississippi requires that an action
be filed within one year of the intestate's death or within ninety days of notice
to creditors, whichever is less. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-1-15(3)(c) (1994).
In Nebraska, paternity is also established if the father openly cohabitated with
the mother during the child's conception. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-
2309(2)(ii) (Michie 1995). In North Carolina, a cause of action must be filed
within six months of posting of notice to creditors. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-
19 (1984). Some states allow the father to establish paternity by publicly ac-
knowledging the child. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215(c) (West 1990);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 5102(b)(2) (West 1991). In South Carolina, a cause
of action must be filed within eight months of the decedent's death or within
six months of appointment of the estate's personal representative. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-2-109(2)(ii) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997).
388. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-4 (1998).
389. Id.
390. States requiring at least a 95 percent probability of paternity include
Arizona, Montana, Oklahoma, and Tennessee. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
states have enacted some statutory time frame or limitation in which
a paternity action must be commenced for purposes of inheriting
from the estate of a deceased putative parent.
39 '
The most popular time frame under early state paternity laws
often required that a child's paternity be proven prior to the putative
parent's death and during the lifetime of both child and father. In
1978, the United States Supreme Court denied a Fourteenth Amend-
ment Equal Protection Clause challenge to such a time requirement
under the then New York inheritance statute in Lalli v. Lalli.39 2 This
statute conditioned a nonmarital child's right to inherit based solely
on the existence of an order of filiation filed "during the pregnancy
of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child" and fi-
nalized during the father's lifetime.393 The Court, in applying the
middle-tier of scrutiny, concluded that this statutory requirement was
substantially related to the important state purpose of administrative
convenience and accuracy in establishing paternity of deceased puta-
tive fathers. 394 The Court further stated that "requiring that the order
be issued during the father's lifetime permits a man to defend his
reputation against 'unjust accusations in paternity claims' which was
a secondary purpose" of the statute.
395
It seems that protecting the reputation of a deceased person
would rarely justify the denial of that person's living, biological
child's right to inheritance by intestacy solely because the child
25-814 (West Supp. 1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-105(f) (1997); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 2(A)(5) (West 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-304(a)(5)
(Supp. 1998). Some other states require the genetic test to be at least 97 per-
cent positive. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1114(a)(5) (Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 15-8-3 (Supp. 1997). A few other states require a 98 percent probabil-
ity on genetic tests. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.822.1(4) (Supp. 1998); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 308(3) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.26.040(1)(g) (West Supp. 1998). The remaining states require the genetic
test to be at least 99 percent positive. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
126.051.1(e) (Michie Supp. 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-11-5(D) (Michie
Supp. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03(A)(5) (Anderson Supp. 1997).
391. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 460 (1988) (noting that states are re-
quired to enact a statutory scheme pursuant to the federal Child Support En-
forcement Amendments).
392. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
393. Id. at 262 (quoting N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.2 (McKin-
ney 1967)).
394. See id. at 275-76.
395. Id. at 271.
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failed to or was practically unable to secure orders of filiation during
his predeceased father's lifetime.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion rejected the premise that a
legitimate state purpose was served by requiring a formal acknowl-
edgment of paternity in all cases, especially where there is clear and
convincing evidence of paternity.396 Brennan surmised that this re-
quirement could exclude an entire class of nonmarital children from
inheriting from parents with whom they may have had harmonious
relations. 397 Nonmarital children who were informally and openly
acknowledged as well as supported by a putative parent would not, in
most cases, see the need in bringing an adversarial proceeding of
paternity during the parent's lifetime.398 The dissent found even less
tenuous the state purpose of protecting estates from dubious and stale
claims by unknown nonmarital children.399 A less intrusive means of
meeting this state objective could be served by "[p]ublication notice
and a short limitations period in which claims against the estate
could be filed. 400
Justice Brennan's pronouncement has become a part of the
modem statutory standard in proving paternity for inheritance pur-
poses. Jurisdictional time frames for filing such actions now range
from five months to one year after the decedent's death,4' within six
months of an appointment of a personal representative over the
deceased's estate,402 prior to the pending of the deceased parent's
estate,40 3 or within three to six months after the posting of notice to
creditors.
404
Georgia's inheritance statute, however, continues to restrict
nonmarital children from inheriting through or from their deceased
putative parent's estate "unless, during the father's lifetime and after
396. See id. at 277-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
397. See id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
398. See id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
399. See id. at 279 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
400. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
401. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-12-7 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 91-1-15 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997).
402. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997).
403. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-4(c)(2)(A) (1994).
404. See MISS. CODE. ANN. § 91-1-15(1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19
(1984).
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the conception of the child, ' 4° 5 a presumption of paternity arises by
one of the delineated statutory factors. 40 6 Such time limits, when un-
reasonably applied, may have the greatest negative impact on post-
humously conceived children who often cannot be practically con-
ceived or born within the required jurisdictional time frame.
407
Traditional constructs represented in state family laws were con-
stitutionally challenged to reflect changing patterns in parental and
familial relationships.411 The Uniform Paternity Act of 1973 "was
enacted to eliminate the legal distinction between legitimate and ille-
gitimate children and to provide a comprehensive scheme for judicial
determination of paternity., 409 A number of states have adopted
some form of section two of the uniform law which states that, "for
purposes of intestate succession by, through, and from a person, an
individual is the child of his natural parents, regardless of their
marital status., 410 For the most part, marital status of the putative
parent(s) has now become but only one means of determining pater-
nity of nonmarital children under state inheritance laws.
41
405. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-4(c)(1)(A) (1994).
406. See GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-4(c)(2)(A) (providing that a child may in-
herit from his father and his father's family if a presumption of paternity is
filed before an estate is pending and the presumption of paternity is not over-
come by clear and convincing evidence).
407. See supra Prologue.
408. See supra Part II.B. and infra Part IV.B.2.
409. People v. Vega, 33 Cal. App. 4th 706, 710, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 479, 483
(1995) (citations omitted). See also Michael M. v. Giovanna F., 5 Cal. App.
4th 1272, 1278, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 460, 463 (1992) (stating that in addition to pro-
viding a comprehensive scheme for judicial determination of paternity, the
Uniform Paternity Act was intended to rationalize procedure, to eliminate con-
stitutional infirmities in then-existing state law, and to improve state systems
of support enforcement).
410. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-114, 8 U.L.A. 91 (1998). Some of these
states include Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, New
Mexico, North Carolina, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.114 (Mi-
chie 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-114 (West 1987); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 45a-438(b) (West Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-114
(Supp. 1997); IND. CODE § 16-1508 (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-114 (Mi-
chie 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-19 (1984); WIs. STAT. § 851.51 (1991 &
Supp. 1997).
411. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-12-7 (West Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 91-1-15 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-109 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997).
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3. Assisted reproduction and state inheritance laws
Assisted reproductive technology has also had significant impact
on the parameters of family law in this regard. During the last two
decades, state legislatures have struggled to enact laws which reflect
the evolving definition of children, paternity and familial relation-
ships resulting from assisted reproduction.4 12 The U.S.C.A.C. Act413
has provided the most comprehensive coverage of parenting issues
involving surrogacy, artificial insemination, and posthumous con-
ception.41 4
Heterologous artificial insemination presents the problem of
determining the child's paternity because donor sperm is used.
415
Traditional surrogacy 416 arrangements create the possibility of three
separate sets of parents: the child's biological parents, the child's
gestational mother and her husband, and the child's intended custo-
dial parents. Finally, gestational surrogacy417 raises the unique issue
of whether the biological or gestational mother is the resulting
child's legal mother.418  The uniform law addresses these
controversies by assigning parental rights and duties to participants
pursuant to an "intent-based" analysis. The paternity of children
born from artificial insemination by donor is only assigned to the
impregnated mother's husband, where the husband has consented in
writing to the procedure.41 9 No parental status is assigned to the
sperm donor.420 Likewise, in surrogacy arrangements, the law, upon
court approval, awards paternity and maternity to the child's
412. See supra Part II.B.
413. 9B U.L.A. 187 (Supp. 1998).
414. See supra Part II.A.
415. See supra Part II.A.
416. See supra Part II.A.
417. See supra Part II.A.
418. Arizona's statutory approach to surrogacy is that "[a] surrogate is the
legal mother of a child born as a result of a surrogate parentage contract and is
entitled to custody of that child." If the said mother is married, "her husband is
presumed to be the legal father of the [resulting] child." ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 25-218(B), (C) (West 1991); see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-401
(1997) (stating that custody is awarded to the adoptive mother where the
woman agrees to relinquish all parental rights and responsibilities towards the
child).
419. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(B), (C).
420. See id.
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
intended parents, who are defined as "a man and woman, married to
each other, who enter into an agreement under [the U.S.C.A.C. Act]
providing that they will be the parents of a child born to a surrogate
through assisted conception using egg or sperm of one or both of the
intended parents." 42 1
Some progress has been made by states in addressing the paren-
tal issues which resonate from artificial insemination and surrogacy.
Most state statutes reflect a form of the U.S.C.A.C. Act's intent-
based paternity outcome in heterologous artificial insemination.
422
Children born through artificial insemination are considered the natu-
ral and legitimate children of the consenting husband and mother for
all purposes, including child support.
423
For the most part, however, the inheritance rights and legal
status of nonmarital children conceived through artificial insemina-
tion remains in nationwide limbo.424 A few progressive legislatures
have adopted statutes which provide that "[a] child born [by] A.I.D.
may inherit the estate of his mother and her consenting spouse or
their relatives as [if he was their] natural child."425 These statutes do
not allow the child to "inherit from his natural father or his natural
father's relatives. 426 Only three states addressing the status of post-
humously conceived children have passed laws which specifically
421. Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act, § 1(3), 9B U.L.A.
187 (Supp. 1998). In section two of the U.S.C.A.C. Act, maternity, except as
determined under a relevant provision concerning surrogacy arrangements, is
otherwise assigned to "a woman who gives birth to a child." Id. § 2, 9B
U.L.A. 188.
422. Most states follow the approach taken by the Illinois statute which pro-
vides, in relevant part, that, "[a]ny child.., born as the result of heterologous
artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a
naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife so requesting and
consenting to the use of [the] technique." 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 (West
1993). Additionally, Louisiana provides that "[t]he husband also cannot dis-
avow paternity of a child born as the result of artificial insemination of the
mother to which he consented." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 188 (West 1993).
423. For instance, in Arizona, "[a] child who is born [from] artificial insemi-
nation is entitled to support from the mother as prescribed by this section and
the mother's spouse if the spouse is either the biological father of the child or
agreed in writing to the insemination before or after [it] occurred." ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-501(B) (West Supp. 1997).
424. See supra note 1.
425. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-777 (1993).
426. Id.
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determine the inheritance rights of children conceived after the death
of an alleged parent.427 Of the three, Florida and North Dakota stat-
utes specifically provide that, "[a] child conceived from the eggs or
sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer of their
eggs, sperm, or preembryos to a woman's body shall not be eligible
for a claim against the decedent's estate unless the child has been
provided for by the decedent's will." 428 Both of these innovative
statutes reflect an intent-determinative parentage analysis, which
gives the greatest degree of protection to posthumously conceived
children.
4. The inadequacies of state law in establishing social security
survivors
The fast-paced advancement of reproductive technology has re-
sulted in many inconsistencies in state inheritance, paternity, and as-
sisted reproduction laws429 upon which Social Security officials rely
heavily in determining the legal status of children for survivor's
benefits. These phenomena increase the presence of distributional
inequity where claimants of equal relational status to a worker are
treated differently based solely upon their deceased parent's domicile
at death.
430
427. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 to 165 (Michie Supp. 1997); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-18-04 (Michie Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West
1997).
428. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997). Virginia's statute also resem-
bles this statute by permitting a transfer of property to such children by will
executed prior to the decedent's death. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-71 (Michie
Supp. 1997). Louisiana's statute resembles the remaining states which either
explicitly or implicitly restrict inheritance rights to children who are conceived
prior to the death of the parent. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 957 (West Supp.
1997).
429. See Le Ray, supra note 333, at 794-95.
430. See Schemenauer, supra note 375, at 1229 (stating that "[t]he fate of
these [posthumous, illegitimate] children should not depend on the location of
the court in which they must bring their claims"). A challenge ever before so-
cial security enthusiasts has been to reconcile the relationship between individ-
ual equity and social adequacy in determining the amount and relevant propor-
tions of benefits. See MYERS, supra note 261, at 24-29. One of the basic
principles of the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) pro-
gram under social security is the balance between individual equity and social
adequacy. Most assume that complete individual equity exist providing a di-
rect return on a taxpayers' individual contributions into the general trust fund.
330
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
The departure from such heavy reliance on state intestate laws
began as early as 1965 when Congress amended the child survivor's
provisions to expand presumptive dependency beyond state intestate
laws. The congressional report accompanying the 1965 amendment
stated that
In a national program that is intended to pay benefits to re-
place the support lost by a child when his father retires,
dies, or becomes disabled, whether a child gets benefits
should not depend on whether he can inherit his father's
intestate personal property under the laws of the State in
which his father happens to live.43'
Yet, the inconsistencies resulting from state intestate laws continue
to plague Social Security officials, often leaving them in a legal
quandary. A recently proposed ruling seeks to clarify and provide
greater uniformity in the administration's application of state inheri-
tance laws.432 State inheritance and paternity laws no longer provide
the degree of reliability, consistency and constitutional nexus re-
quired in determining whether a child is entitled to survivor's bene-
fits under social security.
A more accurate view considers the Act's original purpose and goal of pro-
viding social adequacy within a benefit structure which does not always foster
a proportionate payment of benefits based upon a worker's higher earnings or
longer periods of covered participation. See id.
431. S. REP. No. 89-404, at 110 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1943, 2050.
432. See Application of State Law in Determining Child Relationship, 20
C.F.R. pt. 404 (1997). This regulation states, in pertinent part that
We are proposing to revise our rules on determining whether a natural
child has inheritance rights under appropriate State law and therefore
may be entitled to Social Security benefits as the child of an insured
worker. Specifically, we propose to revise our rules to explain which
version of State law we will apply, depending on whether the insured
is living or deceased, how we will apply State law requirements on
time limits for determining inheritance rights, and how we will apply
State law requirements for a court determination of paternity. We are
also proposing to clarify our current rule on determining an applicant's
status as a legally adopted child of an insured individual.
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B. Constitutional Parameters: Social Security's Classification of
Conception, Legitimacy, and Dependency
1. The Act's classification of children
An evaluation of the statutory treatment of the relational status
of qualifying children under the Act raises tangential Fifth Amend-
ment equal protection claims that posthumously conceived children
are certain to raise.43 3 The survivorship provisions as applied have
resulted in differential treatment based upon the marital status of a
child claimant's parents.434 The two classes of marital and nonmari-
tal children can be subdivided into three additional subclasses of
children which laws have treated differently based upon the nature
and timing of the child's birth. These subclasses are: (1) intervivos
children (children who are conceived and born prior to both parents'
death); (2) after-born or traditional posthumous children (children
who are conceived during the deceased parents' life, but are born
alive within 280 to 300 days after the parents' death); and (3) after-
conceived or posthumous conceived children (children who are con-
ceived and born after the parents' death). Social security survivor's
benefits are most often awarded based upon the marital status of the
child's parents and the timing of the child's birth. Consider the fol-
lowing diagram which illustrates the legal classification of children
based upon these factors:
LEGAL CLASSIFICATIONS OF CHILDREN
Marital Intervivos After-
Children Conception Conceived
Nonmarital Intervivos After-
After-BornChildren Conception Conceived
433. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
434. See id.
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a. marital children
i. marital intervivos children
For the most part, marital intervivos children are not required to
prove paternity or dependency on a deceased parent in order to qual-
ify for social security survivor's benefits or other similar employ-
ment-related death benefits under worker's compensation and vet-
eran's administration laws due to the marital presumption of
paternity. The marital union is considered the most reliable prob-
ability of dependency required under the Act.435
ii. marital after-born children
Most jurisdictions recognize the statutory presumption of le-
gitimacy of marital children born within 300 days after the dissolu-
tion of marriage by the death of one of the child's parents.436 "After-
born" 437 children who are conceived prior to the death of a parent,
but are later born alive within the statutory time period are generally
entitled to take under and through the estate of a deceased marital
parent pursuant to most states' posthumous or after-born statutes.
438
435. See id. at 499.
436. Statutes of inheritance as well as other statutory entitlements have tra-
ditionally adopted this presumption in an effort to preserve the traditional
bounds of the two-parent family unit.
437. An after-born heir is defined as "[ain individual in gestation at a par-
ticular time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120 hours or
more after birth." UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-108, 8 U.L.A. 87 (1998).
438. ALABAMA-Posthumous children are included in "heirs," "issues" or
"children" when these terms are used to limit a future estate. They are entitled
to the estate as if they were born before the death of the parent. Any future
estate which is conditioned upon the parent's death without heirs is revoked by
the birth of a posthumous child capable of taking by descent. See ALA. CODE
§ 35-4-8 (1991). ALASKA-After-born heirs: "An individual in gestation at
a particular time is treated as living at that time if the individual lives 120
hours or more after birth." ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108 (Michie 1996).
ARIZONA-Posthumous children are included in "heirs," "issues" and "chil-
dren" when these terms are used to limit a future estate. They are entitled to
the estate as if they were born before the death of the parent. Any future estate
which is conditioned upon the parent's death without heirs is revoked by the
birth of a posthumous child capable of taking by descent. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 33-237 (1990). ARKANSAS-Posthumous heirs: Descendants of the
estate conceived before his death, but born afterwards shall inherit as if born in
the lifetime of the intestate. No right of inheritance shall be given to any other
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Due to this presumption of paternity and inheritance under state
laws, marital after-born children are presumed dependent upon their
deceased parent at death and therefore conclusively entitled to survi-
vor's death benefits under the Act.
439
person, not a lineal descendant, unless the person was alive at the time of the
intestate's death. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-9-210 (Michie 1987).
CALIFORNIA-Unborn relative of decedent: "Relatives of the decedent con-
ceived before the decedent's death but born [after his death will] inherit as if
they had been born in [his or her] lifetime." CAL. PROB. CODE § 6407 (West
1993). COLORADO-Posthumous children take as others: "When an estate
has been limited by any conveyance ... of any person to be begotten, such
children born after the decease of their parent shall take the estate in the same
manner as if they had been born in the lifetime of the parent, though no estate
has been conveyed to support the contingent remainder after his death." COLO.
REv. STAT. § 38-30-119 (1982). DELAWARE-Posthumous children: A
posthumous child or a child in the mother's womb, if born alive, shall take in
the same manner as if absolutely born at the decease of his or her parent. He
or she will be provided for as an after-born child. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12
§§ 310, 505 (1995). There is a requirement that the child survive for 120 hours
after the decedent's death or the child will be considered to have predeceased
the decedent. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12 § 504 (1995). DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA-Share of posthumous child: "[A] child or descendant of the
intestate born after the death of the intestate has the same right of inheritance
as if bom before his death." D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-314 (1997). The right of
inheritance only vests in children or their descendants unless the person is in
being and capable in law to take as heir or distributee at the time of the intes-
tate's death. See id. FLORIDA-After-born heirs: "Heirs of the decedent
conceived before his or her death, but born thereafter, inherit intestate property
as if they had been born in the decedent's lifetime." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
732.106 (West Supp. 1998). GEORGIA-Posthumous children: "[S]hall
stand upon the same footing with children in being upon all questions of in-
heritance." GA. CODE ANN. § 113-903(4) (1974). HAWAII-Posthumous
children: Shall in all cases inherit the same as if they had been born during
their father's lifetime. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 532-9 (1993). After-born
heirs: "An individual in gestation at a particular time is treated as living at that
time if the individual lives 120 hours or more after birth." HAW. REV. STAT. §
560:2-108 (Supp. 1997).
439. See also 5 U.S.C. § 8101(9) (1994) (defining a child as "one who at the
time of the death of the employee is under 18 years of age or over that age and
incapable of self-support, and includes stepchildren, adopted children, and
posthumous children, but it does not include married children.") (emphasis
added); 38 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1991) (defining a child as one who is under 18
years of age, incapable of self-support, or pursuing an education up to age 23,
and is a legitimate child, a legally adopted child, a stepchild, or an illegitimate
child acknowledged by his father or otherwise shown to be the child of the al-
leged father). An administrative decision reported at 1938, A.D.V.A. 432, ap-
proved the survivorship death benefit claim filed by a widow prior to the birth
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iii. marital after-conceived children
Posthumously conceived children may not avail themselves of
the marital presumption of filiation with a deceased parent because
that parent's death dissolves the marital relationship with the child's
surviving parent prior to the child's conception. The inheritance
laws of most jurisdictions require a child to be conceived prior to the
death of the deceased parent in order to take as an "after-born
child."440 Therefore, most state inheritance laws view the birth of a
posthumously conceived child as illegitimate due to the timing of
conception after the death of the putative parent.
441
Under social security, marital after-conceived children would
therefore be unable to avail themselves of the dependency presump-
tions related to a parent's marital status. Likewise, they would have
to establish dependency under the "last resort" test related to the
child's cohabitation with or support received from the predeceased
insured parent.
b. nonmarital children
i. nonmarital intervivos children
Social security benefits for children in this category are contin-
gent upon proof of the child's paternity and dependency upon the
wage earner. These criteria are presumed if the relevant state intes-
tate laws consider the applicant entitled to inherit from the deceased
worker's estate. Paternity and dependency can also be presumed by
meeting any one of the formal parental acknowledgment tests pro-
vided by the Act.442 Finally, nonmarital intervivos children may
need to use the "last resort" test by proving that they were living with
of a posthumous child upon the live birth of the child. See id.
440. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-4-8; ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108.
441. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-4-8; ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.108.
442. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I)-(III). These include: a preexisting
judicial order of paternity; formal parental acknowledgments through certain
conduct, such as written and verbal statements, residing with the child and
custodial parent, or other ordinary parental interaction with the child; informal
or formalized child support; or other evidence of dependency upon the parent.
See id.
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the deceased parent at death, or that the deceased was supporting
them at his death. 43
ii. nonmarital after-born children
Where this traditional posthumous child is conceived outside the
bounds of marriage, the child is still entitled to file an action to prove
paternity under local paternity laws.444 Local probate statutes gener-
ally do not treat nonmarital posthumous children any differently than
marital posthumous children for purposes of inheritance once filia-
tion is proven.
445
Posthumous nonmarital children have brought considerable liti-
gation by claiming social security survivor's benefits.446  The
443. See supra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
444. For instance, in New York, such proceedings are allowed
If, at any time before or after a petition is filed, the putative father
dies,... neither the proceeding nor the right to commence the pro-
ceeding shall necessarily abate but may be commenced or continued
by any of the persons authorized by this article to commence a pater-
nity proceeding where:
(c) a blood genetic marker test had been administered to the putative
father prior to death; or,
(d) the putative father has openly and notoriously acknowledged the
child as his own.
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 519 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
445. The difficulty in bringing such actions initially lies in securing the de-
ceased parent's biological material such as blood and DNA samples needed to
prove the biological relationship between the parties. See generally Corbett v.
Corbett, 418 N.Y.S.2d 981, 983 (Fam. Ct. 1979), affd sub nom. Mary Ellen C.
v. Joseph William C., 435 N.Y.S.2d 738 (App. Div. 1981) (denying petitioners
request to bring a paternity action under local statute because such action must
be filed prior to the death of the alleged father). See also In re Will of Janis,
600 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (Sur. Ct. 1993) (refusing to allow a non-marital child to
exhume decedent's body for purposes of establishing standing to contest the
admission of a will into probate); Anne R. v. Estate of Francis C., 634
N.Y.S.2d 339, 341 (Fam. Ct. 1995); Estate of Sandier, 612 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758
(Sur. Ct. 1994) (holding that DNA testing "of the putative paternal grandpar-
ents with that of the infant may be performed in an effort to provide the 'clear
and convincing evidence' that is required to establish paternity under [New
York probate law]"). Nonmarital posthumous children thereby have standing
to bring an action of filiation where they can show biological or other "con-
duct" oriented proof such as acknowledgment, support, or judicial decree.
446. See Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1097 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
to establish benefit eligibility, the posthumous, illegitimate claimant was not
336
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presumptions of paternity and dependency under the Act are nor-
mally unavailable to this class of children based upon the timing of
their birth. They are often required to prove paternity by clear and
convincing evidence and to show actual dependency. Even where
paternity is proven, dependency is often difficult to prove because
the child was in gestation during the wage earner's lifetime. The
only viable option is to use the "commensurate support test" to prove
that the deceased parent's support was commensurate with the needs
of the unborn child given the parents' financial status and the stage
of the mother's pregnancy.447
required to show that the insured parent knew of her conception or intended to
contribute to her support); Dubinski ex rel. Van Schindel v. Bowen, 808 F.2d
611, 613-14 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that an illegitimate child born six months
after the wage earner father's death was not entitled to survivor's benefits
where the record did not show that the wage earner paid for the mother's
medical care or donated significant amounts of cash); Johnson v. Secretary of
Health and Human Servs., 801 F.2d 797, 798-99 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
the determination that a father's payment of the pregnant mother's transporta-
tion qualified as a significant contribution was insufficient to entitle an ille-
gitimate, posthumous child to survivor's death benefits); Imani ex rel. Hayes v.
Heckler, 797 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that under Missouri intes-
tacy law the illegitimate, posthumous child was not a successor in interest be-
cause she did not establish paternity either by an adjudication before the death
of the father or thereafter by clear and convincing proof; she was also not enti-
tled under Act's dependency requirements because the father was not living
with or contributing to the support of the child at the time of his death); Par-
sons ex rel. Bryant v. Health and Human Servs., 762 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that, under North Carolina inheritance law, a wage earners'
contribution to the illegitimate posthumous child's mother during gestation
does not require significant contributions; support by the father for the unborn
child need only be commensurate with the needs of the unborn child at time of
the father's death); Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1975)
(holding that with respect to an illegitimate unborn child, it was not necessary
that support be substantial, regular or continuous but only that it be commensu-
rate with the needs of the unborn child at the time of the father's death; the
support provided in the instant case was clearly commensurate with such
needs; and that a posthumous child is not foreclosed from social security child
benefits merely because he was not born prior to the insured individual's
death); Gay ex rel. McBride v. Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 499, 504 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(holding that the support requirement of the illegitimate, posthumous child met
the statutory standard).
447. Dependent, nonmarital after-born children are also entitled to survivor-
ship, benefits under state Worker's Compensation Laws. See, e.g., Bums v.
Miller Constr., 55 N.Y.S.2d 501, 509-10 (1982) (holding that proof of ac-
knowledgment by a predeceased father of an after-born child would not be re-
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iii. nonmarital after-conceived children
As previously mentioned, posthumously conceived children cur-
rently have no legal status for purposes of inheritance in most states
today.448 As such, they cannot avail themselves of the marital pre-
sumption of paternity, intestacy or dependency under the social secu-
rity provisions. This class of children must prove actual paternity
and dependency in order to qualify for survivor's benefits. Their
greatest obstacle is proving actual dependency by establishing co-
habitation or support at the worker's death. The commensurate sup-
port test again becomes the only viable option for these children.
However, even under the most tenable variant of this test, children
who are conceived after the worker's death will still find it impossi-
ble, if not impractical, to prove that their deceased parent's support
was commensurate with their needs as an unborn child given the par-
ents' financial status and the stage of their mother's pregnancy.
2. Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment's Substantive Due
Process
The outcome of a child's paternity has traditionally been deter-
mined based upon the variables represented in the above chart. As
shown, marital children conceived and born prior to the parent's
death are provided the greatest level of protection, whereas children
quired in order for the child to qualify for benefits and that such a requirement
would violate equal protection principles because marital children are not re-
quired to do so).
448. The Uniform Parentage Act does not specifically speak to posthumous
born or conceived children, but requires that actions to prove paternity prior to
the birth of a child be stayed until the child is born. The Act specifically states
that relevant statutes of limitations "do not extend the time within which a right
of inheritance or a right to a succession may be asserted beyond the time pro-
vided by law relating to distribution and closing of decedents' estates or to the
determination of heirship, or otherwise." UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 7, 9B
U.L.A. 306 (1987).
Proof of biological paternity alone, however, does not permit the child to
take as an heir under the decedent's estate, absent any specific legislation cre-
ating inheritance rights in such children. Other possible means of proving tra-
ditional relational status such as legal adoption, equitable adoption, parentage
by step-marital relationship, and other legal fictions based upon an alleged par-
ent's conduct toward the living or inter-utero child during the parent's life also
provide little assistance to the posthumously conceived child's claim of filia-
tion under existing laws. See supra Part III.B.
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who are conceived after the death of a parent are afforded little or no
assurance in establishing paternity and dependency for social secu-
rity benefits. The underlying inquiry then becomes whether equal
protection safeguards under the United States Constitution will per-
mit social security laws to treat similarly situated children differently
based upon circumstances of marital status and birth.449
Child social security survivor's benefits are premised upon es-
tablishing two relational criteria with the deceased wage earner: pa-
ternity and dependency.450  As discussed earlier, benefits are
awarded to all child applicants who satisfy certain objective factors,
such as a marriage ceremony between the child's parents, which cre-
ate statutory presumptions of paternity and dependency. These
classes of children, therefore, almost never have to prove actual de-
pendency or paternity.45'
Where an applicant does not meet any of the statutory presump-
tions, actual proof of paternity and dependency is necessary. Under-
standably, survivor's benefits are categorically denied to children
who are unable to establish paternity. Failure to meet the Act's de-
pendency standard, however, may also disenfranchise even those
classes of applicants whose paternity has been satisfactorily proven.
This classification distinction, most often present between nonmarital
and marital child applicants, led to the constitutional challenge of the
Act's dependency requirement in Mathews v. Lucas.
452
This 1976 case summoned a judicial interpretation of the legis-
lative intent and history of child survivor's benefits under the Act.
The Supreme Court's primary objective was to determine whether
Congress intended to exclude child applicants solely upon their fail-
ure to prove dependency. The nonmarital claimants in Mathews ar-
gued that the Act's statutory classifications which created a pre-
sumption of dependency for marital children and certain other
qualifying classes of nonmarital children infringed upon their equal
protection guarantees under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
453
449. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 497.
450. See id. at 497-99.
451. See id. at 498-99.
452. See id. at 497.
453. See id. at 502.
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The claimants were able to prove paternity with their deceased
father, Robert Cuffee.454 They failed, however, to raise any statutory
presumption of dependency because their father had not supported or
lived with them at death; had not acknowledged them in writing or
by a pre-death court support or paternity order; had not married or
attempted to marry their mother, Ruby M. Lucas, prior to death; and
had not by his conduct entitled them to take under the intestate laws
of his domicile at death.a 5
The Lucas children's application for survivor's benefits was ini-
tially denied by the Social Security Administration, but was later up-
held by the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Is-
land which determined that the Act's dependency classifications
were unconstitutional.456 The Supreme Court summized the lower
court's recognition that
the web of statutory provisions regarding presumptive de-
pendency was overinclusive because it entitled some chil-
dren, who were not actually dependent, to survivorship
benefits under the Act [which] ... was not intended merely
to replace actual support that a child lost through the death
of the insured parent .... Rather, . . . the statute [was]
designed to replace obligations of support or potential sup-
port lost through death, where the obligation was perceived
by Congress, on the basis of the responsibility of the rela-
tion between the child's parents, to be a valid one.
457
The district court concluded that Congress' apparent view that mari-
tal children were more entitled to child support than nonmarital chil-
dren was not a justifiable legitimate governmental interest which
would sustain the Act's classifications of dependency presump-
tions.
4 58
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the Act's dependency
classifications might result in similarly situated classes of children
being treated differently where no proof of paternity or dependency
454. See id. at 500.
455. See id. at 500-01.
456. See Lucas v. Department of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 390 F. Supp.
1310, 1320 (D.R.I. 1975).
457. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 502-03 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
458. See id. (citing Lucas, 390 F. Supp. at 1320).
340
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
is required.459 The Court upheld the Act, however, because it deter-
mined that the statutory classifications were substantially related to
the likelihood of dependency at death, which furthered the legitimate
governmental interest in administrative convenience.
460
The district court's decision was reversed and criticized in two
significant ways. The Court first determined that the appropriate
level of scrutiny in cases of legitimacy "does not 'command extraor-
dinary protection from the majoritarian political process' ... which
[the] most exacting scrutiny would entail,, 461 as was suggested by
the lower court in this case. Instead, the Supreme Court applied the
intermediate standard of review to determine whether the statute's
dependency classifications excluding certain illegitimates bore a sig-
nificant or substantial relationship to some important governmental
interest.46z The Court's "role [was] simply to determine whether
Congress' assumptions [were] so inconsistent or insubstantial as not
to be reasonably supportive of its conclusions that individualized
factual inquiry in order to isolate each nondependent child in a given
class of cases is unwarranted as an administrative exercise."
463
Finally, the Mathews court pronounced that the congressional
intent in enacting child survivor's benefits under the Act was to
"provide for all children of deceased insureds who can demonstrate
their 'need' in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds'
deaths." 464 This meant "that the statute was not a general welfare
provision for legitimate or otherwise 'approved' children of deceased
insureds, but was intended just 'to replace the support lost by a child
when his father ... dies.' ' 465 The Court therefore reasoned that the
statutory dependency presumptions, as objective standards of prob-
able dependency, were constitutionally permissible even where cer-
tain classes of nonmarital children were practically precluded from
benefits because of their inability to prove dependency upon their
459. See id. at 503.
460. See id. at 509-10.
461. Id. at 506 (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28
(1973)).
462. See id. at 510.
463. Id. at 516.
464. Id. at 507.
465. Id. at 507 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-404, at 110 (1965)).
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deceased insured parent. The statutory presumptions were "permis-
sible under the Fifth Amendment, so long as [the] lack of precise
equivalence does not exceed the bounds of substantiality tolerated by
the applicable level of scrutiny. 466 The Court determined that "the
materiality of the relation between the statutory classifications and
the likelihood of dependency they assertively reflect need not be
'scientifically substantiated.' ' 467  The dependency presumptions
were found to be reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency
and in furtherance of substantial governmental interests in
"avoid[ing] the burden and expense of specific case-by-case deter-
mination in the large number of cases where dependency is objec-
tively probable. 468
The Court distinguished the Act's dependency classifications
from other discriminatory and impermissible statutory classifications
which conditioned a claimant's entitlement to benefits explicitly
upon his or her legitimacy. In Mathews, the Court opined that an ap-
plicant's legitimacy was only relevant as an "indication of depend-
ency," and that benefits were not denied solely on the basis of le-
gitimacy under the relevant statute.469 In other cases, statutes were
held unconstitutional where marital children were all presumptively
entitled to benefits and nonmarital children were conclusively fore-
closed from qualifying for such benefits based solely upon their
status. 470 Applicants' illegitimacy preempted entitlement even where
there was clear and convincing relational evidence establishing pa-
ternity between the parties.
471
Statutory classifications based upon the timing of conception
were also distinguished and reconciled by the Mathews court in its
review of the Jimenez v. Weinberger472 decision, which "invalidated
discrimination among afterbom illegitimate children as to
466. Id. at 509 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 748, 772 (1975)).
467. Id. at 510 (quoting James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 133 (1972)).
468. Id. at 509.
469. Id. at 511-14.
470. See id.
471. See id. at 510-11 (citing Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); New
Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)).
472. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
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entitlement to a child's disability benefits under the Social Security
Act., 473 The Jimenez statute denied after-born children social secu-
rity benefits even where both paternity and dependency were proven
by claimants.474 The Supreme Court in Jimenez correctly determined
that "to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively avail-
able to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment."
475
The Court distinguished the Jimenez decision from the case at
hand by showing that the statute as applied in Jimenez denied post-
humous children the right to prove dependency, whereas the Act, as
challenged in Mathews, provided substantial and reasonable alternate
means of proving dependency upon a deceased insured by a showing
of the parent's cohabitation or support at death. 476 Unfortunately, the
Court further opined that rights to benefits for posthumous children
were reasonably preserved by the Act's dependency requirements in
Mathews because of the greater likelihood of children being "de-
pendent during the parent's life and at his death.,
477
Justice Stevens' dissent opined that the majority failed to ade-
quately distinguish between these two decisions in a manner justify-
ing a different outcome.478 Stevens reasoned that the governmental
purpose supporting the provisions in both cases were one and the
same. Mathews pronounced administrative convenience as justifica-
tion for the statutory litany of presumptive dependency, whereas
Jimenez resorted to a similar government interest in preventing spu-
rious and dubious claims.479 Neither case, in the dissent's opinion,
provided a reasonable basis for the statutory exclusion of an entire
class or subclass of nonmarital children.
480
The dissent also refused to accept the Court's premise that ad-
ministrative convenience substantiated the over-inclusiveness of the
Act's presumptions of dependency. Instead, Justice Stevens sharply
criticized what was characterized as the majority's rather tenuous
473. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 511.
474. See Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 630.
475. Id. at 637.
476. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 512.
477. Id. at 514.
478. See id. at 516-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
479. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
480. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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justification of how the Act's presumptions of dependency at an in-
sured's death are "rationally and substantially related to the actual
fact of dependency." 48' The presumption of dependency based upon
state intestate law was viewed as the most tenuous nexus to actual
dependency.
482
Finally, the Mathews dissent concluded "that the classification
which [was] sustained.., in the name of 'administrative conven-
ience' [was] more probably the product of a tradition of thinking of
illegitimates as less deserving persons than legitimates." 483 It was
painstakingly clear to these dissenting justices that the Nation's
commitment to the premise that all persons are created equal de-
manded fair and equal treatment for all regardless of a person's cir-
cumstances of birth.484
The post-Mathews era embellished greater judicial flexibility in
addressing the dependency at death requirement. Lower federal dis-
trict courts slowly began to recognize the impracticality of strictly
imposing the actual dependency requirement on children who were
born after the death of a parent. The adoption of "commensurate
support" under the last resort test provided a means for courts to
fashion some type of remedy for after-born children while still
maintaining a somewhat abstract version of the dependency require-
ment upheld in Mathews. The posthumous conception frontier pres-
ents an even greater challenge in substantiating the Act's actual de-
pendency requirement. The unresolved query, as raised in Hart, is
how to expand the dependency standard so that posthumously con-
ceived children are treated fairly, if not equally, in their pursuit of
survivor's benefits under the Act.
C. Constitutional Considerations in Expanding Dependency
1. Dependency and a new class of survivors
The Hart case proves that Social Security's sole reliance upon
state intestate and paternity law along with the Act's statutory de-
pendency presumptions will, in most cases, exclude posthumously
481. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
482. See id. at 521-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
483. Id. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
484. See id. at 516 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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conceived, nonmarital claimants from benefiting from the social se-
curity contributions of a deceased worker.485 It is doubtful that Con-
gress ever intended to create social legislation geared to ameliorate
poverty that would exclude a particular group of orphaned children
based solely on the timing of their birth.
History has shown that Congress' approach has been to expand
coverage to persons most likely to suffer severe economic loss due to
a wage earner's death. This view towards inclusiveness has been
most prominent in judicial recognition of the Act's remedial nature
by applying the most liberal interpretation appropriate and necessary
to award benefits whenever possible.
486
Congress once thought it prudent and efficient to conclusively
presume statutory dependency for marital and voidable marital chil-
dren. The presumption of dependency was then expanded to include
nonmarital children who qualify under state intestate and paternity
laws, or who were formally or informally acknowledged by the de-
ceased worker prior to death, or who were equitably adopted. Fur-
ther provisions enlarged the class of potential beneficiaries to include
those applicants who could actually prove paternity and dependency
under the "last resort test.
' 487
The Lucas children in Mathews experienced first-hand the det-
riment in being unable to meet the presumptive or actual dependency
standards due to the timing of their father's death. The judicial
stonewall built by the Supreme Court through upholding presumptive
and actual dependency standards has the potential to totally extin-
guish the payment of survivor's benefits to an entire subclass of
nonmarital children who are unable to meet the Mathews standard
because they were bom after their parent's death.488
Lower federal courts, recognizing this potential subclass exclu-
sion, applied an abstract version of actual dependency to allow after-
bom children to overcome this biophysical impracticality. They
485. See supra notes 353-71 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
"commensurate support test."
486. See supra Prologue.
487. See supra notes 302-71 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
dependency requirement of survivor's provisions under the Social Security
Act.
488. See supra notes 449-84 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
Mathews decision.
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fashioned a commensurate support test tailored to accommodate this
final subclass of potential applicants. The lower federal courts are
doing what Congress intended-to replace the loss of financial sup-
port a child suffers due to the death of a qualified deceased
worker.
489
Reproductive technology has created an entirely new subclass of
nonmarital children whom Congress has yet to consider as potential
claimants entitled to benefits under social security legislation. Con-
stitutional principles of equal treatment pronounced by the Supreme
Court in Mathews and Lalli compel some level of inclusion for this
newly created class.490 Fairness and equity should always be ques-
tioned where certain classes of persons benefit greatly with little or
no effort, while entire classes of others are precluded from the same
benefits based on conditions for which they have no control.
A Fifth Amendment equal protection analysis requires at least
some minimal accommodation for a reasonable segment of the sub-
class population. The Mathews Court was less inclined to invalidate
the dependency requirement under the Act because the statute did not
result in a total abrogation of the right to benefits for all subclass
members. The Court found that the Act's presumptive dependency
provisions and last resort test provided a means by which "any oth-
erwise eligible child may qualify for survivorship benefits by show-
ing contribution to support, or cohabitation at the time of death...,"
and that the "statute [was] carefully tuned to alternate considera-
tions."
491
There are no viable alternate considerations or means by which
most posthumously conceived children can secure their entitlement
to survivor's benefits. The statute as it stands is overinclusive in that
children who may not be actually dependent are presumed depend-
ent, and underinclusive due to the total exclusion of after-conceived
children who have no statutory opportunity in which to prove de-
pendency on a deceased parent.
492
489. See supra notes 353-71 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
"commensurate support test."
490. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976); Lalli v. Lalli, 439
U.S. 259, 266 (1978).
491. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 512-13.
492. See id. at 513.
346
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Even lower federal courts would be hard pressed to fashion a
means by which a reasonable segment of this new class of children
could qualify for survivor's benefits under the Act. Although the
commensurate support analysis under the last resort test was applied
in Hart, the lack of direct relevant evidence of the father's intent to
conceive and support future offspring prevented a positive out-
come.493 What level of evidentiary proffer could substantiate the
support of or cohabitation with an unconceived child? Could the
worker's predeath support of the intended gestational or custodial
parents qualify as the support of the unconceived child? Perhaps the
worker's prepayment of a frozen sperm or embryo storage contract
might meet the support at death standard under the last resort test.
The last resort test really provides no resort at all for posthumously
conceived children.
Hart was only the first of many potential actions that may be
filed by similar claimants seeking survivor's benefits. State intestate
and paternity laws offer little or no assistance to Social Security offi-
cials in addressing these cases. A national standard must be estab-
lished. Congress should speak affirmatively in order to clarify
whether after-conceived children will be given an opportunity to
apply and qualify for survivor's benefits based upon a deceased par-
ent's earnings record.
2. Falling government interests
The so-called middle tier of judicial scrutiny, when applied, re-
quires that a substantial relationship exists between government in-
terest and statutory classifications based upon legitimacy under Due
Process standards of the Fifth Amendment. 49 4 Although the Court
has resisted applying the highest level of scrutiny to such classifica-
tions, it has clearly rejected legitimacy as a sole basis which would
either substantially or rationally relate to any important or legitimate
public purpose.
495
493. See supra Prologue.
494. See supra Part IV.B. for a discussion on the Fifth Amendment implica-
tions of failing to provide survivor's benefits to posthumously conceived chil-
dren.
495. See supra notes 433-84 and accompanying text.
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The governmental interest most often meeting the substantiality
test in social security legislation is the safeguarding of administrative
convenience.496 The Court in Mathews found that conditioning sur-
vivor's benefits on a showing of presumed or actual dependency was
substantially related to this governmental interest.497 The specific
administrative convenience asserted was that the dependency re-
quirement reduced the number of case-by-case determinations and
prevented dubious and spurious claims.
498
More than twenty years ago, the dissent in Mathews raised seri-
ous doubt of whether this interest justified the total exclusion of a
nonmarital subclass.499 Today, there is even greater speculation as to
whether this same interest could substantiate the statutory exclusion
of nonmarital, posthumously conceived children.
Medical technology has greatly diminished if not eliminated the
greatest concern in preventing dubious postdeath claims by non-
marital children because such claims can now be more easily dis-
credited. The difficulty of proving paternity is no longer adequate
justification for denial of death benefits to posthumous born or
conceived children. Where samples have been retrieved, DNA de-
terminative paternity testing can now be readily performed after
death.500 Moreover, a number of states have incorporated DNA
testing as a means of proving a child's paternity for inheritance pur-
poses.5 ' The reliability of DNA paternity testing also addresses the
Mathews court's concern that a decedent's reputation should be pro-
tected by preventing potential dubious claims after death. Finally, in
light of the computer and cyberspace revolution since the 1976
Mathews decision, which, parenthetically, is reflected in the Social
Security Administration's own systems modernization over the last
decade, it is questionable whether the same evidentiary value can be
496. See supra notes 460-84 and accompanying text.
497. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509.
498. See id.
499. See id. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
500. See, e.g., In re Estate of Sandler, 612 N.Y.S.2d 756, 758 (Sur. Ct. 1994)
(holding that DNA testing "of the putative paternal grandparents with that of
the infant may be performed in an effort to provide the 'clear and convincing
evidence' that is required to establish paternity" under New York probate law).
501. See supra note 383.
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assigned to the overall administrative convenience that presumptive
dependency serves in preventing case-by-case determinations.
50 2
Promoting intent-based parenting in inheritance and social secu-
rity benefits determinations actually serves greater governmental in-
terests than would the total abrogation of such entitlements for post-
humously conceived children. Most governmental concerns related
to reducing dubious and spurious claims would be eliminated in sur-
vivor's benefit claims if the dependency requirement could be satis-
fied by a worker's predeath, formally written document acknowl-
edging the intent to support potential posthumously born or
conceived children.50 3 The written document, possibly a "Procrea-
tion Will," could serve as proof of paternity as well as dependency
under the Act.504 There would also be little concern in safeguarding
the deceased's reputation due to the existence of a written acknowl-
edgment similar to the letter written by the decedent in Hecht.
50 5
Where no procreation will exists, a rebuttable presumption of
paternity and dependency of resulting children should arise where
the concepti providers were married at the death of one of the pro-
genitors. This presumption furthers the state's interests in promoting
concepts of a nuclear family, ensuring that whole-blood siblings
share equal legal status. Extending the dependency presumption to
nonmarital children places this subclass in constitutional parity with
intervivos and after-born marital children whose paternity and de-
pendency is also presumed without actual proof.
50 6
502. See A BRIEF HISTORY, supra note 261, at 17-18. "The SMP [Systems
Modernization Plan] was a major success and it positioned SSA to adapt to the
changes of the 1980s and to take advantage of new and emerging technologies
in the 1990s and beyond." Id. The SMP is reported as changing the time it
took to receive a Social Security card from six weeks to five days, and the time
to post annual wage reports from thirty-nine months to six months. See id. at
18.
503. See infra notes 545-47 and accompanying text for a discussion on in-
tent-based parenthood and posthumously conceived children.
504. See infra notes 545-47 and accompanying text for a discussion on in-
tent-based parenthood and posthumously conceived children.
505. See Hecht v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
275, 277 (1993).
506. On another level, constitutional parity is also implicated in terms of a
possible takings analysis under the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
Permitting decedents to make testamentary provisions for after-conceived chil-
dren fosfers the emerging judicial recognition of one's right to transmit pro-
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3. A constitutional interpretation of traditional concepts and
nontraditional conception
Justice Brennan's dissent in Mathews correctly assessed the in-
terpretive approach taken by the Court in allowing an entire subclass
of illegitimate children to be statutorily excluded from entitlements
presumptively available to other illegitimates as having been rooted
in a history of traditional prejudice against such children.5 0 7 It is
questionable, however, whether the decision is premised upon a ma-
joritarian construct or if it reflects judicial activism tainted by indi-
vidual judicial bias.
508
In one respect, the opinion relies heavily on the representative
democracy inhering in the enactment of state inheritance laws upon
which a presumption of dependency arises for certain classes of ille-
gitimates. While reaching its final analysis in upholding the depend-
ency requirement, the Court concludes that
where state intestacy law provides that a child may take
personal property from a father's estate, it may reasonably
bate, "property-like, potential life" interests after death as recognized by the
Hecht court. The total abrogation of a testamentary right of substantial eco-
nomic value without just compensation by the government may be construed
as an unconstitutional taking under Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), and
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). See Chester, supra note 217; Korn-
stein, supra note 217. The Irving decision greatly threatened the positivist
view that no constitutional safeguards are attached to the right to inherit,
prompting courts to reconsider the rationality of legislation attempting to fore-
stall the aggregate sum of the right to transmit and receive property by inheri-
tance. See Irving, 481 U.S. at 715-17. Perhaps the few states which have
statutorily addressed the legal status of posthumously conceived children were
cognizant of the constitutional impediment implicated in completely destroy-
ing both intestate and testate rights of unconceived children. The statutes all
preserve the after-conceived child's right to inherit property through their pre-
deceased parent's testate estate.
507. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 516-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent
concluded "that the classification which [was] sustained ... in the name of
'administrative convenience'[was] more probably the product of a tradition of
thinking of illegitimates as less deserving persons than legitimates." Id. at 523
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
508. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31-38 (2d ed.
1991) (providing an insightful overview of the interpretive mechanisms used in
constitutional judicial review on the Supreme Court level and a discussion on
the inherent tension between jurisprudential decision-making and the demo-
cratic process).
350
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be thought that the child will more likely be dependent
during the parent's life and at his death. For in its embodi-
ment of the popular view within the jurisdiction of how a
parent would have his property devolve among his children
in the event of death, without specific directions, such leg-
islation also reflects to some degree the popular conception
within the jurisdiction of the felt parental obligation to such
an "illegitimate" child in other circumstances, and thus
something of the likelihood of actual parental support dur-
ing, as well as after, life.509
The Court's unfounded retreat to historical tradition by enlisting
representational reinforcement relegating its constitutional interpre-
tation to a consideration of society's "popular views" regarding the
legal status and treatment of nonmarital children. Earlier in the
opinion, the Court had rejected the popular view while lamenting
that "the law has long placed the illegitimate child in an inferior po-
sition relative to the legitimate in certain circumstances, particularly
in regard to obligations of support or other aspects of family law."
510
This circular analysis only leads to one conclusion-judicial restraint
resulting in the summary exclusion of an entire subclass of nonmari-
tal children due to the Court's unwillingness to exercise any degree
ofjudicial discretion.
Society's traditional views as represented in past laws through
democratic pedigree have rarely provided a justifiable basis in de-
termining the legal status and rights of persons who, as the Court
identifies, have "characteristic[s] determined by causes not within
the control of the.., individual, and [that] bearI no relation to the
individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society."
51'
Tradition then, as a means of judicial interpretation, will consistently
provide reasonable outcomes for members of the majority polity,
while those who are underrepresented or excluded from the demo-
cratic process have no voice in public policy which might at some
point in time, through the judicial process, determine their substan-
tive individual rights.
512
509. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 514-15.
510. Id. at 505-06.
511. Id. at 505.
512. See generally Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitution-
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For members of the minority polity, including African-
Americans, women, and illegitimates, tradition may have provided
the greatest obstacle to overcome in securing their equal protection
rights.513  African-Americans were traditionally defined as mere
property to be owned, sold, used, or destroyed in whatever way
deemed by their owner.514 The only interim category held by them
which resembled some respect for their humanistic qualities was the
Constitution's recognition of their three-fifth's of a person count for
southern congressional seats.515 Women, on the other hand, were
deemed persons who had no legal status to own property, except
through their husbands.5" 6 As stated earlier, tradition propelled the
alism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990) (supporting a progressive constitutional
view, while evaluating and comparing two constitutional paradigms: conser-
vative constitutionalism and progressive constitutionalism). Professor West
raises the modem constitutional law question of whether
the Constitution [should] be read, and the courts used, as a vehicle to
preserve existing social and private orderings against majoritarian po-
litical change-making it an essentially conservative document, pro-
tecting the status quo against democratic excess-or should it be read
and implemented in such a way as to facilitate continuous, inventive
challenges to the dominant private and social order, making it a guar-
antor of at least progressive inspiration, if not progressive change?
Id. at 645.
513. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506; see also STONE, supra note 508, at 31-
38 (discussing equal protection rights).
514. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Con-
stitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) (proposing a coher-
ent theory of constitutional interpretation, "the constructivist coherence the-
ory," which seeks to explain, compare, and contrast existing constitutional
interpretive theories in a manner that presents factors which should be consid-
ered in constitutional interpretation). The author provides an insightful ac-
count of the inadequacies of traditional constitutional interpretive theories from
the historical, legislative, and jurisprudential treatment of African-Americans.
See id. at 1209-17, 1262-85.
515. See id. at 1283 n.400 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3).
516. See JUDITH G. GREENBERG ET AL., WOMEN AND THE LAW 369 (2d ed.
1998). Greenberg states that in the past, the roles of wife and husband
assigned to the husband the control over property, power to enter into
contracts, and duty to assure economic support for the wife and chil-
dren at least as to items necessary for subsistence. In his Commen-
taries on the Laws of England, William Blackstone explained the
doctrine of martial [sic] unity upon marriage, the husband and wife
became one person in the law; the legal existence of the woman was
suspended during the marriage. The husband served as the family's
representative to the state through property, contract, and suffrage
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treatment of nonmarital children as though they were "nulliusfilius,"
the children of no one.517 As such, they were traditionally denied all
legal status necessary to inherit by, through or from a biological par-
ent or to receive support or to benefit from any other parental pre-
rogative.
518
The Court's adherence to tradition was pivotal in a dual father-
hood case determining the visitation rights of an unmarried father to
his biological child conceived in an adulterous affair with a married
woman. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,519 Justice Scalia's opinion up-
held the states' interests in safeguarding an extant unitary family
over invalidating a state law preventing the putative father from
proving legal paternity with his biological child.520 Under this stat-
ute, the mother's husband was conclusively presumed to be the legal
father of the child because she was conceived during the marriage.
Only the child's mother or marital father were permitted to rebut the
presumption within two years of the child's birth.521 In this case, the
rights. The common law tradition from England also specified powers
of the husband over the property and services of his wife and children,
along with powers to discipline them. The married woman obtained a
dower interest in her husband's property, but it was a mere expec-
tancy, not a right. The married woman undertook duties to serve her
husband and children in the domestic sphere.
Id. at 369.
517. See supra notes 382-84 and accompanying text.
518. See supra notes 382-84 and accompanying text.
519. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
520. See id. at 128-30. The case reported that the results of a blood test
showed a 98.07 percent probability of the child's paternity to the putative fa-
ther. See id. at 114. The child countersued through her guardian ad litem
claiming her right to associate with both "psychological or defacto father[s]."
Id.
521. The statute provides, in relevant part, that
(b) [I]f the court finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as dis-
closed by the evidence based upon blood tests ... that the husband is
not the father of the child, the question of paternity of the husband
shall be resolved accordingly.
(c) The notice of motion for blood tests under subdivision (b) may be
raised by the husband not later than two years from the child's date of
birth.
(d) The notice of motion... may be raised by the mother of the child
not later than two years from the child's date of birth if the child's
biological father has filed an affidavit with the court acknowledging
paternity of the child.
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mother reunited with her husband, both of whom refused to chal-
lenge the child's paternity. The putative father attacked the constitu-
tionality of the California statute's conclusive presumption of pater-
nity for marital children upon grounds that it denied him the right to
associate with his daughter under procedural and substantive due
process guarantees. 522 The Court refused to declare any such pro-
tectable rights because it deemed essential that the father's "asserted
liberty interest be rooted in history and tradition... as... according
constitutional protection to certain parental rights."
523
The opinion rallied strongly behind judicial restraint in inter-
preting the Due Process Clause's core textual meaning of the term
"liberty" as applied specifically to an unmarried man's right to asso-
ciate with his biological child conceived with another man's wife.
524
This conservative interpretation led to the Court's conclusion that
although strong constitutional precedents exist recognizing funda-
mentally protected rights generally assigned to parenthood, the Court
prefers to "refer to the most specific level at which a relevant tradi-
tion protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be
identified. 525
Act of Oct. 1, 1981, ch. 1180, 1981 Cal. Stat. 4760-61.
522. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 119-21.
523. Id. at 123.
524. See id. at 126-27.
525. Id. at 127-28 & n.6; see also Fallon, supra note 514, at 1209-30 (evalu-
ating the inadequacies of traditional constitutional interpretive theories). Fal-
Ion classifies interpretative theories into two basic groupings: open-system
theories and privileged factor theories. Originalism and interpretivism would
be considered privileged factor theories under this analysis. Interpretivism is
viewed by supporters as preserving the Constitution's original meaning by
drawing analysis from within the framers' intent and the language of the text.
This approach reflects great deference to the democratic and majoritarian
foundation of traditional government. Interpretivism is criticized as an inter-
pretive approach which breeds ambiguity in assuring determinative analysis of
the framers' actual intent and of the true meaning of words written by them as
an expression of their intent. Fallon argues that originalism
encounters a daunting array of historiographical, conceptual, and in-
terpretive problems. If, for example, the framers are taken individu-
ally, a problem exists in defining what, among a person's mental atti-
tudes, ought to count as an intention. Moreover, the originalist
confronts a perplexity that borders on paradox if it turns out that many
of the framers had a certain kind of 'interpretive intent': if they in-
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In this case, unfortunately, a tunneled view of constitutional in-
terpretative methodology meant that the protection of substantive due
process would rarely embrace derivative rights of liberty unpopular
or previously unfamiliar to the majority.52 6 Scalia's opinion may
have reflected the analytical redundancy inhering in the fora of juris-
prudential precedents where overly cautious judicial restraint, based
solely on society's deeply embedded traditions and history, has re-
sulted in decisions that fail to promote even basic liberty interests
which form the core of freedom embodied in the Constitution.
52 7
The downfall of unrestrained judicial activism has counterma-
joritarian implications where judicial review is tainted by a judge's
replacement of the democratic cry with their own personal voice.
5 28
The dissenting opinions in Mathews and Michael H. raised some
speculation of whether tradition and individual bias prevents the
Court from reaching constitutionally-driven outcomes. 52 9 Some re-
sponsible jurisprudential interpretive balance is needed to ensure that
judge-made law has some "cognizable roots in the language or even
the design of the Constitution."530 Under either interpretive approach
taken by the Court in such cases, the unresolved query remains the
same: who will speak for the politically mute?
Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. recognized the Court's
role in creating new constitutional rights through measured judicial
expansion of the Due Process Clause beyond the Constitution's ex-
plicit language and as anticipated by the framers. 531 Perhaps Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion provides a more appropriate vehicle
of constitutional interpretation; she "would not foreclose the
tended that a constitutional provision be adapted judicially to accom-
modate evolving needs rather than applied only to an [sic] historically
defined set of situations.
Fallon, supra note 514, at 1211-12 (footnotes omitted).
526. See generally STONE, supra note 508, at 35-44 (discussing the inherent
tension between judicial review, democracy, and constitutional interpretation).
527. See id.
528. See id. at 33-44.
529. The Mathews dissent concluded "that the classification which [was]
sustained ... in the name of 'administrative convenience'[was] more probably
the product of a tradition of thinking of illegitimates as less deserving persons
than legitimates." Mathews, 427 U.S. at 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
530. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 122 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
531. See id. at 122-23.
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unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of historical
analysis. 532
The Court is likely to retreat to history or tradition as a primary
interpretive module in determining whether Congress should expand
dependency to permit posthumously conceived children the opportu-
nity to qualify for social security survivor's benefits pursuant to their
asserted rights of equal protection under due process. Jurisprudential
history shows that this newly created subclass of nonmarital children
are unlikely to prevail under this interpretive construct. Posthu-
mously conceived children have no long standing history, nor do
they have a place in society's traditions. As in Michael H., should
532. Id. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542-44 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Interpretive approaches providing
constructs for constitutional analysis include: (1) Originalism, which inter-
prets constitutional provisions so as to reflect the framers' and ratifiers' origi-
nal meaning or intent in adopting the Constitution and the Bill of Rights; (2)
Textualism, which means that the Constitution should be narrowly construed so
as to remain within the confines of the plain meaning of its text; (3) Tradition
& Common Law, which recognizes that society's traditions and history, as rep-
resented in part by local laws enacted through the democratic process, should
play a role in determining the boundaries of judicial review in consideration of
jurisprudential precedence; (4) Prevailing Morality & Social Conscience,
which recognizes that judges should consider society's overall moralistic and
ethical values in determining whether outcomes are inherently good, bad, or
offensive to the public psyche and may include a consideration of central, pre-
vailing religious paradigms; (5) Principles of Equity, Justice, and Fairness,
which suggests that courts should participate in assuring that principles of eq-
uity, fairness, and justice form the core basis of judicial review. Under the
leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Warren Court years are known as
best refining these principles in its decision-making role. See STONE, supra
note 508, at 35-44.
Cf Fallon, supra note 514, at 1227-30 (rejecting a pure balancing theory
and incorporating all interpretive theories on a weighted basis depending upon
their reliability and relevance in a particular constitutional argument, as an ef-
fective means of constitutional analysis, stating that "[i]t fails to explain pre-
cisely how conclusions within the various categories ought to be reached once
their lack of independence is recognized"). Fallon proposes an alternate con-
stitutional interpretive theory, the "Constructivist Coherence Theory," as a
more complete adaptation to a balancing approach. This theory incorporates
the five predominant interpretive arguments: text, historical intent, theory,
precedent, and value into a conceptual balancing methodology geared to
achieve a coherent result among the different types of theories. See id. at
1237-51 (providing a detailed description and explanation of the constructivist
coherence theory, thesis, and methodology).
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the Court apply a very narrow inquiry in assessing whether society
has traditionally embraced the rights of social entitlements of non-
marital children who are conceived after the death of a parent, the re-
sounding response will be no. Should the Court, however, consider
whether some level of constitutional protection has, in recent history,
been extended to the entire class of nonmarital children, perhaps tra-
dition can be redefined to overshadow society's failure in past his-
tory to treat all children equally regardless of their parents' marital
status. Under this construct, the matter of equal entitlements for these
children is "stare decisis" under well-settled constitutional prece-
dence.
533
Beyond a historical mode of constitutional interpretation, the
Court is most justified in exercising its judicial discretion where un-
anticipated rights arise from inevitable changes in normative social
constructs due to modem technology and progressively evolving
cultures.534 Perhaps the Court should interpret and apply the Con-
stitution so that its provisions defy tradition, when necessary, where
the letter and spirit of its embodiment are threatened by improper
government executive or legislative action. If the Constitution is to
remain a forceful, living source of individual freedom, the Supreme
Court must continue to apply it so that it reflects a changing world.535
A new class of persons now exists which the framers never an-
ticipated. They are, nevertheless, members of the general group of
persons whom the framers sought to protect from unwarranted gov-
ernmental action. Judicial activism motivated by this equitable prin-
ciple most certainly has its place in resuscitating the plain meaning
of constitutional text which promotes the life, liberty, and property of
all persons.
536
533. See, e.g., Wolfe v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1025, 1027 (10th Cir. 1993) (re-
quiring that illegitimate children prove dependency while dependency is pre-
sumed for legitimate children).
534. See generally STONE, supra note 508, at 35-44 (exploring the tension
among judicial review, democracy, and interpretation).
535. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 140-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
536. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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V. THE LEGISLATIVE IMPERATIVE: AMENDMENT TO THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT-A VIEW TOWARDS DEPENDENCY AND POSTHUMOUS
CONCEPTION
A. A Social Security Approach: Dependency and Its Progeny
The initial question is whether the legislative purpose in enact-
ing social security survivor's provisions intended to support children
who are conceived and born after the death of the deceased wage
earner. Of Congress' objectives in its enactment of the Act, the
keeping of families together and giving children the opportunity to
grow up in health and security provides the most persuasive ammu-
nition against the complete abrogation of survivor's benefits for
posthumously conceived children.537 Social security survivor's pro-
visions were drafted to supplement the support of orphaned children
who, because of the death of their qualifying wage earning parent,
would undoubtedly suffer severe financial misfortune throughout
their childhood and possibly beyond their adulthood.5 38  Thus,
Congress sought to remedy the social ills and devastating economic
plight most likely confronting a worker's orphaned children, so as to
preserve their opportunity to one day become working productive
members of society despite their parents' own reproductive choices
and untimely deaths.
The Court has translated this legislative objective into a prereq-
uisite of statutory dependency under the Act. Dependence means
"relying on or requiring the aid of another for support."139 There is
more than one variant of dependency, however, that meets the legis-
lative purpose of providing orphaned children with a secure and
healthy childhood. The Act provides two approaches in this regard.
The Act presumes dependency based upon many circumstances
which equate to an objective "probable dependency," and bases "ac-
tual dependency" on criteria of the worker's conduct under the last
resort test.
540
537. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
legislative history of the Act.
538. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
539. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 501 (3d ed. 1992).
540. See supra notes 321-53 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
dependency requirement under social security.
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Proving an applicant's reliance on a deceased worker is pivotal
in establishing actual dependency under the Act. This presupposes
that the applicant had the physical capability of doing so prior to the
worker's death. Where this is impractical, an applicant's last resort
is to prove that the worker was either living with or supporting them
at his death.1
41
Lower federal district courts established yet a third course to de-
pendency by adopting a commensurate support test which enabled
after-born applicants to establish their prebirth reliance on their de-
ceased parent's support.5 42 For these children, this prebirth reliance
is based solely on the deceased parent's conduct toward the mother
and the fictitious needs of the unborn child at the worker's death.543
Thus, the determinative evidence establishing dependency is the
worker's pre-death conduct regarding the care and safeguarding of
an unborn child. It is this conduct, accompanied by the worker's
pre-death acknowledgment of his or her impending parentage which
is interpreted as supporting an unborn child. This interpretive analy-
sis amounts to nothing more than the intent-based parental analysis
found in contemporary jurisprudence and legislation determining the
rights and status of children of assisted reproduction.
544
1. Intent-based parenthood and posthumous conception
Academicians have generally supported some aspects of the
growing concept of intent-based parenting in determining parental
prerogatives and establishing legal familial relationships.5 45 Profes-
sor Shapo recognizes that
541. See supra notes 321-53 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
dependency requirement under social security.
542. See supra notes 354-69 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
"Commensurate Support Test."
543. See supra notes 354-69 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
"Commensurate Support Test."
544. See infra notes 545-47 and accompanying text for a discussion on in-
tent-based parenthood and posthumous reproduction.
545. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 1182-94 (discussing two major theories
postulated by legal scholars on intent-based parenting as being rights-based (or
constitutionally supported) or as based upon enforcing the contractual relations
entered into between progenitors. A detailed analysis on the impact of intent-
based parenting as it relates to inheritance, artificial insemination, in vitro fer-
tilization and surrogate contracts is also provided). The author lends overall
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intent-based theories of parenthood do not necessarily aim
to reshape the American family. Indeed, intent-based par-
enthood tends to support the traditional family since the
principal users of noncoital reproduction are married cou-
ples who want to raise a child genetically related to at least
one of them. Moreover, commentators argue that intent-
based parenthood serves the resulting child's best interests
by placing the child with adults who clearly want to raise
him or her. 46
My support of intent-based parenting in alternate reproductive
cases extends beyond the proposition that it fosters a child's psy-
chological and relational development. An intent-based analysis can
also be utilized as a means of settling the financial interests of re-
sulting children in terms of inheritance 547 and employment-related
survivor's benefits such as social security.
Although Professor Shapo and other scholars have addressed the
inheritance rights of children conceived through assisted reproduc-
tion under an intent-based parenthood analysis, I propose to show
that this analytical methodology also supports the posthumously con-
ceived child's right to survivor's benefits under current jurispruden-
tial interpretation of the Act's survivor's provisions. As discussed
previously in this Article, the commensurate support test as it
support towards intent-based parenting, but raises significant issues regarding
the practical implications of establishing probative evidence substantiating
progenitors' preconception intent in all cases. Professor Shapo concludes that
in many instances involving reproductive technology, decisions based upon
intent-based parenting will often necessitate litigation unless some formalized
reproductive registry system is established. The ultimate question which must
be considered in any intent-based parental analysis is the impact such determi-
nations will have on the resulting child. It may not be in a child's best interest
to have parental determinations held up by litigation if such activities will im-
pact the child's early social adjustment and bonding needs. The child's well-
being must also be considered in alternate reproductive scenarios where an in-
tent-based resolution produces nontraditional family structures involving dual,
multiple or same-sex parents. See id. at 1194-1207.
546. Id. at 1182 (footnotes omitted).
547. See id. at 1188-94 (arguing that intent-based parenthood decisions
would simplify the determination of whether a child is entitled to inherit from
the intended social parent, but recognizing that further complications would
arise under existing alternate reproductive laws where the nonexistence of evi-
dence substantiating the requisite intent requires heightened levels of govern-
ment intervention or regulation).
360
SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS
currently exists provides little if any recourse to posthumously con-
ceived children. This test does, however, provide the requisite elas-
ticity in expanding statutory dependency so that class members of
after-conceived children may qualify for survivor's benefits under
the Act.
An intent-based parental analysis provides at least minimal
statutory protection for this class of children because determinative
evidence would consist of the deceased parent's pre-death conduct
and posthumous procreative intent. However, before an intent-based
analysis can be applied, we must engage in a public policy analysis
addressing the possible moral and ethical outcomes in response to the
expansion of dependency in a manner that extends social security
survivor's benefits to a worker's after-conceived children.
2. Moral and ethical implications in expanding dependency
The expansion of social security survivor's benefits to after-
conceived children raises certain moral considerations in determining
the efficacy of the inclusive approach I will ultimately promote in
this Article. Initial concerns of distributive justice and equality arise
in determining whether this newly created class of nonmarital chil-
dren should benefit from social programs in a manner comparable to
other children. On the other hand, a purely communitarian response
would employ the consideration of whether the greatest overall good
to society as a whole is promoted by expanding the dependency
standard. 548 The analytical methodology which perhaps preserves
the virtues of both approaches is presented by John Rawls' book, A
Theory OfJustice, 5 49as he explores the political and moral implica-
tions of theories of justice.
Rawls introduces his reader to a philosophical interpretation
based upon the original position using hypothetical contracting par-
ties who possess certain motivational characteristics: they are gener-
ally uninformed about moral and political external choices (the veil
548. See TOM L. BEACHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 77 (4th ed. 1994) (defining communitarianism as "theo-
ries [that] view everything fundamental in ethics as deriving from communal
values, the common good, social goals, traditional practices, and the coopera-
tive virtues").
549. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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of ignorance); they are objective, rational beings (mutually disinter-
ested and untainted by envy), and they are "continuing persons
(family heads, or genetic lines)."55 For the limited purposes of this
paper, I will borrow from Rawls' basic interpretive concept of the
original position in evaluating predictable responses from affected,
as well as unaffected, ideal citizens as they consider whether survi-
vor's benefits should be extended to a worker's after-conceived chil-
dren.
a. the unaffected ideal citizen
The unaffected ideal citizen is a person who has no precon-
ceived frame of reference concerning posthumous conception or so-
cial security survivor's benefits. This person could also be an
individual who is not necessarily paying into the social security sys-
tem, having no measurable connection to the system beyond that of a
general taxpayer. When confronted with the choice of whether post-
humously conceived children should be entitled to benefits, the truly
unaffected ideal citizen's most likely response would be one of
passive indifference. This result is premised on the assumption that
awarding such benefits to other persons would provide the citizen
with little or no tangible social advantage. Further thought, however,
requires a consideration of whether expanding survivor's benefits re-
duces the unaffected ideal citizen's ability to obtain social goods oth-
erwise available.
Thus, this indifferent response might change if the favorable re-
spondent views the current denial of benefits as a future obstacle
which might impede their own ability in the future to provide for any
after-conceived children should they ever become affected partici-
pants. As such, the preservation of a general social right of no cur-
rent consequence may invoke favorable responses from unaffected
ideal citizens seeking to secure their own greatest share of future so-
cial commodities or rights. Moral principles of beneficence 551 and
550. See id. at 128-29, 136-38, 142-47.
551. See BEACHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 548, at 259 ("[mlorality re-
quires not only that we treat persons autonomously and refrain from harming
them, but also that we contribute to their welfare. Such beneficial actions fall
under the heading of beneficence .... [P]rinciples of beneficence potentially
demand more than the principle of nonmaleficence because agents must take
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maleficence5 52 might also motivate this citizen to support the equal
treatment of such children, or at least dissuade the citizen from
speaking out against permitting such benefits. An even more favor-
able response is likely if the veil of ignorance is pierced by intro-
ducing religious constructs promoting human life and rights for all
persons conceived or in the process of being conceived. 3
An opposing respondent could argue that the provision of bene-
fits to persons who are conceived after death threatens the overall fi-
nancial well-being of society by allocating limited resources to
persons who would not normally be born by traditional coital rela-
tions. This concern raises the ancillary issue of whether posthumous
conception is a form of procreative liberty which should be encour-
aged by securing survivor's benefits for resulting children. Addi-
tionally, one could find it unreasonable to provide such an economic
incentive to persons seeking to procreate posthumously. Finally, one
could argue that providing benefits to posthumous children nega-
tively impacts natural population controls created by once infertile
couples.
b. the affected ideal citizen
There are two distinct classes of affected ideal citizens: those
who pay into the social security system, but who have no interest in
posthumous conception; and those who may or may not pay into the
system, but who are participants in the process of posthumous repro-
duction as either the posthumous progenitor, the surviving custodial
parent, or the after-conceived child. Again, these ideal citizens are
positive steps to help others, not merely refrain from harmful acts").
552. See id. at 189 (defining "[t]he principle of nonmaleficence [as] an obli-
gation not to inflict harm intentionally. It has been closely associated in medi-
cal ethics with the maxim Primum non nocere: 'Above all [or first] do no
harm"').
553. See, e.g., ROBERT D. ORR, M.D. ET AL., LIFE AND DEATH DECISIONS:
HELP IN MAKING TOUGH CHOICES ABOUT BIOETHICAL ISSUES 70-71 (1990)
(stating that "[s]cripture speaks of man being made in the image of God (Gene-
sis 1:26-27, 5:1; 1 Corinthians 11:7). This Judeo-Christian tradition of the
imago dei is the basis for personhood, dignity, and basic human rights. This
biblical concept of the person affirms that each infant born possesses an intrin-
sic dignity which entitles him to receive whatever... care is thought to be in
his or her best interests").
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normalized, for interpretive purposes, by viewing their response from
the "original position 5 54 of persons so situated.
i. payor of social security benefits
The response of this affected ideal citizen in the original position
would, on one level, be based on the assumption that the broader
provisions of rights to others ensures the greatest social good, even
though this person has no intent to procreate posthumously. The
reciprocity of good will supports this response as the favorable re-
spondent seeks to treat others the way he or she would have others
treat them. 5  The favorable respondent would be more reluctant to
restrict the expression of libertarian rights by others where there is no
threat to their own obtainment of desired social goods. This approach
supports expanded coverage for all persons so long as coverage is
provided in an equitable and fair manner.
An opposing affected ideal citizen, tainted somewhat by height-
ened concerns of financial self-interest, would oppose the provision
of expanded benefits to after-conceived children on the basis that
third parties should not have to pay for another person's exercise of
nontraditional procreative activity. This position supports the re-
sponsibility theory of parental choice which imputes individual fi-
nancial accountability to one's parenting decisions. This respondent
does not necessarily view posthumous conception as a social ill, but
instead fears bearing the partial financial responsibility for another
person's procreative choices.
556
554. This is not strictly speaking Rawls' "original position" since these per-
sons have some knowledge of their position in society and of their desired
ends. See RAWLS, supra note 549, at 118-50. As affected citizens, their re-
sponse to the query of whether survivor's benefits should be provided to all
posthumously conceived children will inherently reflect some degree of indi-
vidual bias and preference. The opposing respondent would thus place little
substantive value on a favorable response from affected ideal citizens because
of their tainted motives of self-interest. See id.
555. Jesus states the Golden Rule as follows: "Therefore all things whatso-
ever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the
law and the prophets." Matthew 7:12 (King James).
556. Using the analogy of private insurance law, this concern is based upon
the assumption that the opposing respondent's premiums (or taxes) would in-
crease if benefits are made available to posthumously conceived children.
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An opposing respondent might further argue on moral or relig-
ious grounds that a quasi-governmental social insurance program
should not support the nontraditional procreative choices of a few
with public funds provided by private individuals who have no bio-
logical or legal connection to the resulting offspring. The moral-
political position supporting current restrictions against using gov-
ernment funds for abortions is supportive of this position.
557
ii. posthumous progenitor
The affected ideal citizen in the original position 'desiring to pro-
create posthumously would quite easily rationalize the efficacy of
providing survivor's benefits to their resulting children. Their re-
sponse would in most cases be tainted by self-interest in assuring for
themselves and their offspring the greatest degree of social rights and
privileges. On a more objective level, this respondent might justify
the provisions of benefits based upon their having made contribu-
tions into the social security system for this very purpose. Principles
of equity and fairness would support their argument that all of their
children, regardless of the timing of their births, should be able to
benefit from a parent's lifetime contributions into a social insurance
program.
In theory, there may be some hypothetical ideal citizens who
would not want benefits expanded to include the children they intend
to conceive after death. One rational basis for this conclusion would
exist if the respondent's veil of ignorance is breached by informing
him about the system's family maximum limits which restrict the
overall amount of survivor's benefits payable on a deceased worker's
earnings record.558 Armed with this information, the ideal citizen de-
siring to procreate posthumously might choose to provide greater fi-
nancial security to children conceived prior to the citizen's death.
557. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300a-6 (1994) (prohibiting federal funds from
being used to support family planning "programs where abortion is a method
of family planning").
558. See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text for discussion of the
concept of the maximum family benefit under social security law.
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iii. surviving custodial parent
In practice, the rational response by a surviving custodial parent
would be motivated by self-interest concerns of maintaining a certain
living standard for their surviving family. In this regard, the ideal
citizen again would seek to obtain the greatest degree of social ad-
vantages by choosing to expand benefits to their custodial children.
On a more objective level, this citizen would also consider it proper
and just to provide coverage to the children of deceased biological
parents who paid lifetime contributions into the system.
In theory, there may be some surviving custodial parents who
would choose not to expand survivor's coverage to children they are
raising. Depending on external information beyond the context of
the original position of such parents, there may be certain self-
interest economic benefits which would motivate such an unlikely
choice. A possible situation might arise where the surviving parent
is dependent on other quasi-public funding or benefits which restrict
or cap recipient earning levels, such as in certain auxiliary social se-
curity benefits.5 59 One additional possibility which could motivate
an unfavorable response is where the parent's acceptance of
additional income from the child's survivor's benefits would result in
unfavorable income tax consequences.
5 60
iv. after-conceived child
In the abstract, the ideal citizen as an after-conceived child
would almost always prefer to be born and economically supported
by whatever means available. Again, motives of self-interest call
forth the response that would ensure the availability of the greatest
degree of social resources in a fair and equitable manner. The
559. See, e.g., MYERS, supra note 261, at 60 (stating that "[u]nder certain
circumstances, the [monthly social security survivor's] benefit otherwise pay-
able to a widowed spouse is reduced if such spouse also has a pension based on
employment under a retirement system for federal, state, or local government
employees which is not coordinated with or supplementary to OASDI").
560. See id. at 146-52, 498-500 (discussing the social and political implica-
tions of the taxation of OASDI benefits in 1983). The likelihood of this option
occurring is weakened, however, due to the fact that child survivor's benefits
are not considered a part of the custodial parent's income for taxation purposes.
Child survivor's benefits belong to the beneficiary for income tax purposes.
See id. at 150.
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after-conceived child is unlikely to inherently view him or herself as
a lesser person having a nonlegal existence which does not deserve
to be supported by biological parents. Such a child is also unlikely to
place considerable moral value or weight on the practice of assigning
financial advantages to children based upon the timing of their birth.
Once born, the rational ideal citizen would seek to secure all rights
and benefits necessary to further their individual advancement in so-
ciety.
In theory, it is also possible that there may be some hypothetical
after-conceived child who would not choose to expand survivor's
benefits. This position would almost always be supplanted with the
child's attending desire not to be born if their parents fail to provide
the financial and relational support the child needs to achieve their
own social goals. One might venture further to say that unfavorable
social conditions, if known in advance by the unconceived child,
might cause the child to decide against being born into an overly
populated world. In this case, the question of expanding survivor's
benefits becomes a nonissue. Finally, one might find unconvincing
any analytical process which assigns rights to a nonexisting, hypo-
thetical child.
c. balancing the rationality of response
Three basic arguments, which I classify as either conservative,
moderate, or progressive, support the response provided by the fore-
going affected and unaffected ideal citizens in the original position.
i. the progressive response
Affected participants of posthumous procreation who seek to de-
rive the greatest benefit available from the relevant worker's earning
record present the progressive response. This approach would liber-
alize the expansion of benefits in every case to all children who are
conceived posthumously. Some aspects of this view are also re-
flected in the favorable response from the unaffected ideal citizen
who would not ordinarily be opposed to postmortem conception and
the payment of survivor's benefits to after-conceived children. The
progressive view substantiates the provision of benefits by assigning
equal value and status to all existing and potential human life. This
response has strong kinship to the tenets of prolife supporters. This
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approach ignores the counter arguments of moderate and conserva-
tive respondents that some measurable limitations should be placed
upon the practice of posthumous conception to ensure the greatest
individual and communal equity.
ii. the conservative response
On the other end of the spectrum exists the conservative re-
sponse which only supports posthumous reproduction as a procrea-
tive choice where the progenitors have sole economic responsibility
for resulting offspring. This approach is supported by affected pay-
ers into the social security system who do not ever intend to procre-
ate posthumously. The ideal citizen providing this response argues
that posthumous conception is a nontraditional private practice which
does not deserve the public or private funding by unaffected third
parties.
Parental responsibility is portrayed as a means of discouraging
assisted reproduction by persons who have not made alternative fi-
nancial arrangements to support such offspring. Likewise, this posi-
tion would consider it bad public policy to utilize social security in-
surance as a source of postmortem child support. The conservative
approach only awards survivor's benefits to children who are
conceived through traditional means of reproduction where concep-
tion occurs prior to the progenitor's death.
iii. the moderate response
The moderate view represents a middle ground between the
other two approaches. It requires some level of preconception activ-
ity by the progenitor so as to insure that the parent intended to pro-
vide postmortem support to after-conceived children. This approach
only permits posthumously conceived children to receive survivor's
benefits where their predeceased parent indicated some intent to pro-
vide for the child. The harshness of a strict parental responsibility
theory is therefore ameliorated by allowing parents to utilize social
security benefits as an additional means of fulfilling their moral if
not legal obligation to support offspring. Under this approach, pro-
genitors and their families would avoid the punitive nature of the
conservative view which is premised upon a progenitor's use of al-
temate reproductive technology during conception.
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The moderate response is supported by segments of analysis
presented by the unaffected and affected ideal citizen. Most respon-
dents view the provision of survivor's insurance to after-conceived
children as the preferable course of action so long as certain vari-
ables are in place. One concern expressed by the unaffected citizen
was that survivor's benefits be made available to all similarly situ-
ated persons in a fair and equitable manner. This approach protects
any future rights to benefits unaffected citizens might desire in the
future. Likewise, the moderate approach imposes certain limitations
and requirements in the provision of survivor's benefits to ensure the
financial viability of the social security system and the overall finan-
cial well-being of society. This middle-course rejects the progressive
view that survivor's benefits should be provided to all children who
are conceived posthumously. Progressive respondents thus criticize
the moderate view as being too exclusionary. The conservative re-
spondent criticizes the moderate approach as being too inclusive.
There are three support tests which come within the moderate
approach which help determine whether a predeceased parent in-
tended to provide support for an after-conceived child for purposes
of securing social security survivor's benefits: commensurate sup-
port;56' constructive support;562 and prospective support.
56 3
d. the better view towards dependency
In balancing these considerations, it is my contention that the
moderate approach is the preferential response in determining
whether benefits should be provided to after-conceived children. The
conservative stance fails to properly balance the individual autonomy
of participants with asserted political and moral arguments which
suggests some limitations should be placed upon the provisions of
benefits to such children. Likewise, the progressive position fails to
consider the practical and political realities of posthumous concep-
tion which warrant some level of restrictions being attached to such
benefits. The moderate approach more closely represents the legis-
lative intent of the survivorship provisions and leading jurispruden-
tial precedents which seek to provide survivor's benefits in a liberal
561. See infra Part V.B.1.
562. See infra Part V.B.2.
563. See infra Part V.B.3.
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manner to those children to whom their parents intended to provide
support.
After-conceived children are ideally the type of intended benefi-
ciaries Congress envisioned would need and rely heavily upon the
after death support of a deceased wage earning parent. These chil-
dren are prone to suffer the greatest financial loss than would any
other group of orphaned children. Their sole means of receiving
support directly from a deceased parent's estate may be through em-
ployment-related survivor's benefits such as social security. Current
state inheritance laws either implicitly forestall such children from
taking anything under their biological parent(s)' testate or intestate
estates, or expressly limit them to inheritance from their parent(s)'
testate estate.
64
B. A Social Security Approach: Constructive Support
1. Commensurate support and posthumous conception
The interpretive analysis utilized in the commensurate support
test would need to be adjusted to reflect the biophysical impediments
inherent in posthumous conception.565 In this regard, however, the
path to statutory dependency should not create a substantially greater
burden upon after-conceived children in establishing their predeath
reliance upon a deceased parent, than the paths of marital, nonmari-
tal, or after-born children under principles of equal protection and
distributive justice.
566
There are several reasonable paradigms of the commensurate
support test which I have developed to meet these objectives. The
commensurate support test allows children to prove that their de-
ceased biological parent's support was commensurate with the needs
of the unborn child given the father's financial status and the stage of
564. See supra notes 203-21 and accompanying text for a discussion on state
inheritance laws.
565. The commensurate support test is inapplicable to posthumously con-
ceived children because the child's mother is not pregnant at the time of the
worker's death.
566. See generally Wolfe v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1025, 1026 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding the same test should be used for posthumous children as is used for all
children).
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the mother's pregnancy.5 67 I propose a deviation from this test which
is designed to allow posthumously conceived children the opportu-
nity to meet the support requirement by a predeceased biological
parent first, under a "Constructive Support" test, and secondarily un-
der a"Prospective Support" test.
2. Constructive support and posthumous conception
Under a constructive support test, which I am proposing as a
new approach, applicants would be able to show that their deceased,
biological parent supported the child's intended custodial parent
during a preexisting, substantial relationship between the progenitors
prior to the wage earner's death. The type of support given by the
worker should relate specifically to the intended custodial parent's
impending care of an unconceived child. Thus, the worker's
procreative support of the intended custodial parent would be con-
strued as the worker's constructive support of the unconceived child.
A constructive application is required under this test because of
the unsubstantial needs of unconceived children. It is impractical to
require the actual support of an unconceived child who, at the time of
the worker's death, could not possibly have material needs during the
preconception stage which would satisfy the Act's support require-
ment that contributions be "made regularly and [are] large enough to
meet [an] important part of [the child's] ordinary living costs.
568
Thus, by operation of law, certain pre-death conduct towards the in-
tended custodial parent would translate into the support of an im-
pending child.569
Probative weight could be assigned to evidence tending to show
that the deceased worker made regular payments toward the intended
custodial parent's ordinary living expenses in preparation for the im-
pending pregnancy. This might include the worker's maintenance of
567. See id. at 1028.
568. Id. at 1026. See also 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (1991) (describing the sup-
port requirements under the Act).
569. Some aspects of the doctrines of equitable legitimation and virtual
adoption may support this constructive analysis by utilizing equitable princi-
ples which consider that which should have been done based upon the conduct
of the relevant parties. See Prince v. Black, 344 S.E.2d 411, 412-13 (Ga.
1986); Davis v. Jones, 626 S.W.2d 303, 308-09 (Tex. 1982).
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appropriate shelter, food, and furniture for the purpose of preparing
the surviving parent for childbearing and rearing.
The constructive support test might be most difficult to prove
under circumstances where it is hard to ascertain the worker's true
intent in providing for the ordinary living expenses of the intended
custodial parent. There must exist additional evidence linking the
worker's support to an intent to procreate at some future date. This
type of evidence may be more properly characterized as the worker's
prospective support of an unconceived child. I would therefore pro-
pose the adoption of an alternate route to statutory dependency which
would focus, instead, on affirmative pre-death actions taken by the
worker to care for their concepti and future offspring under a pro-
spective support test.
3. Prospective support and posthumous conception
The birth of "prospective support" was recognized in its earliest
form as a proper means of determining statutory dependency by the
lower district court in Mathews, when it stated that
survivorship benefits under the Act... [were] not intended
merely to replace actual support that a child lost through the
death of the insured parent.... Rather,... the statute...
[was] designed to replace obligations of support or potential
support lost through death, where the obligation was per-
ceived by Congress, on the basis of the responsibility of the
relation between the child's parents, to be a valid one.
570
This judicial interpretation more properly reflects the remedial
nature and humanitarian purpose resonate in the Act's foundational
congressional purpose than does the Court's rejection of this ap-
proach in favor of the current strict view of an actual dependency re-
quirement.
I am proposing the adoption of a prospective support test as a
means of equipping this potential support standard with the teeth
needed to overcome the Court's view on statutory dependence. It is
more than just basing an applicant's future right to potential support
on their deceased biological parents' legal or moral obligation to
570. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1976) (citations omitted)
(second emphasis added).
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support them. My proposed prospective support test equates to a
showing that the deceased worker acknowledged an intent and made
a firm commitment to provide future support to potential biological
offspring prior to death. This would enable survivor's benefits to
supplement the formalized anticipated support a child would con-
tinue needing in spite of the timing of a parent's demise. The com-
mensurate support test is, in its simplest terms, more properly char-
acterized as a showing of the worker's prospective support of an
unborn biological child. The actual support of a worker's child does
not really begin until after the child is born because the Act refers to
the support requirement as being met when a worker contributes to a
child's ordinary "living" expenses on a regular and substantial ba-
sis.571 The Act implies, therefore, that only children who are living
at the worker's death are capable of being supported. It then follows
that qualifying after-born applicants under the current commensurate
test are actually awarded survivor's benefits based upon their par-
ent's prospective support.
My proposal seeks to have evidence of this same prospective
support also qualify as statutory dependency on behalf of applicants
who were unconceived at their biological parent's death. This ap-
proach recognizes a worker's prospective support of concepti having
the potential of becoming human life.
The interim category assigning the status of frozen concepti re-
quires a minimal level of respect and treatment of concepti prior to
its entry into the gestation process.572 This level of special respect
might be initially reflected in the care and maintenance of frozen
concepti in appropriate storage facilities at a cyrobank.573 Proper
maintenance and care would also be represented where concepti pro-
viders exercise their decisional control over the concepti by execut-
ing a storage agreement which set forth their intended purpose in
571. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3) (1991).
572. This proposal, based upon the special respect which should be afforded
frozen human gametes recognizes the potential of gametes becoming human
life. See, e.g., Hecht v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d
275 (1993); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
573. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 840, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276; Davis, 842
S.W.2d at 592.
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depositing the concepti and their desired future use of the concepti as
well as their designation of any intended concepti recipients. 74
More determinative evidence would be necessary, however, to
show that the worker intended to extend this preconception support
to and beyond the point of the conceptus' actualization in becoming
a living being capable of support under a strict interpretation of
statutory dependency. Prospective support provided during the im-
pending child's gestation and life could be represented by clear and
convincing proof formally expressed by the deceased worker prior to
death.
The worker's pre-death conduct could consist of evidence
showing that the worker paid for the future, long term cryobank stor-
age of the concepti and for the assisted reproductive procedures to be
performed on the intended gestational parents. Other evidence of
probative value would be the worker's prearranged preparations for
the requisite prenatal and medical care of the gestational parent dur-
ing any post-death pregnancies. This might also include the worker's
prearranged payment and securement of the impending child's nec-
essary lifetime medical and health insurance as well as educational
costs, perhaps by some type of testamentary trust instrument.
Beyond such instances of the worker's predeath conduct, there
should be further dispositive evidence of his expressly-stated intent
to support biological children later born from deposited concepti.
This expressed intent could be shown informally by representations
made in formal documents such as beneficiary designations in life
insurance policies and employment beneficiary contracts, designa-
tions in testamentary devices, or any other written or verbal
574. This approach is consistent with views of legal commentators address-
ing the status of frozen gametes and the implications of parenthood by intent in
posthumous conception. See, e.g., Shapo, supra note 1, at 1182-93 (presenting
the various arguments and views of legal scholars regarding parenthood by in-
tent). Many of the examples of evidentiary standards of proof in establishing
parenthood by intent for social security benefits which I suggest in these sup-
port tests are consistent with evidentiary standards suggested by the wealth of
legal commentaries addressing the status of frozen embryos, posthumous con-
ception, and human gametes for purposes of inheritance rights and paternity. I
adopt some of these same evidentiary standards for the novel purpose of de-
termining a child applicant's dependency on a predeceased parent for social
security survivor's benefits. See generally Garside, supra note 1 (discussing
the rights of posthumously conceived children).
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statements made to reliable sources such as medical insurance and
health care providers, close associates or family members.
A worker's formalized public acknowledgment would, of
course, provide the greatest reliable source of evidence in establish-
ing postmortem procreative intent. The decedent in Hecht attempted
to provide such documentation when writing a letter directly to un-
conceived children, by acknowledging his intent to parent them and
his regrets for not surviving to do so. 57  Such letters of acknowl-
edgment written to future children and possibly even reservations of
specific personal property of sentimental value could be formalized
into a document such as the previously mentioned procreative will.
The adoption of a standard of prospective support furthers the
intent-based analysis which recognizes individual procreative rights
existing in assisted reproductive technology law. Parental rights are
determined by the intentional conduct of participants. Assisted re-
production has impacted reproductive traditions of society by alter-
ing the expectation that concepti donors will or should always be-
come the intended gestational or custodial parents of resulting
children. Laws are changing to reflect this social progression by as-
signing parental status to the husband of a woman impregnated with
donor sperm by artificial insemination where he consents to the pro-
cedure. 576 Even though there may not be a biological connection
between the intended custodial parent and child, paternity is based
upon the potential parent's preconception conduct showing a com-
mitment to becoming a parent. The prospective support approach
also places determinative weight upon the progenitor's express
commitment to procreate and parent in determining the legal status
of children to be born some time in the future, even if after the in-
tended parent's death.
C. Social-Political Considerations of Prospective Support
1. Financial responsibility and posthumous conception
Perhaps the inevitable question in determining the legal entitle-
ments of posthumously conceived children is the determination of
575. See Hecht, 16 Cal. App. 4th at 841, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277.
576. See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. § 73 (McKinney 1988).
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who should bear the cost of supporting them. Professor Shapo and
other scholars present this query in terms of whether procreative ex-
pressions through alternate reproductive technology should be con-
ditioned upon a person's ability or willingness to financially support
and care for resulting offspring.577 One commentator proposes the
imposition of mandatory financially responsibility through inheri-
tance upon progenitors seeking to procreate posthumously.5 7 8 This
proposal thus requires such progenitors to formalize their procreation
and child support intent as a precondition to posthumous reproduc-
tion.
579
I find that the question of parenting responsibility is also impli-
cated in determining whether social security survivor's benefits
should be made available to posthumously conceived children. In
this regard the query becomes whether the social welfare, or revised
Workfare system, should fully embrace total responsibility for these
children, or should some means of cost-sharing be employed to shift
at least partial responsibility upon the child's predeceased parents?
This, of course, requires a reconsideration of the limits placed upon a
deceased parent's legal obligation to support offspring beyond his or
her death. It would seem that the existence of the type of informal
conduct discussed under prospective support and formal procreative
intent as possibly expressed in a procreative will, could be construed
as an enforceable pre-death agreement to support one's after-
conceived children. In any case, the recognition of deceased
workers' prospective support of future offspring certainly fosters the
parents' moral obligation to support their biological children.
One public policy argument which supports the prospective sup-
port test is the prevention of state wards and orphans. Permitting an
additional class of nonmarital children the opportunity to qualify for
survivor's benefits furthers this interest. The increased financial
577. See Shapo, supra note 1, at 1207-20 (discussing the concept of fostering
responsibility in alternate reproductive cases upon intended social parents by
comparing the works of scholars preferring the communitarian goals of im-
puting individual responsibility over personal autonomous pursuits of protect-
ing individual rights of procreation).
578. See Burkdall, supra note 25, at 898-99.
579. See id. at 898.
580. See supra notes 229-37 and accompanying text for a discussion on post-
death support obligations.
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burden placed upon the social security system would at least be
borne in part by contributions and employment taxes paid into the
fund by the child's parent prior to his or her death. Most would con-
sider the better approach in supporting orphaned children is with so-
cial security survivor's benefits than with funds from the general
public treasury which have no direct nexus to the work history and
activities of the child's biological parents.581 The prospective sup-
port test helps to reserve limited welfare funds for those children
whose parents have truly never recognized their legal or moral obli-
gation to support the child, or who have never acknowledged any pa-
rental responsibility or biological connection with the child.
2. Statute of limitations and posthumous conception
There are some political realities which must be reflected in in-
creasing the class of qualified applicants under a bankrupt social in-
surance system. To help foster the ongoing long-term viability of the
social security program as it stands, or as it is subject to change,
there should be placed a time limitation upon which potential appli-
cants must be conceived, born and therefore qualify to apply for such
benefits after the worker's death. The absence of such a time frame
stretches the constructive and prospective dependency standards to
rather tenuous abstractions. There must be placed a limit upon one's
expectation of postmortem parenting and any attending rights of re-
sulting children.
Such statutory limitations should however, meet existing con-
stitutional parameters applied to existing statutes of limitations re-
lated to proving a nonmarital child's paternity and resulting legal
rights and entitlements.5 82 A beginning point would be to require the
581. From a comparative standpoint, it is interesting to note one court's in-
terpretation of the proper financial chain of responsibility in such quasi-public
insurance programs. For instance, Workmen's Compensation Survivor's bene-
fits are based upon "statutory scheme[s] . . . designed to provide economic
support efficiently to the employee injured on the job or to his or her depend-
ents when the employee has died, and to place the cost of such support upon
the employer, and ultimately, the consumer, rather than upon the general pub-
lic." Bums v. Robert Miller Constr., 55 N.Y.S.2d 501, 508 (1982) (citation
omitted).
582. See generally Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (holding that a statute
of limitations should be long enough to present a reasonable opportunity for a
person to assert a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child and must also be sub-
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child's conception or birth within a period no later than the final
closing of the deceased worker's estate. On the outset, a two-year
statute of limitations accruing from the worker's date of death would
seem to provide a substantial portion of the protected class the op-
portunity to become potential life deserving the opportunity to be re-
spected and supported as the worker's potential children.
5 8 3
VI. CONCLUSION
The greatest obstacle in overcoming the provision of survivor's
benefits to after-conceived children is the reconciliation of whether
Congress intended to exclude this newly created class of orphaned
children from benefiting from the employment and earnings of their
predeceased parents. The legislative intent has shown that survivor's
benefits should replace the loss of support an orphaned child would
have received but for the untimely death of a parent with a qualifying
work history. The Act's application to all such children needs fur-
ther clarification in order to properly carry out this congressional in-
tent.
There are also very prominent political hindrances in expanding
the Act's coverage in a time when the nation's social security system
faces the imminent prospect of becoming bankrupt. The political
climate of social legislation provides, however, no justifiable reason
upon which Congress should refuse to fairly provide current cover-
age across the board to all equally qualifying applicants. The over-
haul of a bankrupt system does not command the forestalling of the
rights of one class of persons over another. Instead, any structural
modifications in benefits under the existing system should be equita-
bly borne by all persons similarly situated.
It has further become evident that the Social Security Admini-
stration can no longer rely upon state paternity and inheritance laws
stantially related to the state's interest in avoiding stale or fraudulent claims).
583. Most commentators supporting the practice of posthumous conception
propose a similar time frame, or minimally concede that the assignment of fi-
nancial benefits based upon a resulting child's biological connection with a
predeceased parent should not exist in perpetuity. See supra note 1. See also
Thies, supra note 26, at 923, 960 (proposing that an additional justification for
imposing a statute of limitations is to reconcile issues dealing with the applica-
tion of the Rule Against Perpetuities to conveyances intended to benefit post-
humously conceived children).
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in determining entitlement to survivor's benefits under the Act. The
fragmented state legislation, or lack thereof, and inadequacy of state
action in areas dealing with assisted reproductive technology sum-
mons congressional action to the forefront in order to provide greater
uniformity in awarding survivor's benefits.
The congressional purpose of this social legislation mandates
that minimal accommodations be expressly provided for the new
class of nonmarital children-the posthumously conceived. The
adoption of a constructive support standard would be a move in the
right direction in at least considering how one might address this
problem. The more reasonable approach would be to call an "egg"
an "egg" by adopting the commensurate support test as it works un-
der a prospective support analysis. Intent-based parenting is un-
doubtedly becoming a primary consideration in determining the
status and rights of children and progenitors participating in assisted
reproduction. The application of the prospective support test as pro-
posed here incorporates this important concept while also recogniz-
ing the moral significance of recognizing concepti as having the po-
tential of becoming human life or children who also deserve the
opportunity to grow up in health and security.
EPILOGUE: HART AND AN EXTENDED VIEW OF DEPENDENCY
The outcome in Hart would remain unchanged, but on different
grounds, if the constructive or prospective support tests had been
made available to Judith Hart upon her application for survivor's
benefits. Upon her proof of paternity, she would have been required
to prove that her predeceased biological father made every effort to
support her preconception existence in expectation of becoming her
father some time in the future. Thus, her mother's proffered testi-
mony and documentary evidence establishing her husband's intent to
procreate by depositing his sperm prior to death would in most in-
stances meet the required evidentiary burden of prospective support.
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